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There is no one great 'Indian Land Problem". Rather, there 
are a variety of problems which centre about the owning and working 
of agricultural land in India. This study is concerned with a 
portion of one of them: the social aspects of the agrarian problem. 
That is to say, the interest here is in the relations between men 
which grew around the ownership of landed property. No attention 
is therefore given directly to the agricultural problem or the 
economic, legal, administrative or political aspects of the 
agrarian problem. They are not completely ignored, of course - 
that would be impossible - but matters such as productivity, land 
use, rural debt, inheritance laws and fragmentation; consolidation 
and the political use of the 'land question' are discussed only 
when they actually intrude into the social sphere.. 
The study is also limited to that part of the north Indian 
plain which has been successively known since the eighteenth 
century as Avadh, the North-Western Provinces and Oudh, the United 
Provinces of Agra and Oudh, and Uttar Pradesh. And even within 
that area it is limited to the reasonably homogeneous expanse of 
the Gangetic alluvial plain and leaves aside the politically akin 
but geographically dissimilar districts of the Himalayan foothills. 
With regatd to names, particularly Avadh for Oudh, Kanpur 
for Oawnpore and Banaras for Benares, I have conformed to modern 
Indian practice, except where the anglicised version appears in a 
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1. 
CHAPTER I. 
THE EIGHTEENTH CENTURY: THE BACKGROUND YEARS. 
(i) 
No one ruled northern India at the beginning of the 
eighteenth century. Instead, the land. was. racked by the conflict 
of warring factions and kingdoms. The Mughal empire shrank at 
the death of Aurangzebe to a hollow kingdom about Delhi. The 
great Subas (provinces) of the empire, Avadh (anglicised as Oudh), 
Bengal and Hyderabad, asserted their independence. Delhi itself 
was encircled by the hostile power of resurgent non-Muslim nations: 
the Sikhs in the north-west, the Rajputs in the west and the 
Marathas in the south. Even Agra, with its memories of Akbar and 
its ethereal Taj Mahal, the tomb of Shah Jahan's empress, fell to 
the plundering Jets. 
Such a war of succession was traditional. From the south-east, 
however, a new factor emerged as the merchant-adventurers of the 
English East India Company pushed northwards along the Ganges 
valley from their capital at Calcutta. By mid-century they had 
consolidated their borders with Avadh and the Marathas: and were an 
all-important factor in the political future of the countr7. 1 
So the great plain became a battlefield. Armies watered 
by its great eastern rivers: Jumna, Ganges, Gumti, Gogra, Chadbal 
and Son. Soldiers, horses and elephants passed in procession 
through its villages. Lawlessness reigned. "No man who had the 
energy to rob his neighbour cared to turn to industrial occupations 
"2 
as a means of livelihood;" -agriculture offered no attractions 
comparable with a career of active spoliation."
3 
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In this atmosphere the traditional agrarian system fell 
into decay. The traditional basis of that system, "the king's 
share" of the produce of the fields, claimed in return for the 
sovereign's protection, 4  remained but the central power in its 
weakness was seperated from its collection. When Indian empires, 
whether Hindu or Muslim, were strong, the 'land revenues' were 
5 
collected by paid State officials. In times of weakness, however, 
they gave way to collecting agencies.6 Thus in the eighteenth 
century, the revenues of a specific area were "assigned" in lieu 
of wages or as a reward, distant or troublesome local chiefs were 
a ccepted as revenue agents (or, perhaps more precisely, their 
power was recognised for what it was), and revenue "farmers" 
ccmtracted for the collections in difficult areas with the aim 
of securing as much as possible beyond the State's demand for 
themselves.
7 
Even State officials consolidated themselves in 
positions as leviers rather than collectors of revenue.
8 
It 
amounted to this, that the revenue of any area was collected from 





The kingdom of Avadh occupied the central portion of the 
rich alluvial plain which xxx lies between the foothills of the 
Himalayas and the Ganges river system. The foothills were its 
border in the north with the mountain kingdoms of Nepal and 
Garhwal while the line of the Jumna and the Ganges marked it off 
from the NUghals in the west and. the Marathas in the south. Thls 
border with the English in Bihar was not as clearly marked although 
4. 
it was nearly the line of the Gandak. 
In the eighteenth century Avadh became the epitome of that 
decay of Indian institutions, that "rottenness at the corei l) 
which caused their downfall. The kingdom had asserted its 
independence from the Nughal Empire during the reign of the Nawab 
Saadat Ali Khan (1722-1739)1/ Yet the stream of fair and efficient 
rule flowed for only two generations - through the reigns of Saadat 
Ali Khan's successors, Safdar Jang and Shuja-ud-dauLah, -before 
it petered out in the sands of the extravagant, dilatory, wastreCL, 
Asaf-ud-daulah. 
In the twenty-two years of Asaf-ud-daulah's rule, the resources 
of the kingdom were totally dissipated. The Nawab himself was 
incapable of ruling. The Company's Resident at Lucknow, Bristow, 
reported on 1776, 
"His Excellency is juvenile in his amusements, volatile, 
injudicious in the choice of his confidants and so familiar 
in his conversation as to throw aside the sovereign and. admit 
his favourites to a freedom destructive to all subordination 
and a cause for the inattention paid by them to his commands. 
He frequently passes whole days in dissipation and is of late 
much given to liquor, for I have known him to make himself 
and his favourites and even his menial servants indecently 
drunk. By this mode of passing his time he can have little 
leisure for business and indeed he hardly attends to any 
excepting when I wait upon him on the Company's affairs and. 
then I am generally referred to his minister, to whom and. 
other favourites he confides the entire charge of this 
government."12 
5. 
From the beginning of his "reign" he was prepared to be such 
a puppet. As soon as he succeeded his father, Shuja-ud-daulah, in 
1775, he passed the administration to his diwan, Murtaza Khan, and. 
settled a jagir worth a lakh of rupees annually and a higher army 
rank than had hitherto been created, upon him.
15 
Yet his withdrawal from government did not improve him. He 
remained a complete profligate. Sir John Shore recorded in 1795: 
"Every evening Asaf-ud-daulah stupifies himself with opium 
... His confidants are the meanest and lowest: he dreads 
the society of men of worth ... • Beggars; buffoons, dancers 
and all that class, with fools, knaves and sycophants, compose 
the court of this illustrious ruler of millions."
14 
His extravagance was prodigious. Hundreds of thousands of 
rupees were spent on festivals, both Hindu and Mus1im1 5 He kept 
"t elve hundred elephants, two or three thousand horses and a 
thousand dogs" of which "400 elephants, 500 horses and a hundred 
dogs (were) fit for riding or the chase". 16 There were,in addition, 
"pigeon houses, cockpits, sheepfolds, deerparks, and monkey, snake, 
scorpion and spider houses" on the same scale. 17 
The results were plain. "Disaffection and anarchy"18 prevailed 
throughout the kingdom. Only the presence of two brigades of 
Company troops prevented an insurrection. 19  One-third of the 
income of the kingdom, however, had to be "assigned for the purpose 
of securing the internal peace of the country and for the collection 
of the revenues." 20 Yet, even so in 1782 for example, one crore 
of rupees was spent to enable the Company's forces, "intended solely 
for the defence of the country" to subdue "refractory zamindars" 
(landholders). 21 
The collapse of the revenue system was, indeed, the hallmark 
of the degeneracy of the newbi rule. The zamindars acquired 
"almost hereditary rights over their lands" and certainly paid 
no heed to commands from Lucknow.
22 As was typical of Indian 
governments which had lost their power, the revenues were 
separated from the official administration. Early in Asaf-ud-
daulah's nawabi the greater part of the revenues were assigned 
for specific payments to "officials, servants and. creditors of the 
State ;... troops stationed in Oudh, merchants, contractors for 
military stores and all persons having transactions with the 
government were paid in this way. .25 Later, contractors took 
almost complete control of the districts and extracted the 
government's demand ands,as much as they could for themselves. 
Their rapacity was enormous - and unchecked. They amassed great 
fortunes by their oppressions and 'business acumen'. 
"Like bloated spiders having thrown out their webs and 
entangled their prey, victim after victim, estate after 
estate (was) added to the contractor's possessions so that 
when turned out of office he (retired) as an enormous landed 
proprietor." 24 
Their control in the district went unchallenged. 
"They were, by a strange injustice, themselves the assessors 
and, in many cases, the only accessible court of appeal, and. 




Often, too, they subdivided their "farm" with other contractors, 
thus making oppression more minute. 26 
7. 
With the exception of the reigns of Sa'adat Ali (1798-1814) 
and Muhammed Ali (1857-1842), Avadh affairs deteriorated even 
further during the nineteenth century. In an attempt to 
counteract the excesses of revenue farming, Baillie, the Company's 
Resident, instituted the Amani System during the reign of 
Ghazi-ud-din (1814-1827). This new system was simply contracting 
without any sum being specified in the contract. In practice this 
meant that the contractor was able to enrich himself "at the 
expense of both the *web and the landholders
,27
. After two 
years it was discontinued; to be tried again under Nasir-ud-din 
(1827-1857) and Muhammed Ali (1857-1842) with similar dismal 
28 results. "The fact was that without any honest mils and vigilant 
supervision no Nawdb could command success."
29 
This disorganisation not only meant the ruin of the State: 
cultivator in the village suffered horribly from the merciless 
treatment of the extortionate contractors. They issued only 
annual leases and charged rents which were out of all proportion 
to the cultivators ability to pay.
50 They were, however, collected 
with unmitigated harshness. The revenue fell due in nine 
instalments between 11 SepteMber and 12 June. 
"In the case of default eight or ten sepoys (soldiers) were 
quartered upon the proprietor and he had to provide for their 
subsistence. If the proprietor still refused payment his 
property was attached and sold. He and his children were 
imprisoned and tortured. by whipping with a knotted leather 
thong until blood was drawn." 51 
Nor, with the exceptions mentioned above, did the personal 
8. 
qualities of the rulers imprave. Ghazi-ud-din, who changed his 
title to King, 32 was "half-witted" 33 and the history of his 
successors was one of "reckless extravagance, taladministration 
and sensuous luxury" 4 Amjad Ali Shah (1842-47) "equalled, 
perhaps even surpassed, his predecessors" in 'weakness and 
profligacy" 	The last of the line, Wajid Ali Shah (1847-56) 
completed the tale of "demoralisation and ruin" 6 
To the traders and administrators of the Company this position 
was intolerable. Thw whole of their interest was threatened by 
such appalling weakness on their borders. Various efforts were 
made to bolster the Nawabs, to induce them to reform, but each 
attempt failed. Five years after enacting a commercial treaty ,  
the Governor-General, Lord Cornwallis, complained. in despair that 
"the evils which had prevailed at the beginning ... had 
increased ... (the government's) finances had fallen into 
a worse state by an enormous accumulation of debt ... (and) 
not only the subjects and merchants (of Oudh) ... but those 
residing under the Company's protection stffered many 
exactions contrary to the commercial treaty from the customs 
house officers and from zamindars, amils (revenue officials), 
etc." 37 
In such a position, absorption proved to be the only solution. 
So, over a period of eighty years from 1775 the Company swallowed 
the kingdom, piece by piece. That, however, is the story told in 
the next chapter. 
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TEE NINETEENTH CENTURY: THE FOUNDATION YEARS. 
As the "land systems of British India" were established over a 
lengthy period, they varied considerably: the methods of the mid-
nineteenth century differed, often greatly, from those to which the 
eighteenth century administrators resorted. The mere lapse of tine 
was not the only factor, however : political circumstance was at 
times even more influential. Together, however, time and circumstance 
moulded the tenures of land and shaped their administration in the 
India which was brought, piecemeal, under British domination. 
These factors operated in the United Provinces, as elsewhere. 
There the settlement of the land revenue, i.e. the determination of 
the amount payable (the assessment) and the formulation of a contract 
between some person (the settlement-holder) and the government for 
the payment of that assessment, varied in the three component 
territories, viz., Benares, the rest of the North-Western Provinces, 
and Avadh. In Benares there was a permanent settlement (i.e. the 
assessment was never revised) with the zamindars as the main 
settlement-holders. On the other hand, the settlements in the other 
two areas were temporary, i.e. the assessment was revised at regular 
intervals, but with zamindars in the North-Western Provinces and 
taluoidars in Avadh. (Me differences between the zamindars and the 
talucidars wore, firstly, of privileges and, secondly, of estate, as 
will be seen later.) 
Time played its part: Benares was settled in 1795, the North- 
15. 
Western Provinces in the years from 1801-1844, and Avadh after 1858. 
So, however, did circumstance: the proximity of Benares to Bengal 
under Lard Cornwallis, the Governor-General responsible for the 
permanent settlement of Bengal in 1793; the administration of the 
North-Western Provinces by men anxious to understand Indian usages; 
and the shock of the mutiny of 1857 in Avadh: these were all 
important determinants of policy. 
There was one common feature: all the settlements were with 
landlords. The nineteenth century consolidated the landlords; the 
twentieth century progressively reduced them. To assess the measures 
of the twentieth century it will be as well, first, to trace the 
developments of the nineteenth century. 
(i ) 
The growth of the United Provinces was at the same time the 
reduction of the kingdom of Avadh. Starting from Benares in 1775, 
the English stretched out two pincer-like arms by their gains of 
1801 and 1805 which embraced, and finally crushed, the ailing kingdom. 
The advance was inevitable for as the Nawabi rule fell into decay, 
the state which had once been reckoned as a buffer against Mughal, 
Rohilla and Maratha, became a threat to peace and order which the 
Company could not tolerate on its borders. Absorption, addition or 
annexation, by agreement or by force of arms, became necessary so 
that the essential conditions of trade and industry might be 
maintained. 
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relatively minor, additions. The Nawab ceded the first,Benares,to 
the Company in May 1775 by the Treaty of Faizabad.
1 
The Company, 
however, retained the Raja, Chait Singh, as zamindar until 1781 2 and 
it was not until 1787 that Jonathan Duncan came, as Resident, to 
take full control of the administration.
3 
Duncan strengthened his 
control in 1794 when after protracted negotiation, Raja Mahip Narain 
relinquished his rights to all except his family estates.
4 
From this extension into the Nawabls territories the Company 
moved in 1801 north into Gorakhpur and west through the lands of the 
lower Doab into Rohilhand. By the Treaty of Luoknow 5 the Nawab 
ceded the sixteen "Ceded Districtsn 6 and was thereby encircled by 
the territories and the power of the British. With his northern 
border contiguous with the kingdom of Nepal, the Nawab was otherwise 
isolated from those Indian royal houses which remained independent. 
In 1805 the British strengthened their western 'arm', this time 
at the expense of the Maratha ruler, Sindhia. By the Treaty of Surji 
Arjangaon which followed Lord Lake's victories of 1803, the Upper 
Doab and the Delhi territories became part of Bengal's 'Upper 
Provinces'. 7 These Upper Provinces and Benares were grouped as the 
North-Western Provinces and until 1833, when a Lieutenant-Governor was 
appointed, they 	administered from Calcutta.
8 
There were only minor additions from 1805 until the annexation 
of Oudh in 1856. Nepal lost the hill districts of Garhwal after the 
Gurkha War of 1815. 9 The Bundelkhand districts came separately: 
10 	11 	12 
Banda and Hamirpur by 1817, Jalaun in 1840 and Jhansi in 1853. 
16. 	1 :-;. 
The provincial outline had by then been filled out; Agra province 
was complete and it only needed Avadh to make the union. 
The final reduction of Avadh oame with its annexation in 1356: 
13 
then the pincers closed. 	The Directors had held back in 1837
14 
but as disorder increased strong measures became more attractive. 
The unrest was in large part the work of the "nobles", the Taluqdars 
who, unchecked by the government of the King (the newly-styled Nawab), 
15 
subjected the people to "every kind of oppression, tyranny and exaction". 
16 
Following the report of Colonel Sleeman "the only remaining remedy 
was deemed to be annexation, with a liberal provision for the reigning 
house".
17 
On 13 February 1856, therefore, Nawabi rule came to an end 
and Avadh became a British province administered by a Chief Commissioner. 
The territorial acquisition was complete. 
(ii) 
The arrival in 1786 of Lord Cornwallis as Governor-General 
decided the future of the revenue administration of the Benares 
territories. Jonathan Duncan, a supporter of Cornwallis in the Bengal 
18 
Council, came as Resident in 1787 with instructions to make a 
settlement of the zamindari under his personal supervision.
19 
Accordingly he made settlements with the smile (revenue collectors) 
in '1788, some for one year but the majority for five years.
20 
On 
17 June of the following year Cornwallis instructed him to implement 
the decennial settlement
21 
which was to lead to a permanent settlement. 
These moves were part of a larger pattern, being similar in 
design and purpose to the permanent settlement of Bengal, Bihar and 
17. 
Orissa which Cornwallis was then preparing.
22 
No more thorough 
investigation of the basis of the settlement was carried out in 
Benares than was attempted in Bengal: Duncan pleaded that because 
23 
of lack of time he was unable to undertake any more minute investigation 
than the compilation of the jamas (assessments) of the previous ten 
years from the records of the kanungos (accountant for group of 
21 
villages), corrected by reference to the &mils and settlement holders. 
25 
It was also decidedly a zamindari settlement, although the dis-
possession of many of the zamindars by Raja Bulwant Singh in the 
period before the Company's acquisition of Benares
26 
and the refusal 
of Raja Mahip Narain to countenance any liberalisation of the period 
of limitation
27 
meant that a sizeable area was settled either with 
farmers or remained kachha (that is the settlement was held directly 
by the raiyats.) 28 Under the terms of the permanent settlement those 
zamindars who had lost possession after 1775 were able, through the 
diwani adalat (court), to regain their estates by compensating the 
farmer to wham it had been let29 but this compromise did not alter 
, substantially the mixed character of the settlement. This feature 
did in fact distinguish Benares from Bengal where the settlement had 
been invariably made with "some one landlord or zamindar and never 
with village communities".
30 
Later, cadastral surveys and records of 
rights still further distinguished the Benares settlement. 31 The 
settlement which was made permanent by Regulation I of 1795 on 
27 March 1795, 32 was, however, by its decision to leave landlord-
tenant relationships to mutual adjustment, very clearly a product of 
Bengal. 
18. 
Beyond attempting to encourage the landlords to give pattas to 
their tenants 33 Duncan did little to regulate this aspect of the 
settlement. No record of rights was made at the time and the 
settlement officers who worked in the Benares districts in the early 
eighteen-forties detailed in the Settlement Reports their attempts 
to make a voluntary record in the permanently-settled estates.
34 
It 
was considered sufficient in 1795 for the regulations to make it 
necessary for the zamindars to act with "good faith and moderation" 
towards the tenants - "pattidars, under-renters and raiyats."35 At 
the same time the Government reserved the right "to protect all 
classes of people, and more particularly those who from situation 
are most helpless", 36 a reservation which became necessary "to save 
cultivators from unlawful confinement, torture, corporal punishment 
and the disagreeable methods a harsh landlord did not hesitate to 
employ towards recalcitrant tenants or those whom unfortunate circum-
stances prevented from prompt payment of rent or manorial dues."37 
The settlements made the revenue assessment permanent but left 
the rents to bargaining between landlords and tenants •
38 
This, as 
usual, favoured the zamindars who enhanced the rents so vigorously 
that by the mid-nineteenth century there remained no relation between 
rent and revenue. The Raja of Agoree Burhur, whose estates Duncan 
found unhealthy, sterile and cultivated by slaves,
39 
had a rent roll 
double the land revenue by 1850.
40 
The settlement officer of Benares 
in 1887 mentioned an estate which had a rental of Rs. 46,285 as against 
a revenue demand of Rs. 3041
41 
The Benares zamindar became in little 
more than two generations, the most oppressive form of landlord - 
the rent farmer. 
19. 
A more adequate regulation of tenure relationships had to wait 
until the Tenancy Act of 1859. Until then the tenants were at the 
mercy of the zamindars and the permanency of the Benares settlement 
kept it as an exception in the revenue structure of the North-Western 
Provinces. 
Only the stubborness of the Company's Directors kept Benares as 
an exception, however, for the settlements outlined by Wellesley's 
government for the Ceded, and then the Conquered, Districts, aimed at 
a permanent settlement. The settlement was to be with the zamindars
42 
43 
and kachha settlements with the raiyats were discouraged. 	The 
settlement was to be for three years in the first place,
44 
 after which 
another three year settlement at an increased jama and then a fourt 
year settlement at a further increased jama was to be made.
45 
At the 
end of this ten year period the government agreed to a permanent 
settlement being concluded for "such lands as shall be in a state of 
cultivation sufficiently advanced to warrant the measure on such terms 
as Government shall deem fair andequitable, a due regard being had to 
the actual state of the country, and its means and capability of 
further improvement."46 
These instructions became part of Regulation X of 1807 which 
added the proviso that a permanent settlement would be only with the 
sanction of the Directors. The same regulation set up a Board of 
Commissioners to make the four year settlement:
17 This Board 
enquired immediately from the Collectors about the advisability of a 
48 
permanent settlement. 	As a result, they reported on 13 April 1808 
that "with every previous disposition in favour of the principle of 
a Permanent Settlement, We submit ... our deliberate and unqualified 
49 
opinion that the measure ... is at this moment unseasonable". 	In 
support of this view they pointed to the large amount of uncultivated 
land, the sparse population and the lack of knowledge which the 
Company had of the nature of the revenue system,
50 
a lack whioh was 
not remedied by the summary methods of determining the assessment to 
which the administrators resorted.
51 
The Company's Indian government continued to press for a perm-
anent settlement.
52 
The plan was in fact shelved only after Holt 
Mackenzie, Secretary of the Board of Commissioners,outlined in his 
Minute of 1819 a detailed system of assessment based on investigation 
into the capacity of the land and the rights of the holders of land. 53 
Mackenzie's recommendations were later embodied in Regulation VII of 
182254 under which settlements were carried out until 1833. 
Regulation VII represented an important advance. It gave the 
settlement officers the dual task of "equalising the public burthens, 
and of ascertaining, settling and recording the rights, interests, 
privileges and properties of all persons and classes awning, occupying, 
managing or cultivating the land". 55 It attempted to overcome the 
earlier problems of over-assessment and the neglect and dispersal of 
rights in land. However, "too much detail was required on all points".
56 
Progress was so slaw that by 1832 some districts estimated it would 
57 stilliake 60 years to complete 	survey". te the 
21.: 
Regulation IX of 1833 amended the assessment regulations so that 
the work of settlement could proceed more rapidly.
58 
These new rules 
59 
governed settlements carried out between 1833 and 1842 under the 
direction of Robert Mertins Bird, who, in his Report (21 January 1842), 
claimed he had aimed at "the assessment of a fair and moderate revenue 
(and) the ascertainment of private rights (in land holdings)".
60 
These principles were, of course, very similar to those of Regulation 
VII of 1822; the difference lay in the details of the settlement 
procedure. Regulation IX was important. Its more badly-based 
'aggregate to detail' settlements allowed the North-Western Provinces 
to be .completely and accurately settled. Moreover, the protection of 
tenant rights beganwith the recognition of occupancy rights based 
on the "rule of thumb".' of twelve years' continuous occupation.
61 
The zamindari character of the settlements remained, however. 
Tenant right did not imply a raiyatwari settlement: even where the 
village communities were recognised,a Ilambardarl (representative) 
had to be elected or selected from amongst the co-sharers.
62 
There WAS 
a great variety of settlement holders:- 
"Many large zamindars retained great estates. In some parts 
of the country the settlement was made with cultivating village 
communities; but.,. in the greater part of the North-Western 
Provinces the settlement was most frequently made with small 
landholders and village proprietors. In many villages where 
neither great aamindars nor old proprietary families established 
claims, it being necessary to find some proprietors, a good 
headman or solvent farmer, or some other person of some sort, 
was established as proprietor."63 
22. 
As well, revenue officials fully explored the differences in the 
constitutions of the "co-parcenary village communities" .64 
Tenant rights were not so minutely recorded as proprietary 
tenures, yet it was important that a general privilege of occupancy, 
conditional only on the payment of the rent stipulated, was recognised 
for resident raiyats. The Settlement Officers, moreover, appear to 
have been anxious to protect these rights.
65 
In all this the settle-
ment of the North-Western Provinces represented a great advance over 
many earlier notions of revenue administration. Saved from the system 
of Bengal and . Benares by the not altogether altruistic insistence of 
the Directors, it avoided many earlier errors and gave a greater 
opportunity for the preservation of indigenous land-holdings. 
(iv) 
As the North-Western Provinces became a reaction against the 
permanent settlement after appearing certain to become a part of that 
system,sc - Atadh finally moved sway from the "North-Western Provinces" 
policy which was first adopted there after annexation. 
As soon as the Company had replaced the King, Dalhousie ordered 
a settlement which was to be concluded with "the actual occupants of 
the soil, that is with village zamindars or with the proprietary 
co -parcenaries •.. (and not) middlemen as Talukdars, farmers of the 
revenue and such like".
66 
These were ideas taken from the North-
Western Provinces and the summary settlement in 1856, in many individual 
cases, resulted in the bypassing of the talucidars who had grownup 
under the Nawabi rule and superimposed themselves on the Oudh revenue 
system.
67 
Yet, overall, the Talugdars retained a considerable 
25. 
majority of the villages included in taluqas at theend of the Newabi, 
13,640 villages from a total of 23,543,being settled with them." 
This settlement, however, lasted only fifteen months before the 
uprising of 1857 brought it to a halt •69  After the 'Mutiny' it was 
not possible for the work of the settlement to be looked at in the 
same light. Political considerations entered and the answer to the 
question, With whom should the settlement be made? was found with 
reference not to landed rights but rather to political power and 
social influence. 
On 15 March 1858, the Viceroy, Lord Canning, confiscated the 
proprietary rights in all but six (the 'loyal') taluqdaris. 7° He 
aimed at a situation in which he would be able to 'buy' the support 
of the Taluqdars by offering them a complete restoration in exchange 
for their "full and complete allegiance".
71 So, on 25 October 1859 
the Taluqdars received sanads which fully reinstated them in their 
former position72 provided they managed their estates iroperly and 
showed "constant good faith, loyalty, zeal and attachment in every 
way in which they can be manifested, to the British government". 73 
In a matter of divide and rule politics the taluqdars were favoured 
for they had "both power and influence 	The village proprietors 
(had) neither".
74 
 It was part of the policy of creating a "breakwater" 
75 
between the Indian people and the British government, a part of 
the plan "to hold the Eastern Empire with the least strain on the 
population and finances of Great Britain".
76 
The second summary 
settlement therefore almost completely restored the taluqdars in those 




The reinstatement of the taluqdars did not, however, preclude a 
violent controversy in the province over subordinate rights in land. 
Charles Wingfield, who became Chief Commissioner in May 1859, attempted 
to carry Canning's confiscation to its extreme and he declared that 
every right in land had been taken over and then re-vested, by the sanad, 
in the taluqdar.
78 
He therefore, omitted from the sanad the reservation 
79 
of the government's right to enact tenancy legislation and attempted 
to prevent the recording of any subordinate rights during the settlement. 80 
The controversy lasted until Wingfied resigned in 1864 and produced a 
clash between the Chief Commissioner and both his Indian and British 
superiors. The Viceroys, (Lord Elgin and Sir John Lawrence), and the 
Secretary of State all attempted to break the impasse but it was not until 
Lawrence by-passed Wingfield by appointing a Financial Commissioner to 
handle land and revenue matters that the deadlock was broken.
81 
The issues involved were the recognition of underproprietary and 
occupancy rights. The taluqdars, sensing their strong position and 
supported by Wingfield, refused to countenance any encroachment on their 
awn rights. They held that the raiyats were allowed to hold land only on 
sufferance: "They have been allowed to retain hold of our land for 
generations, not because they had any right to what they held, but because 
we were kind enough not to deprive them of their houses and comforts 
every now and then". 82 Strachey, the new Chief Commissioner, settled 
83 
the dispute in September 1866. 	Be compromised with the taluqdars and 
in return for the government's limited recognition of underproprietary 
rights
84 
secured a right of occupancy for exproprietrs. 85 This was, 
however, a meagre victory: the occupancy area amounted to only one per 
- 
25* 
cent. of the whole province
86 
and tenants-at-will held more than seventy-
eight per cent. of the total area. 87 On the other hand, the talucidars 
made enormous gains - socially and financially. Irwin remarked that they 
were probably "the most fortunate body of men in India".
88 
Yet, there 
were reports in the 'sixties even that they had more land than they could 
manage89 and even before the Talucidar Relief Act of 1870 Campbell expressed 
doubts about their ability to remain solvent.
90 
The Avadh Compromise, with its dominance of the talucidari interests, 
received legislative force from enactments of 1866 and 1868. It formed 
an unpromising base for tenure relations. In turning away from the 
liberal policies of the North-Western Provinces, Oudh had built its 
"breakwater" - from millstonesi 
(v ) 
The three settlements were alike, then, in this fundamental respect: 
that all were made with a 'landlord'. The legislators and administrators 
concentrated on this aspect of the tenure system, finding, culling and - 
in varying degrees - justifying proprietors, persons with whom the 
government could lodge the responsibility for the revenue. They wanted an 
assured revenue, not a perfect agrarian system.
92 
This is hardly to be 
wondered at: the Englishmen who organised the settlements were the 
servants of a dividend-paying Company in the early nineteenth century. 
If reform was only an incidental part of their programme or the preserve 
of the few, this was in keeping with the tendencies tat home'. In some 
respects, indeed, the administrators in India were innovators showing 
93 
0 	the way to the 'Mother Country'. 
26. 
However, as well as passive neglect, the settlements had led 
in many cases to the actual loss of rights by the cultivators.
94 
The customary right of occupancy which was generally recognised in 
pre-British times,
95 
was inaderluately recognised, let alone secured, 
by mid-century. Moreover, the landlords had been quick to assimilate 
the new notions of their status and powers. 96 Many revelled in 
their new-found strength, even if they gained, thereby, little 
advantage. In Gorakhpur in 1838, for example, when because of the 
large amount of waste land there was actually competition for tenants, 
the cultivators were not secure from "the vexations of the hay held 
over their heads by litigious men, who farmed the rents, and were 
in noway interested in their condition".
97 
That the landlords could do this must be explained, in addition 
to the fact of their newly secured power,by the changed economic 
conditions which followed the pacification of the country by the 
British. During the first half of the century war ceased to be the 
natural environment of every-day life and in this changed atmosphere 
northern India underwent a period of expansion. "The Doab 
expecially rose into a great agricultural and commercial tract 
filled with new and {growing cities •
98 
There was an increased 
99 
pressure on land, not so much from an absolute increase in population 
as from a shift in the balance of population implied in the retmra 
to normal economic activities of those who had been engaged in war 
100 
or disorder. 	Most of these probably returned to the villages 
and agriculture; others displaced artisans
101 
who, because of the 
lack of industry, 1°2 were also forced to take to farming. As this 
• 
2. 
increased pressure began to take effect, so the value of the 
individual tenant began to decline. No longer needed as a warrior,
103 
he could be treated much more summarily. The result was "a scramble 
104 
for land and a scramble for rent". 
105 
The problem was most acute in Bengal and it was there that 
the first measures were taken against it.
106 
By the mid-nineteenth 
century, however, the North-Western Provinces had the same problems 
of oppression and insecurity while in Avadh the amazing rapacity 
107 
of the talugdars bolstered the natural faults of Indian landlordism. 
(vi) 
The first tenancy acts in both provinces approached this 
situation in a similar way. Both set up, under the landlords, an 
agrarian structure which took note of two main groups: those with 
underproprietary rights and those tenants who 'deserved' consideration 
in either rents or tenure, or both. The majority of these latter 
were the occupancy tenants. Furthermore, in neither case was the 
basis of occupancy rights satisfactory. 
The earliest move was made in the North-Western Provinces where 
the Bengal Tenancy Act, X of 1859, was adopted.
108 
It established 
three groups of protected cultivators: permanent tenure holders, 
fixed rate tenants and 'occupancy tenants 
109  The first two groups 
were derived from the Benares permanent settlement. The permanent 
tenure holder was an underproprietor in that he held, under a 
superior owner, a permanent and transferable interest in his land. 
If his rent had remained unchanged since the permanent settlement, 
28. 
110 
he was free from any future enhancement. 	The fixed rate tenant 
did not have this under-proprietary interest in land; his 
privileged position rested on the fact that the rate of his rent 
111 
had not changed since the permanent settlement. 	If he could 
sustain this claim, he had a heritable and transferable tenancy at 
112 
these rates. 	In both these cases the Act presumed that if the 
rent had remained unchanged for the preceding twenty years if had 
been unchanged since the permanent settlement and the onus of 
proving any change lay with the landlord.
113 
Act X adopted the 'twelve year rule' as the basis of occupancy 
rights. Any tenant who could prove that he had held the same land 
continuously, either himself or through his ancestors, for twelve 
114 
years had a right of occupancy. 	There was no provision made for 
its devolution or transfer.
115 
This form of occupancy right represented a compromise. Itwas 
not the customary Indian basis which recognised only a distinction 
116 
between resident (khudkasht) and non-resident (paikasht) tenants, 
and it was in fact suggested at first, in Bengal, that occupancy 
should be given to all khudkasht cultivators, who were to be those 
who had resided in the village for three years.
117 
 The administrators 
of the North-Western Provinces, however, felt that the older 
khudkasht-paikasht distinction was obsolete and eventually they 
had their awn method - the 'twelve year rule/ - which was not 
concerned with residence in the village in which the land was 
situated, accepted as a compromise.
116 
In many respects this was 
an unhappy solution. It saved rights "in danger of being lost 
29. 	. 
I. 
through failure of technical proof" 119 , - the extent of the 
occupancy area in Agra bore witness to that. Unscrupulous land-
lords, however, misused their power over their tenants which the 
time limit gave them, causing increased conflict and litigation. 
Raving established these groups it was necessary for the Act 
to attempt to provide abasis for their relations with the landlords. 
The most important of these was rent. For the Benares tenures 
this was fixed by their nature but for the occupancy tenant the 
Act attemted to provide some machinery to control enhancement, 
(increases in rental). The attempt was unsuccessful. Enhancement 
was allowed, by order of a court, on two grounds: either that the 
rent paid was not "fair and equitable" (which was taken to mean 
that it was below that paid by similar tenants on similar land in 
the neighbourhood), or that the productivity of the land had 
120 
increased other than by the "agency or expense" of the tenant. 
These methods proved unworkable. There was no satisfactory basis 
in the first, and the second dissolved into the formulae of the 
judgement in the 'Great Rent Case' of 1865: "the enhanced rent 
was to be calculated so as to bear to the old rent the sane proportion 
that the proved increase of value in the produce did to the old 
value".
121 
In Bareilly the Settlement Officer reported that the 
Act had proved "a curse ... by the power it gives to the landlords 
to enhance the rents"I
122 
The non-occupancy tenants, the residual group, were given no 
protection. Their rents could be raised simply by the landlord 





end of the preceding agrioultural year. 
The agrarian structure of Oudh was embodied in two Acts: 
the Oudh Sub-Settlement Act, XXVI of 1866 and the Oudh Rent Act, 
XIX of 1868. These however only gave substance to the concessions 
wrung from the taluqdars by Strachey's Compromise of 1866. 
Act XXVI of 1866 provided for underproprietors. A tenure 
holder who could prove that he had held by pukka contract an 
underproprietary right in his land within the period, 13 February 
1844 to 13 February 1856, could receive a 'sub-settlement' at the 
most favourable rates which he had enjoyed in any one year after 
his estate was incorporated in the taluqa.
124 
In practice this 
by 
meant that a subsettlement could be gained only/those who, but 
for the taluqdar, would have been full owners of the village or 
125 
estate. 	Underproprietors in such a position were assured of 
at least twenty-five per cent. of the revenue.
126 
 In those cases 
were the underproprietor's rights entitled him to less than twelve 
per cent. of the revenue, he was given a sub-settlement at ten per 
127 
cent. of the gross rental. 	Still smaller grants or plot-rights 
were recorded as privileged at the settlement but were not given 
128 
a sub-settlement. 
Occupancy rights in Oudh were only for . exproprietors. They 
were accorded, by the Rent Act, XIX of 1868, to those who had been 
proprietors in the thirty years prior to annexation in the lands 
which they held on 24 August 1866, provided that these lands had 
not cone into their possession, for the first time, since 1856.
129 
130 




was heritable but not transferable. 	It also carried a rental 
privilege of two annas in the rupee less than the rent paid by 
non-occupancy tenants for the same quality land. As well, the 
rent of an occupancy tenant could be enhanced only once in five 
years unless the area of the holding increased or the revenue was 
revised.
132 
TO enhance the rent the landlord had to show that it 
P. 
	
	was lower than that usually paid by occupancy tenants, the the 
tenants holding had increased or that the rent was more than twelve 
and one-half per cent. lower than the rents of tenants at will.
133 
Non-occupancy tenants in Oudh were left with completely unregulated 
rents
134 
and even occupancy tenants could deprive themselves of 
their rights under the Act by signing a contract which had this 
135 
effect. 
The solutions to tenant problems posed by these first 
measures could not, by their incomplete and unsatisfactory nature, 
be final. The legislative activity of the late nineteenth century 
therefore aimed at reforming - or rather repairing - the structure 
which had been created. It was essentially conservative reform 
for it worked within the existing frame and only attempted in 
minor matters to add to it. Even in these instances, the moves 
were not radical. A right of occupanay in their former sir land 
was recognised for exproprietors by the Act XVIII of 1873 in the 
North-Western Provinces.
136 These new 'exproprietary tenants' were 
also given the privilege of paying four annas in the rupee less 
32. 
137 
than tenants at will, for the sane quality land. 	In Oudh a 
similar extension was made by the Land Revenue Act of 1876 when a 
right of occupancy in sir was granted to those proprietors whose 
rights had been transferred by sale or in execution of a Court 
decree.
138 
The most important measures in this period, however, were 
contained in the Oudh Rent Act XXII of 1886 and the North-Western 
Provinces Tenancy Act, II of 1901. There was legislation in the 
North-Western Provinces in 1873, 1881 and 1886 but these did not 
alter the principles or the methods of 1859, their purpose being 
to correct matters of detail.
139 The real problem which had to be 
solved, however, was not a matter of detail for it was the problem 
of the large groups of tenants at will which existed in both 
provinces. In the North-Western Provinces these people cultivated 
nearly forty per cent. of the lands of the province in 1882-3
140 
while in Oudh at the same time they numbered 1,800,000
141 and 
142 
cultivated as much as seventy-eight per cent, of the province. 
In both provinces their problem was insecurity. Tenants at the 
will of the landlords, they were subjected to arbitrary ejectment 
from their holdings, a matter which became more serious as population 
and competition for land increased. 
Avadh and the North-Western Provinces had their awn reasons 
for this insecurity. In Avadh it was an outcome of the complete 
lack of protection in the matter of rents. "Incessant competition" 
for land143 allowed the landlords to raise the rents of tenants at 
55. 
will out of all proportion to the tenant's ability to pay. 144 
Default gave the landlord his excuse to eject. To correct this 
anomalous position was the necessary function of the new Rent Act. 
The solution was found in the system of statutory tenancy. With 
the exception of tenants on areas of unstable cultivation, sub-tenants 
and tenants on the landlord's private sir lands, all non-occupancy 
tenants were given the right to hold the land to which they were 
admitted for a period of seven years. The rent for this initial period 
was to be that agreed to by the landlord and tenant. At the end of the 
seven years they could be ejected but if they were allowed to continue 
their rent could be enhanced only by one anna in the rupee (six and 
one-quarter per cent). Even if the land was let to a new tenant, 
the rent could be raised by one one anna in the rupee. These limits, 
however, did not apply where the landlord had made, or paid compensation 
to a tenant for an improvement which increased the productive power of 
the land. 145 Act XXII of 1886 also made it impossible for a tenant 
to deprive himself of "that protection against enhancement and 
ejectment which it is the special object of the new law to give", 146 
by signing a contrary contract. 
In the Worth-Western Provinces the landlords' energies were 
directed to preventing non-occupancy tenants from qualifying for 
occupancy rights by remaining on their land for twelve years 
for then he became "comparatively independent of his landlord" .147 
The landlord therefore frequently obtained a decree for arrears in 
the tenant's eleventh year of occupation served an uncontested 
34. 
notice of ejectment and then, having prevented him from acquiring 
occupancy rights, readmitted him at a higher rent. 148 This 
problem was recognised from the beginning
149 
but the legislation 
of the 'seventies or the 'eighties did nothing to counter it so 
that the province continued for forty years under a system which, 
as the President of the North-Western Provinces Legislative Council 
felt moved to point out - on the eve:. of the reforming Bill - 
Ifpermits of the arbitrary ejectment of industrious tenants ... 
whose only fault in the landlords' eyes is that they about to 
acquire a status which the law intended they should in the circum- 
stances acquire".




The Tenancy Act of 1901 approached the problems of the 
province from two angles. It retained the twelve year period
152 
but redefined the terminology used in its application. Two phrases 
in particular were dealt with: 'continuous holding' and 'same land'. 
Thus the tenant was deemed to have held his land continuously 
despite the fact that he had lost possession of it for up to one 
year through an accident or because of the malpractice of the 
landlord. 153 At the same time the tenant was deemed to have hold 
or have been reinstated on the 'same land' if he continued to 
occupy land of no greater rentalvalue from the same landlord, 
even though it might be in a different village. 15,1  
From the other angle, the Act tried to encourage landlords 
to grant longer leases to the tenants by making leases of seven 
years or more not count towards occupancy rights. 155 The Act 
therefore aimed, at best, to aid the growth of occupancy rights by 
35. 
preventing nominal 'eleventh year' ejectment and, at least, to 
give the. non-occupancy tenant some degree of continuity in his 
cultivation. 
(viii) 
This foundation century had then established its system of 
tenure by 1901. It was a system based on landlords and tenants. 
Until the eighteen-sixties the administrators concentrated_ on 
consolidating the superior position of the landlords. Then, having 
secured a stable revenue, the administrators turned their attention 
to the larger, though less influential, group - the tenants. 
The last forty years of the century saw an attempt to protect, 
firstly, those tenants who seemed to 'deserve' protection and 
the., necessarily, all tenants from the rapacity of a body of 
zamindars and taluqdars who imbibed quickly the powers ana position 
of the English landlord but seemed to overlook the concomitant 
resposibilities of direction and investment implied in that 
position. 
The administrators did not attempt to change the basic 
agrarian pattern for they believed in it. Instead, they ained 
at bolstering it at its weakest points. Thus, theircmbst radical 
IP, move was to limit the enhancement-of-rent powers of the Avadh 
landlords, although this step was taken only when the 'rental 
market' had become a farce. 
Such stopgap reform was, however, inadequate. The 
pressure of population on the available arable land and the inability of 
56. 
raiyat to produce a return commensurate with the rent continually 
"outpaced" reform. Further reform, to be effective, would need 
to take cognisance of these facts. 
• 
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CHAPTER III. 
1921 - 1947: THE YEARS OF COMPROMISE. 
(i) 
"The end of the World War found India in a state of suppressed 
excitement ... Political agitation, peaceful and wholly 
constitutional as it was, seemed to be working itself to 
a head and people talked with assurance of self determination 
and self-government. Some of this unrest was visible also 
among the masses, especially the peasantry 	The soldiers 
back from active service on distant fronts were no longer the 
subservient robots that they used to be. They had grown 
mentally and there was much discontent among them 	The 
dominant note all over India was one of waiting and expect-
ation, full of hope and yet tinged with fear and anxiety ".1 
In this atmosphere the failure of the tenancy legislation of 
the nineteenth century became increasingly significant. Political 
agitation for independence, although it had some effect in the 
2 villages, was mainly an urban middle-class matter. "The rising tide 
of kisan aggrandisenent" 3 to which The Pioneer alluded was more 
concerned with the problem of securing the "fixity of tenure and 
freedom from excessive enhancement" 4 which the earlier legislation 
had not succeeded in providing. 
In Avadh, the protection afforded to the tenants by the Rent 
Act of 1886 disintegrated from the pressure of 'economic growth'. 
Under its provisions, enhancement was limited to 61 per cent, at the 
end of each statutory period of seven years. This was its weakest 
point and it was here that it failed. 
55. 
"For some time the limit seems to have worked well; but 
as time went on and railway communications improved and new 
markets sprang up, particular classes of land improved 
enormously in value. Those landlords who did not wish to 
evade the law by going beyond this limit resorted to enhance-
ment to taking premiums in advance. From that beginning the 
practice grew to a very serious proportion". 5 
Caught in a growing demand for land6 the resourceless Avadhi 
cultivator was powerless to resist. He had to comply or forego 
his chance of subsistence. For the tenant in possession of land 
nazrana (premium payment) was the means of preventing the ejectment 
against which the law gave no protection once the statutory period 
was over. 7 For the cultivator who needed land, nazrana was the 
necessary 'price' for admission to a holding.
8 
This position was most pronounced where population was heaviest 
and competition for land greatest. So that although the government 
felt that the Act had worked "fairly well" in the northern districts 
where the population was relatively sparse, they had to admit that 
it had broken dawn "completely"! in the "densely populated" districts 
of southern Avadh.
9-  Far from giving the security at which it had 
aimed, the Act had contained so many "loopholes for evasions that 
it ceased to give any effective protection to the tenants". 10 
In Agra the schemes for tenant security - occupancy tenancy 
based on twelve years , occupation and seven year leases which did 
not count toward occupancy rights - foundered on the opposition of 
the landlords. The number of occupancy-right holders increased 
54. 
11 and often only after expensive litigation. 12 slowly Twenty-five 
years after the passing of the Tenancy Act of 1901 the non-occupancy 
area, in which the tenant was largely unsecured, was still larger 
than that held by occupancy tenants. 13 Moreover, the government 
itself discounted much of the value of the increase in the occupancy 
area on the ground that it had taken place in Jhansi Division where 
the competition was for "tenants rather than for land". 14 At the 
same time the seven year leases remained largely inoperative. By 1925 
they.accounted for only 10,67,769 acres - less than ten per cent. 
of the non-occupancy area and only 3.6 per cent. of the total 
holdings in the province.
15 
Even this meagre area was largely 
confined to isolated districts of the three western divisions 
(Meerut, Agra and Rohilkhand) and the Gorakhpur Division in the east1 6 
The landlords' resentment of occupancy rights caused this slaw 
growth. 17 They disliked the independence of the occupancy tenant, 
the fact that he was able - and prepared - to "challenge the 
zamindar with impunity", as much as they disliked his "generally 
well-cultivable and cultivated lands". 18 Mutual antagonism generally 
made the occupancy tenant "a sore in the eyes of the zamindar".
19 
There was, as a result, "a perpetual state of tension, if not of war, 
between the landlord and the tenant" 2° in which the tenants acquired 
rights "by litigation and chicane ... inch by inch". 21 From the 
landlords' side this tension brought suits for enhancement of rent 
or ejectment in ever-increasing nuAbers. 22 Where the landlord did 
not use litigation he coerced: there were reports from Agra 
Province of tenants being forced to surrender their holdings by 
55. 
"fraud and oppression" 23 and, as in Avadh, of illegal exactions. 24 
It was in Southern Avadh that the discontent and dissatisfaction 
of the tenants first manifested itself. Less secure than in Agra 
province, the Avadhi tenants - mostly non-occupancy tenants - had 
to endure the exactions of the talugdars - "the zamindari system at 
its worst". 25 As they formed a fairly homogeneous group with 
similar problems they developed a unity of purpose which became an 
agrarian movement. They were, says Nehru, "at white heat, a spark 
would have lighted a flame" .26 The whole countryside was 
"afire with enthusiasm and full of a strange excitement. 
Enormous gatherings would take place at the briefest notice 
byword of mouth. One village would communicate with another, 
and the second with the third, and so on, and presently 
whole villages would empty out and all over the fields there 
would be men and women and children on the march to the 
meeting placs". 27 
Much of this sense of unity came from the work of local leaders, 
figures such as Pandit Gaurishankar Misra, a vakil (attorney) who had 
renounced his profession to work for the kisans 29 and Baba Rama-
chandra, an itinerant minstrel who, having returned from the Fijian 
sugar-cane fields, wandered through the Avadh districts reciting 
the Ramayana. Ramchandrals use of the traditional greeting, "SitaRam", 
as a catchcry - it was this which Nehru heard calling the villages 
together - was indicative of his methods.29 
56. • 
This spontaneous movement drew strength and inspiration from 
the broader leadership of the Congress organisation which had itself 
been revitalised in the immediate post-war years by the methods 
and personality of M.K.Gandhi.3° The principle of satyagraha 
provided them with a weapon, 31 and at the end of 1920, when the 
arrest of several of their leaders provided the spark, the anger of 
• 
	
	the kisans flared into a movement which spread through the districts 
of Partabgarh, Rae Bareli and Faizabad, demanding "no nagrana, no 
ejectment". 32 In Partabgarh in the autumn of 1920 there was a 
'preliminary skirmish'. Several kisan leaders were arrested for a 
minor offence. The kisans staged a passive demonstration before the 
court and along the road to the gaol which led to the release of the 
arrested men and a belief in the minds of the kisans that this was an 
infallible method of asserting themselves. 36 
The trouble in Rae Bareli began on 2 January 1921 when the 
crops of a talucidar were destroyed and a large mob began moving 
through the countryside, looting and destroying property. The 
south of Rae Bareli district "rapidly assumed a state of anarchy, 
dacoity and bazar lootings". On 6 January 1921 a clash with police 
in the town of Fursatganj led to shooting in which five persons died. 
Further firing took place at Munshiganj on 7 January when a large 
tromd, moving towards the gaol in which those arrested in the 
earlier disturbances were imprisoned, was stopped at a bridge over 
the River Sai. Jawahar Lal Nehru attempted to disperse them but 
before he could do so the police had opened fire and killed at 
least four persons. The police later claimed that they had been 
57. 
provoked by the kisans throwing stones and hitting them with lathis. 34 
The Faizabad disturbances, which began with an attack on a 
zamindar on 12 January 1921, were much more violent. Looting was 
extensive, as many as 65 houses in 30 villages in the eastern half 
of the district being robbed by 14 January 1921. The police 
arrested 346 persons.
35 
Further disturbances occurred on the 23 and 
29 January 1921, 36 but by then the "determined attack of the Govern-
ment" had broken the kisans' spirits. 37 
Later in the =lie year there was a similar series of outbreaks 
in the Lucknaw District - the Eka or Unity movement - which spread 
to Sitapur and Hardoi districts in the northern part of Avadh, but 
it had little organisation or leadership and as it became closely 
aligned with the non-cooperation movement the government took 
strong measures against it and it, too collapsed. 38 
These outbreaks were not, however, in vain. They aroused the 
lkisan conscience' of the Congress and, through the influence of 
Gandhi, it became more and more a mass agrarian organisation. 39 
Kisan Sabhas, the kisans' awn organisations continued to exist, 
particularly in the economic sphere where they were relatively safe. 40 
And, perhaps most important of all, the government realised that 
it had to repair the tenancy legislation of the Province, which it 
attempted in the Oudh Rent (Amendment) Act, IV of 1921. 41 
(ii) 
Under the provisions of Act IV of 1921, the Avadhi non-occupancy 
tenant became a statutory tenant with the right to hold for ten years 
58. 
"from the date of the last change in his rent or the last 
alteration in the area of his holding, or, where no such 
change or alteration has taken place, from the date of which 
the tenant was admitted to the occupation of the holding" . 43 
In the case of tenants admitted after the commencement of the Act, 
this was to be from the time the tenant was admitted "at a rent 
agreed upon with the landlord in accordance with the provisions 
of (the) Act". 44 
This increase in the statutory period from. seven to ten years 
was in itself important. The Act, however, went further and 
provided that "when a statutory tenant dies, his heir shall be 
entitled to retain occupation of the holding at the rent payable 
by the deceased for a period of five years from the date of the 
tenant's death". 45 The cultivator was then liable to summary 
ejectment although he was to receive compensation for improvements 
which he had made to the holding. 46 
At the end of the statutory period the tenant's rent was liable 
to enhancement on a notice served by the landlord. 47 The tenant 
had the right to contest this notice" and if this appeal was 
upheld on the grounds that the enhancement proposed was inequitable, 
the enhancement was to be determined by the Court." If the 
tenant did not contest the enhancement and remained on the holding, 
or if he agreed to the rent as enhanced by the Court, he had the 
right to hold the land for a further ten years, at the higher rent. 5° 
To help the Courts in determining enhancements the Act 
instituted "roster years".
51 Rather than leave to the Courts the 
59. 
decision as to what constituted a reasonable rent for a statutory 
tenant, the government was to appoint Special Officers who would 
determine, every tenth agricultural year, for the different classes 
of soil within each district, the "fair and equitable rates of rent 
for statutory tenants". 52 The rates were to be based on 
"genuine, adequate and stable rents which are paid by 
substantial -tenants who depend for their livelihood on the 
produce of their holdings, and can be paidwithout hardship 
over a series of years, due regard being had to movements 
in prices, ... the letting value of land ••• (and) the 
extent to which caste is taken into account in determining 
the rent payable by tenants ...". 53 
The Court was then to use these rates in determining the enhancement 
of statutory rents, unless the land for which the suit was brought 
was markedly superior or inferior to the other lands in the circle
or the landlord had been responsible for an improvanentwhich increased 
the productive power of the holding. 55  The rates also helped to 
determine the rents of other tenant groups since exproprietary 
rents *doh were more than four annas in the rupee, and occupancy 
rents which were more than two annas in the rupee, below "the fair 
and equitable rate payable by statutory tenants of the same class 
for land of the same class or classes of soil" were liable to enhance-
ment. 56 The regulation of rents by revenue officials therefore 
ran through the whole gamut of the tenant system, in an attempt, as 
W.C•Neale points out, to do what the Imarkett had failed to dos 
the adjustment of the rent to what the land could bear.57 
60. 
The statutory tenant was not freed from the landlord's power 
to eject him during his statutory period. He was of course liable 
to ejectment at the end of that period if he refused to pay the 
rent enhanced by the Court 58 but he was also liable to ejectment 
for arrears of rent at any time, on the suit of the landlord. 58 In 
addition, he was "liable to ejectment from his holding during the 
currency of his tenancy" if he misused or illegally sublet the 
holding. 60  These grounds were not new, but the additional provision 
that a landlord could eject a paikasht tenant if he wished to let 
the land to a khudkasht tenant 61 was a new provision which did 
nothing to increase the security of as many as ten per cent. of 
Avadhi cultivators •62 
In return for these changes - they were only partly improvements - 
in the position of the statutory tenant, the landlord's power to 
take land under his absolute control was increased. The most 
important of these lands were the sir lands, the traditional 'home-
farm' lands of the owner. The 1921 Act safeguarded sir which the 
landlords already held or were acquiring under the provisions of 
the original Act, 63 but as well it allowed them to add to this the 
khudkasht land which they had held in the agricultural year ending 
64 30 June 1921. 	After the Act came into force, further sir could 
be created by continuous "personal cultivation" for ten years 
subject to the limitation that this new sir, added to that already 
held, could not exceed 
"in the aggregate, one-tenth of such portion of the total 
cultivated area of the village as is proportionate to the 
61. 
extent of his proprietary or underproprietary right in the 
village". 65 
In addition to increasing his power to acquire sir, however, 
the Act gave the landlord a new right" to apply to the Deputy 
Commissioner to acquire land from a statutory or non-statutory 
tenant for 
"any of the following purposes, namely, - (a) for agricultural 
development, including demonstration or model farms, dairy 
farms, poultry farms, stock-breeding, horticulture or any 
similar purpose; (b) for mills or factories for industrial 
purposes; (c) for his awn cultivation, and of members of 
his family dependent on him for maintenance; (d) for sites 
for hamlets or markets; (e) for the erection of houses for 
tenants or labourers; (f) for groves; (g) for planting 
trees; (h) for opening or working a limestone, brick-earth, 
kankar or other mineral quarry, or a clay, sand or gravel 
pit, or for the construction of any works or buildings used 
in connection therewith; (i) for making anywater-course, 
reservoir or canal; (j) for making any road, railway or 
• tramway; (k) for building houses, outhouses, thanes or 
godawns for the landlord; (1) for any religious, educational 
or charitable purpose n . 67 
These multifarious private uses were broadly aimed by the 
Government at increased investment by the landlords. They seem, 
however, to have struck the landlords as having a rather different 
purpose. The Collector of Partabgarh District reported that 
62. 
"an indebted zamindar seriously suggested that if he were 
allowed to acquire fifty bighas for a farm he could pay 
off part of his debts by raising fifteen or twenty thousand 
rupees as nazrana by threatening to acquire tenant's land 
under section 30A"
.68 
Although the tenant had the right to compensation of up to four 
times the annual rent and could sue for repossession if the landlord 
did not make use of the land as had been intended, 69 the landlord 
had acquired a new hold over the non-occupancy tenant" which in 
many ways negated the advances which the Act made in his status. 
The landlord's powers in the collection of arrears of rent were 
also increased. Although the Act made the exaction of excess rent 
and nazrana illega1, 71 it preserved the landlord's power of distraint 
over 
"standing crops and other ungathered products of the earth, 
and crops and other products when reaped or gathered and 
deposited in any threshing floor or place for treading out 
grain or the like, whether in the field or within a homestead," 72 
and it gave him the right to apply to the Collector "in case of any 
general refusal on the part of underproprietors or tenants ... to 
pay arrears of rents, rates or cesses" to have these recovered, 
officially, as arrears of land revenue.
73 The overall advantages 
which these powers gave to the landlords helped to tilt the balance 
of the 'exchange' even more in their favour. 
This process of legislative change was, moreover, a continuum. 
Once it had been made in Avadh, it became impossible for the 
65. 
Government to ignore the needs - and the dangers - of the position 
in Agra. A Select Committee was therefore established in 1924 
consider the matter so that amendments to the Agra tenancy laws 
(which were eventually embodied in the Agra Tenancy Act, III of 1926) 
could be introduced 
"while the province was happily at peace, so as to remove 
in good time such grounds for agrarian discontent as might 
afford fuel for grave mischief if such another wave of 
ferment and excitement ... were to impinge again upon the 
province". 75 
Haw sensitive the agrarian situation was in Agra, was demonstrated 
when the plans of the Government were announced. The Board of 
Revenue reported that applications for ejectment rose by fifty per 
cent, throughout the province" and this was confirmed by reports 
from the districts. 77 
The provisions of the Agra Tenancy Act, III of 1926, followed 
the same general pattern as in Avadh, though with less gain to the 
landlords: the statutory tenancy was broader, the requirements for 
sir rather more stringent. The Agra act did, however, tend to 
bring the law of the two provinces much closer together. In particular, 
the tenant structure assumed a much more standard appearance. 
Before the 'twenties, occupancy tenancy had been the norm in Agra, 
while in Avadh this had been taken to be, firstly, non-occupancy and 
then, statutory, tenancy. This is not to say that Agra did not 
have large numbers of non-occupancy tenants but merely that it was 
accepted that the eventual position ought to be that all tenants of 
64. 
unexceptional lands should have at least a right of occupancy. 
There was no such assumption in Avadh. with the new tenancy legis- 
lation, however, statutory tenancy became the norm for both provinces 
for Act III of 1926 ended the accrual of occupancy rights by the 
'twelve year rule , . It preserved those occupancy rights which had 
already been gained and, as well, gave occupancy rights to tenants 
on government estates
78 but in the future allowed occupancy rights 
to accrue only from purchase or by being specifically conferred by a 
proprietor.
79 
Statutory rights were given to non-occupancy tenants except . 
sub-tenants and those on certain specified lands: sir, pastures, 
areas of unstable cultivation and public lands 80 The statutory 
tenancy was, in Agra, a life tenancy
81 
and the heir of the tenant 
was entitled to continue the tenancy for five years. 82 The heir was 
then liable to ejectment
83 
but if the landlord took no steps to 
eject him for three years from the end of his tenancy, he was to be 
"considered to have been admitted to the holding 	(and) deemed 
to be a statutory tenant." 84 
The initial rent of a statutory tenant was to be "as may be 
agreed upon between him and his landholder". 85 This could then be 
enhanced by suit on the grounds that the rent was "less than the 
fair and equitable rate payable by statutory tenants for land of the 
same class or classes of soil"; that the productive powers of the 
land had been increased by fluvial action or by an improvement carried 
out by the landlord; that the area of the holding had been increased 
by alluvion or by encroachment or, finally, that there had been "a 
65. 
rise in the average local prices of staple food crops" .86 The rent 
was reduced when these factors were unfavourable to the tenant. 87 
The "fair and equitable rate payable by statutory tenants" was 
to be determined, along with fair and equitable rates for occupancy 
tenants, by the roster year system. 88 The procedure differed from 
Avadh mainly in that every twentieth year, and not every tenth year, 
was to be a roster year. 89 The "standard rates" for statutory 
tenants derived from the calculations of the roster year were to be 
based on "genuine, adequate and stable rents paid by substantial 
tenants" as in Avadh. 90 The standard rates for occupancy tenants 
were to take account, in addition to "novements in prices, and rents 
and the letting value of land", of the "existing level of occupancy 
rents", a distinction being made between old and new holdings. 91 
These standard occupancy rates were to be used in determining suits 
for enhancement of exproprietary as well as occupancy rents. In 
Avadh these had been measured against statutory rents but in Agra, 
exproprietary rents more than two annas in the rupee below the "fair 
and equitable rate payable by occupancy tenants for the same class of 
land" were liable to enhancement. 92 / There were, therefore, differences 
only of emphasis between the roster year system of the two provinces, 
with Agra, as usual, rather more liberal. 
So also in the matter of ejectment; there was no provision for 
the ejectment of paikasht tenants as in Avadh and the statutory 
period was for the tenant's life, but the other grounds were identical. 
Arrears could be satisfied by ejectment - even before they were 
decreed" - and an illegal transfer or sublease,94 trespass, misuse 
66. 
and an act inconsistent with a lease95 were all grounds for ejectment. 
The position of the landlord in the two provinces was also 
generally similar. The additional powers granted to both groups 
differed only in detail, the relatively stronger position of the 
taluqdars rested on nineteenth century developments which later 
governments found it difficult to bypass. 
The Agra landlords gained additional rights to sir and the power 
to acquire land for their awn use and for the first time, permanent-
tenure holders were permitted to acquire sir." The Act preserved the 
sir which was already in the possession of the landlords - that 
recorded as such in the preceding record of rights, that recognised 
by village custom as the "special holding" of a co-sharer, and that 
land cultivated continuously by the landholder for twelve years 
before 1 January 1902. It then added to this the landholder's 
khudkasht of the agricultural year ending 6 September 192697 and 
provided that the landholder could acquire further sir after 1926 by 
continuously cultivating land for ten years, provided that the total 
sir holding kept within certain limits: 
"If the cultivated area in the mahal 
awned by the landlord or held by the 
permanent tenure-holder is not more 
than thirty acres 	Fifty per cent. of 
such area. 
If such area is more than thirty but 
not more than six hundred acres 
	
As above on thirty acres 
and fifteen psr cent. on 
the balance. 
67. 
If such area is more than six 
hundred acres 	As above on six hundred acres 
and ten per cent. on the 
balance".98 
The Agra zamindar was more favourably placed than the Avadh 
taluqdar in the matter of the acquisition of land. He was given 
power, as in Avadh, to acquire land from statutory tenants for 
various 'developmental' purposes,
99 
but he was also given power to 
acquire land from exproprietary and occupancy tenants, although only 
for the "purpose of farming on improved lines". 100  It was more 
costly for the landlord to acquire occupancy or exproprietary land 
for the Collector had to find "land with similar advantages" for the 
displaced tenant, or award him compensation of six times the annual 
rent.
101  Compensation for statutory tenants whose land was acquired 
was placed at four times the annual rental value of the land based 
102 
on "standard rates". In both cases the tenant could sue for 
repossession if the landlord did not use the land for the purpose 
for which it was acquired, or used it for some other purpose within 
two or if the land was let to another tenant within six years.
103 
The provisions were more liberal than in Avadh but the principle was 
hardly more enlightened. 
This legislation had faced one very serious practical problem: 
"the patent difficulty of getting a Legislature on which the landlords 
predominated" 1°4 to make far-reaching changes in the agrarian 
structure. 
The landlords were themselves very conscious of their supremacy. 
68. 
Raja Jagdish Prasad, a leader of the Agra zamindars made this clear 
in the Legislative Council in 1926. 
"Me attitude of the Government seems to be that if this 
concession of life tenancy is not conceded, then they will 
perhaps withdraw the Bill. In my opinion, Sir, if we the 
zamindar members are unable to secure more concessions in 
the rest of the Bill, it is of course open to us at the last 
stage to throw out the Bill". 105 
The government were also very much aware of this dominance. 
In Avadh they "conducted long and anxious negotiations with that 
great body known as the taluqdars of Oudh" so that they were able 
"to produce the Bill with their free consent as to the main principles 
involved".
106 
Yet even then the government had to report that 
"The taluqdars have not seen their way to grant the concession 
of hereditary rights to tenants which they regard as a 
breach of their proprietary rights and the Government, in 
view of the fact that this Bill is a compromise, have not 
embodied this provision in it".
107 
In Agra the government shelved its plans for universal occupancy 
rights and "contented" itself with "asking for statutory rights". 106 
The legislation was more than mere compromise. In order to 
obtain from the landlords those concessions which they did, the 
Government felt it necessary to grant "concessions to the landlords 
about the abstract equity of some of which ... (they were) 
doubtful" •109  Reform therefore became nothing more than exchange. 
This situation was not new in agrarian legislation: it is probably 
69. 
true to say that all previous acts were compromises in actual fact)
Now, however, the situation demanded so much more. Compromise was 
insufficient. It was however what the provinces received: extended 
landlord powers were the quid pro quo for extended tenant rights. 
The legislation satisfied very few. Even as it passed, leaders 
of all three interested groups, Government, landlords and tenants, 
expressed doubts as to its possible effects. 
The landlords had most reason to be satisfied. Even so some 
realised that they had been fortunate. Certainly not all were as 
naive as the taluqdar who believed that "the three principles" of 
the Oudh Act (as he saw them) were: "no ejectment, no nazrana and 
111 
no occupancy right", and that these gave "full security to the tenantry". 
SOMB spokesmen felt that items such as the roster year system or life 
tenancies might work against the landlords
112 
but others recognised 
113 
that the compromise was very favourable to the landlords 	and that 
114 
if anybody had suffered itwas the tenants. 	One zamindari spokesman 
during the debate on the Agra Bill went so far as to point out that 
the Bill contained provisions which the landlords were liable to 
115 
misuse. 
Spokesmen of the "Government" echoed many of these misgivings.
116 
The Acts represented clearly much less than they had wanted, much 
less than they knew was needed. Sir Ludovic Porter was prepared to 
be optimistic in 1921: the tenants, he felt, were 
"in a position to make a fair bargain on equal terms with 
their landlords and I feel convinced that they will do so, 
and that if any rapacious landlord - such as have always 
70. 
existed in a small minority and will no doubt continue to 
exist - attempts to extort nazrana from them in future, he 
will fail". 117 
Sir Samuel O'Donnell in 1926 was less certain. In March he felt that 
the Act would 
"confer security of tenure and fair rents on the tenants in 
a much larger measure than was hitherto possible whilst 
securing to the landlords a fair share of the profits of the 
land 	(and) it will encourage that friendly coaTeration 
between tenants and landlords on which the prosperity of 
both depends".
118 
By the end of July he was not prepared to go so far: 
"Time alone can show haw far we have succeeded in the objects 
which we placed before UB .s. But we have hever claimed 
that this Bill was a final solution to the agrarian problem. 
We should ourselves have like to see occupancy rights conferred 




It was, however, the small groups in the Legislative Council 
which debated the legislation from the 'tenant' point of view, which 
expressed the greatest disappointment. Pandit Hirday Nath Kunzru, 
a leader of the Liberal League in 1921, felt that the Act had done 
so little for the tenants that its real object must have been "to 
e make concessions not to the tenants but to the landlords".120 Th  
talucidars, moreover, by turning their backs on that opportunity for 
"setting their house in order" had planned their awn downfall.
121 
Pandit Govind Ballabh Pant, the acknowledged leader of the 
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Swaraj Party in the Council in 1926 gave the Act little chance of 
survival)-22 By removing the principle of occupancy right and 
allowing the landlords to increase the area of their 'unregulated' 
lands, any advance in tenant security was, he claimed, "defeated in 
a left-handed manner"
.123 
In this he was supported by independent 
opinion. Mr. Tracey Gavin Jones, a European member of the Council, 
felt that the Bill would merely worsen relations between landlords 
and tenants, 124 while The Leader held in an editorial before the 
debate that statutory tenancy was "calculated to affect adversely 
the bulk of the tenantry in Agra" 125 and the power of the landlord 
to use the acquisition of sir as ta lever to extract nazrana or hush 
money from the tenant (was) a serious danger". 126 
The new legislation operated as had been predicted, at least 
until the depression of the early 'thirties introduced unexpected 
abberations. From the outset the provisions for increasing sir and 
for statutory tenancy were fully implemented and so the ostensible 
purposes of the Acts were achieved. At the same time, however, the 
worst fears of the critics were fulfilled by the way inwhich the 
landlords made use of their new powers of acquisition and ejectment. 
The development of this abuse was more evident in Avadh than 
in Agra. In the former the Act operated for a decade before the 
economic catastrophe of the 'thirties, but even in Agra the same 
trend was apparent by 1930. 
In Avadh, there was a thirty five per cent. increase in sir 
72. 
holdings within the decade. This was general throughout the 
province and was accompanied by a decrease in khudkasht area. This 
trend is seen in Table I. 
TABLE I. 
SIR AND RHUDKASHT HOLDINGS, AVADH PROVINCE, 1919/20 - 1929/30.  
Division 
1919/20 1924/25 1929/30 















Avadh 4,27,817 6,98,274 5,05,253 6,47,080 5,84,868 5,50,526 
SOURCE: Revenue Report,T1919/20, 62A-68A; 1924/25, 86A-92A; 
1929/30, 52A-59A. 
At the same time, as Table II demonstrates, the statutory 
tenancies, which extended to almost seventy per cent, of the total 
holdings are., - 27 brought an enormous reduction in the non-occupancy 
area, although there was a slight re-growth in what was legally 
non-statutory as the original statutory tenants died and their 
holdings fell to their heirs. 
There were, however, varied reports of the practical efficacy 
of the new tenancy. The Settlement Officer of Partabgarh District 
found that statutory rights were "valued by the tenants" because 
they were "less open to disturbance by the landowner". 128 An 
independent observer on the estate of the Maharaja of Balrampur in 
Gonda District found, however, that the now rights had not improved 
TABLE II. 
HOLDINGS OF STATUTORY HEIRS OF STATUTORY AND ORDINARY 
IMANTS, ANADH PROVINCE 1919/20 - 1929A0.  
Year Statutory Heirs Ordinary 
1919/20 - - 81,18,290 
1924/25 66,27,535 4,72,659 9,43,294 
1929/30 61,04,912 9.02,256 9,36,564 
, 




the tenants' economic position.
129 
Moreover, while there was 
reputedly an increase in security in Unao District, marked by the 
increased construction of pukka wells, 130 the Settlement Officer of 
the district reported 
"Statutory tenants hold the bulk of the area in holdings, 
namely, sixty per cent, but the fixity of tenure conferred 
by law on this class of tenant is, in this district at any 
rate, unreal. In practice most landlords find it easy to 
evict statutory tenants or to reshuffle their holdings at 
their pleasure without recourse to legal process".
131 
As early as 1922 the Commissioner of Faizabad reported that while 
the creation of statutory tenancy had been "an universal boon to the 
countryside" and had stopped "most of the nazrana exactions", "the 
new sections 30A, 62A and 68A have opened the way to fresh grounds 
of ejectment which are being seized upon by the less reputable type 
of landlord".
132 A "serious blow to the high caste tenants" had 
been the "power to eject tenants who (had) sublet even portions of 
their holdings". 133 
These problems continued throughout the period. In particular, 
section 30A - the provision for the landlord to acquire land from 
statutory tenants - became notorious. As early as 1923 the Board 
noted that the section was apparently being used to force the tenant 
to pay a higher rent or face ejectment.
134 
 They remarked on the 
same tendency in 1925, 1926 and 1927.
135 
In the last years of the 
decade, however, it was reported that the landlords were beginning 
to realise that the courts would not permit them to use section 30A 
• 
as a "last resort" means of ejectment. 
It seemed to be hardly needed for the landlords had more 
convenient moans of ejectment which they did not neglect to use. 
They ejected tenants rather than sue for arrears, because they 
137 
claimed that they received their dues more quickly. 	They made 
great use of the provisions which allowed them to eject tenants who 
had sublet even part of their holding and paikasht tenants — section 
62A (1), clauses (b) and (e). As the Faizabad Commissioner had 
foreseen, clause (b) was felt mainly by high caste tenants, who 
138 
often "paid" their ploughman by providing himiwith a small field. 
If they were not ejected they often had to pay nazrana to placate 
139 
the landlord. 	If they were not ejected they often had to pay 
nazrana to placate the landlord. 139 This clause, moreover, gave 
scope to the patwari to aid the landlord by falsifying the records. 14° 
As for clause (e), even by 1926 the Government expressed the view that 
it had it had not "been justified by the experience of its working".
141 
It had not, as it had been supposed in 1921 it would, made for more 
efficient cultivation and in many cases it had been found that the 
paikasht tenant was actually living closer to the holding than the 
tenants of the village to which the holding belonged.
142 
Section 67, clause 1 (b), which excluded tenancy rights from 
any cultivator who held any proprietary or underproprietary interest 
in a village, proved to be another "unhappy section".
143 The Pioneer 
claimed it had been so interpreted that a tenant who had at any 
time held a proprietary interest was refused statutory rights and 




up a small ancillary holding as "an asset against the rainy day". 144 
The Board also commented on the misuse of this section. 145 
These factors in combination left the tenant almost as insecure 
as he had been before the amending Act; and indeed in SOMB ways he 
was more harassed than before, since he had to suffer both the old 
and the new impositions. He remained at the mercy of the landlord 
in rental matters. Initial rents were dictated by the landlord 146 
and nazrana and rent concealment vitiated the real level of rents, 
particularly in the southern districts.
147 
In Rae Bareli, for 
instance, estates which appeared to be "moderately rented" were also 
those in which "large sums of nazrana (could) be and (were) frequently 
paid". 148 Even in estates where rents were high, "smaller SUMS" 
were paid to subordinate estate officials,
149 
for the lack of personal 
interest by the Rae Bareli talugdars left these officials "a free 
hand to mulct the tenants" .150 
In Una° concealment of rent was "the outstanding feature of 
the rental system of the district".
151 
In this the patwaries were 
the willing aides of the landlords 152 who, besides levying nazranas 
as high as tivo years' rent, 153 had varied ways of disguising their 
real income. Some executed 
"fictitious leases in the name of some relative, servant or 
friend at a law rent and let out the land to cultivators who 
were recorded as sub-tenants" but who paid rent "not to the 
154 
nominal tenant-in-chief but to the landlord direct"; 
others gave a tenant "possession over a smaller area than that shown 
in his name and (then) re-let the area thus held back to another 
tenant" 155 
77. 
In the district of Bara Banki, though there was little conceal-
ment of rent in the sense of fictitious leases or double-letting, 
nazrana had reached the stage where it was "almost as much regarded 
as a matter of course as the payment of rent". 156 In "well conducted 
estates" a terminated lease was put up to "auction", "either on the 
previous rent or a slightly enhanced rent".
157 
In "badly run 
estates", however, the "manager and his staff" made "private arrange-
ments with the tenant as to the premium to be paid for the renewal 
of his . lease", only part of the proceeds of which were paid into the 
es tate. 158 In Lucknow District, though some talucidars "screwed 
up the rents to an unusually high pitch", recorded talucidari rents 
were usually low to allow for nazrana at the rate of one or two 
years' rent". 159 
Nazrana continued in the Partabgarh District because the tenants 
were afraid of "asserting their rights and thereby involving their 
successors in trouble after their death".
160 Paikasht tenants, 
those with small underproprietary holdings, heirs of statutory 
tenants and 'new comers' were all subject to premium payments which 
the tenancy legislation, by reducing the opportunities for extraction 
from tenants in possession, often made heavier than before. The 
"traditional" rate of one extra rent in seven was, in the case of 
heirs of statutory tenants, generally increased to "two or three 
times the rent" on admission. 161 One estate collected at least 
Rs. 36,000 each year from nazrana which represented about twenty-six 
per cent. of the recorded rent. 162 
Such practices, and the continuation of the insecurity which 
111 
78. 
they signified, made a mockery of the tenancy legislation. The 
tenant in Avadh had gained little from the Act of 1921, except the 
rather doubtful privilege of being subjected to more - and novel - 
forms of oppression. As for the landlords, after only five years 
operation of the Act, Sir Samuel O'Donnell was able to answer them: 
"I have no doubt that when the Oudh Rent Act was under 
discussion many landlords in Oudh feared that for them it 
would be the end of all things. Have such fears been 
realised? Will any Oudh landlord get up and say that his 
legitimate influence has been destroyed in Oudh? I cannot 
believe it. There is not a shred of evidence that the 
legitimate influence of the landlords in Oudh has been 
impaired". 163 
Neither the physical changes, nor the effects on landlord-tenant 
relations of the Agra Act of 1926 were as marked as those of the Oudh 
Rent Act. On the one hand, there was considerable divisional 
variation in sir and khudkasht changes, and on the other, a tendency 
for the ill-effects of the legislation to be delayed. By the end of 
the 'twenties, the net result was that in Agra the kisan had returned 
to the insecurity of the years before 1926. 
The changing pattern of landlord holdings of sir and khudkasht 
exhibited striking differences between the eastern and western 
sections of the province. As Table III shows, in the western 
divisions - Meerut, Agra and Rohilkhand - sir increased while 
khudkasht declined, while in the eastern divisions - Allahabad, Jhansi, 
Benares and Gorakhpur - the reverse process took place. AS a result 
79. 
the overall provincial tendency to increase sir at the expense 
(presumably) of khudkasht in the years between the Tenancy Act and 
the depression, is considerably modified. 
TOLE III.  
SIR and KHODKASHT HOLDINGS, AGRA 
PROVINCE, 1.924/25 - 1929/30. 
(acres) 
1924-1925 1929-1930 
Division Sir Khudkasht+ Sir Kbudkasht 
Meeru •,0 	, 	:: .- ,•• S ' 	 : 0 ; 
Agra 3 49,225 2,51,668 3,52,056 2,18,292 
Rohilkand 2,73,191 2,40,843 2,90,062 2 32,701 
Allahe.bad 3,05,626 1,77 675 2,97,312 2 16 653 
Jhansi 5,13,891 4,51,022 4,98 672 4,82,575 
Benares 5,60,063 1,84,026 5,41,240 1,63,946 
Gorakhpur 7,89,288 5,72,751 7,70,397 6,01,010 
Agra Province 34,04,234 24,61,270 34,87,061 23,42,403 
+ includes thekadars and mortgagees' cultivation. 
SOURCE: Revenue Report, 1924/25, 86A-89A; 1929/30, 52A-57A. 
There was in Agra, as in Avadh, a large reduction in the 
non-occupancy area following the distribution of statutory rights. 




HOLDINGS OF STATUTORY, HEIRS OF STATUTORY and NON-OCCUPANCY 




Division Non-occupancy Statutory Heirs Non-occupancy 
Meerut 13 29 892 10,83,900 47,476 1,01,585 
Agra 13,08,247 9,18.658 40,669 55,402 
Rohilkhand 22,63,444 13,88,547 63,773 . 95,710 
Allahabad 14 66 916 6,67,032 27,129 1,05 639 
Jhansi 20,46 912 9,24,718 41 , 013 2,05,104 
Benares 9 29,253 3,72,070 13,858 82,586 
Gorakhpur 12,21,517 7,58,275 37,706 61,704 
_ 
Agra Province 1,.7 61,34,716 273,021 7,24,201 
1,07,19,982 
+ There were of course no statutory or heirs of statutory tenants 
in 1924/25. 
SOURCE: Revenue Report 1924/25, 86A-89A; 1929/30, 52A-57A. 
The early working of the Agra Act brought an improvement in the 
agrarian situation. In 1927, only from Gorakhpur where the landlords 
attempted to acquire land under sections 40 and 41, was there any 
reported deterioration in relations.
164 There was, however, a 
81. 
noticeable trend towards settling enhancement and arrears 'cases' 
privately as the zamindars felt they secured more favourable terms 
in this way. 165 On the whole, it was the landlords at this stage, 
who complained; the Board reported in 1928 that 
"tenants have undoubtedly gained by the Act and realise 
its benefits ... The landlords, on the other hand, feel that 
their influence and credit are less than before". 166 
This followed a report from Meerut Division in the previous year 
that the zamindars were finding it difficult to mortgage their 
167 
land. 
Yet even when the Act worked reasonably, danger signs appeared. 
Although acquisition powers were not used to "any appreciable 
extent"168 in the early years, ejectments were extensive, particularly 
of trespassers, i.e. tenants holding land without a title. 169 
By 1929 these signs of deterioration had clearly set in. 170 
There was increasing evidence of tenants refusing to pay more than 
the recorded rent171 and this stand was resented by the zamindars 
who felt - and in this they were supported by the Rohilkhand 
Commissioner - that they had become simply "rent collectors". 172 
Perhaps as a means of retaliation, there were increasing moves to 
• acquire land under section 40 and 41 to get 'rid oft "unpopular 
tenants", a trend which the Rohilkhand Commissioner expected to 
cause trouble in the future. 173 On the eve of the slump therefore, 
Agra Province was moving back from the temporary improvements of 
1927 and 1928, to the tensions of the period before the now 
tenancy Act. 
82. 
The depression strengthened the tensions which had been 
developing in the agrarian structure during the -twenties. It also 
redirected them, to some extent, because the reactions of the 
tenants became, for the first time, consciously political. 
The fall in prices was evident by 1929/30.
174 
This decline, 
the equivalent of a return to the price level of 1900,
175 
made the 
rents and assessments based on the inflationary levels of the post-
war years insupportable.
176 Farming was no longer an economic 
proposition for statutory tenants and sub-tenants whose rents, 
177 
officialdom now realised, had been increased "out of all proportdo].e. 
In the western districts the fall in prices came after a series of 
poor harvests
178 and statutory tenants there were able to continue 
only by defaulting. 179 In many cases holdings relinquished by 
tenants could be re-let for only fifty per cent. of the previous 
rent. 180 
The landlords themselves, faced with paying revenue demands 
based on the inflated prices of the 'twenties , 191 adopted the only 
methods which, apparently, they understood to meet the default on 
rent payments by the tenants - "suits for arrears of rent, and 
distraints".
182 
In Avadh, moreover, the taluqdars, loth "to part 
with the relics of their territorial authority", demanded the 
continued payment of "oppressive and unjustifiable dues".
18Z 
Prices continued to fall in 1931 until the economic capacitw 
of both landlords and tenants was reduced to a minimum.
184 Yet 
the landlords did not change their approach. The Commissioner of 
Faizabad reported that many taluqdars in Rae Bareli had 
85. 
"failed to profit by the lessons of the agrarian troubles 
of 1921 and ... persisted in the abuses of the nazrana system 
which had nearly been their undoing". 185 
There was increased litigation for arrears in Avadh although eject-
ments declined.
186 
In Agra, while landlords ejected "privileged or 
undesirable tenants l87  ejectment was held back by the diminished 
demand for land and the fact that some zanindars realised that 
"there was little to gain from it where admission to a 
tenancy involved the accrual of statutory rights and there 
was little money available for premia". 188 
A fall in enhancement suits in Agra came, too, as the zamindars 
realised that the time was "most inopportune" .189 These decreases 
were, however, due "to the want of money rather than a growth of 
better feelings". 190 
In some cases the tenants attempted to make use of the conditions: 
tenants, even occupancy tenants, would relinquish their holdings in 
the hope that the landlord, unable to get new tenants, would re-let 
at a limiter rent. 191 More often, however, they resented the harshness 
of the landlords' methods and attempted to resist. The Congress 
assumed the role of leader in organising "no-rent" campaigns in the 
Allahabad Division while at the same time they pressed the Government 
for adequate remissions of rent. 192 This campaign was partly 
successful. The Government granted ramissions 193 but took exception 
to the "no-rent" campaign and resisted it strongly. 194 
There were some improvements in 19302, particularly in the 
eastern districts of Agra around Gorakhpur where a sugar "boom" 
made things easier, but improvements generally helpad the merchants 
and marwaris, 196  and did not solve the fundamental agrarian problem. 
In Avadh the continuance of law prices forced tenants to throw up 
holdings "rented at uneconomic rates".
196 
Yet there were at the 
same time reports of landlords attempting to take illegal exactions 
in Faizabad
197 
and of the continued ejection of paikasht tenants 
"based on the desire to gain increased rent from the incoming 
198 
tenants". 	In Agra there was a marked fall in litigation, the 
landlords accepting the fact that 
"no useful purpose would be served by obtaining decrees for 
arrears of rent which could not be liquidated or by the 
wholesale ejectment of tenants who could not be profitably 
replaced by others at a time of depression". 199 
The Provincial Congress Committee, however, continued to complain 
of the repressive treatment of tenants by police and zamindars. 200 
The tenants, Nehru claimed, had been faced with continual demands 
to "pay, pay, pay or lose your lands and in addition suffer other 
penalties„ .201 The zamindars exhausted both the patience and 
resources of the tenants. 201 They had little resistance left and 
gradually, as economic conditions began to improve, relations between 
zamindars and tenants settled into relative calm: political agitation 
lessened and there were "no-rent campaigns” only in a few "isolated 
instances". 203 In fact, the zamindars in Allahabad Division "regained 
their courage" and began to file suits for ejectment,
204 
a trend 
which continued through to 1936 and spread to both provinces.
205 
Ejectm 	 206ents decreased again in 1936 	but by then the economic 
crisis was over and relations were returning to the traditional 
85. 
tension and exploitation - the official "normal".
207 
The effects of those years were not to be shaken off so lightly, 
however, for it had been a time of bitterness, a trial of strength 
in which one of the chief consequences was that the zamindars lost 
their dignity, in spite of the backing of the government. They had 
been frightened by the militancy of the kisans - "the threat from the 
Left". 208 Mat was more, they had shawl' their fear; relations 
could never return quite to the"normalcy" of pre-1930, if for no 
other reason than that the kisans now knew the value of political 
pressure. Increasingly, through the growth of the kisan sabhas and 
the leadership of the Congress,
209 the kisans became a political 
force, conscious of their power. 210 This consciousness grew after 
the passing of the Constitution in the Government of India Act of 
1935 which, by widening the franchise, gave the kisan a greater 
political importance • 2h] It was a development of which the zamindars 
could not help but be aware. 
"Since the inauguration of the present Constitution, the 
zamindars, though gradually, nonetheless with a great amount 
of certainty, have been losing ground. In the political 
field, their age-long influence over their tenants waned and 
they, before their very eyes, saw in a majority of cases their 
awn tenants voting against their wishes ... In the financial 
field as well ... the zamindar finds that in spite of repeated 
demands his rents are not being paid and he is hard put to 
realise enough to pay the Government revenue much less to 
212 
make both his ends meet". 
86. 
Despite this realisation the zamindars continued to act as if 
nothing had changed, as if there were a time-lag of a generation in 
their thinking. Their economic powers still buttressed their 
superior position in village life. These powers enabled them, 
despite political changes to continue to behave, at leastwithin the 
village, as they felt it was their 'tradition' to behave. The world 
of the legislature was several spheres removed from the world of 
the village and often there must have seemed little relation between 
them. 213 Nazrana was illegal in Avadh yet official reports were 
forced.to notice that it, and other illegal exactions, continued. 
In Bahraich nazrana was 
"invariably taken by almost all estates ... at the time of 
giving fresh leases to new tenants or admitting the heir of 
a deceased tenant to the statutory tenancy of a holding ... 
The rate of nazrana generally varies from Rs. 1 to Rs. 10 
per bigha; but in some special cases where therewas keen 
competition for particular holdings, the rate of nazrana 
was even much higher than this". 214 
In Sultanpur there was no fixed rate 
"but such (was) the land hunger of a dense population that 
fantastic sums (were) paid for vacant holdings put upt for 
auction, for example, Rs. 5000 in village Itaunya Pachhim, 
tahsil Amethi, for a holding area of 38 bighas, and Rs. 800 
by a Brahman, for 27 bighas in village Raharkpur, tahsil 
. Sultanpur" 215  
In Sitapur, nazrana was realised only "here and there". 
87. 
In Agra nazrana was present as well although the "more numerous 
body of occupancy tenants" prevented as much ::.success as in Avadh. 217 
In Aligarh District it was a feature of all large estates
218 
but in 
Meerut "a district held predominantly by Bhaiyachara and Pattidari 
communities", most of the 
"rent-collecting landlords (were) petty zamindars whose 
status (was) generally not much above that of their tenants, 
and they (had) not, therefore, the influence to exact more 
than the rents agreed upon. Moreover, the majority of the 
tenants themselves (were) of a spirit sufficiently independ- 
ent to resist attempts at such exactions without much 
difficulty" •
2l9 
Nazrana was, however, only one form of exaction. Tenants were 
under an obligation 
"to devote at least one day in the season to the zamindarts 
land which he (had) to plough up free of charge. Closely 
allied (was) Begar or forced labour. The tenant (was) 
forced to carry loads, build houses, tile roofs or perform 
any other odd jobs absolutely free of charge or, at the best, 
for a purely nominal payment, for the zamindar and, in most 
cases, for his officials".
220 
As well, the zanindar requisitioned goods - ghee, oil, milk, 
gur - at below market rates
221 
and in many cases exacted dues and 
levies for things as diverse as keeping a bullock cart
222 
or the 
birth of a child. This latter was called "pet-piravan": "the word 
means 'pain in the stomach , and is a euphemism for labour pains. 
88. 
It is paid when a lady in the zamindarls family is safely delivered 
of a child". 223 
Some zamindars went further than financial or material 
exactions. Tfie:Cbngrets Committee which drew up the report of 1936, 
while admitting that "illegal practices ... are not resorted to by 
all zamindars" ,224  did maintain that the zamindars had perfected a • 
great many diverse forms of exacting. 
"Fields, already sawn, are ploughed up and crops forcibly 
reaped or burnt down. The tenant is called up to the 
zamindarts kutchery and there keptin confinement for several 
hoursy, sometimes for two or three days, without any food. 
Be is made to stand in the sun, sometimes with a stick 
between his legs, so that he cannot bring them together. 
He is beaten, care being taken not to leave marks on the 
body, and sometimes the members of his family are forced to 
witness the beating. He is made to kneel dawn, put his 
arms from under the knee joints and clasp his ears with his 
hands. This is called "sitting like a cock". His cattle are 
forcibly impounded. ... It is not feasible to inflict 
physical violence on members of the higher castes. But the 
zamindar resorts to more powerful methods of coercion. 
He has bones burnt before the man's house and, in this way, 
wounds him in his religious susceptibilities". 225 
But above all, the zamindar was always in a more powerful 
position even when strictly within the law. The tenant could be 
enmeshed in the legalities of his position so that he was never 
89. 
V 	
able adequately to clear himself. The Congress Commit tee Report 
gives the case of a distraint in village Aura, district Allahabad. 
"In this case the tenant owed Rs. 150 to the zamindar as 
arrears. For the recovery of this amount, his four bullocks 
actually worth Rs. 300 were auctioned for Rs. 55, out of 
which Rs. 35 were deducted as cattle pound charges and 
Rs. 20 only taken as payment of the arrears. Finally, a 
decree for Rs. 162 was granted by the court against the 
tenant as the amount still outstanding as arrears, in 
satisfaction of which the tenant paid Rs. 60 cash and 
gave a hand note for Rs. 45" •226 
Accounts of zamindari misdemeanours such as these were often 
discounted as the ravings of class-conscious Congressmen. 227 Yet 
Congress was never a distinctly class organisation. It had a large 
zamindari membership and zamindars were frequently its lenders in 
the local and provincial sphere.
228 Moreover, Gandhi, to whom 
means were all-important, rover supported abolition of the landlords 
from above. 229 It was largely because it was socially inclusive 
that Congress found difficulty in implementing a consistent policy 
when it became a political, as opposed to a national, body after the 
elections of 19'37.
230 
Moreover, while some reports may have been embellished by the 
natural hyperbole of the villager, this would hardly seem to be a 
satisfactory explanation for the whole problem when the continually 
deteriorating relations of landlords and tenants are considered. 
There are too many reports from official or independent sources of 
excesses - nazrana and the like - for these to be discounted and 
it would seam to be reasonable to assume that if SOMB illegalities 
did exist, then others also existed in various forms. 
Agrarian relations were strained in 1937, exacerbated by the 
electoral victory of Congress and the expectation of far-reaching 
reform by the kisans. The zamindars withdrew customary privileges 
of the tenants while the tenants attempted to claim new rights • 231 
Litigation increased as both groups attempted to establish their 
position and rights before the new legislation which Congress promised 
was enacted.
232 In 1938/39 it was only possible to say that the 
situation had become no worse.
233 
Nevertheless there was a twenty-
234 five per cent. rise in litigation, 	as the tenants "took every 
opportunity to contest the claim made by the zamindars".
235 The 
zamindars acted in the same vein and "many suits were instituted 
even for a single instalment of rent whereas in previous years 
arrears were often allowed to run for a considerable time"•
236 This 
brought about increased ejectments for there was "a growing 
237 
disinclination of the zamindars to show any leniency to the tenants". 
Actual clashes occurred between groups
238 
and agrarian relations 
fell to a dangerous nadir. 
( iv) 
The essentially conservative measures of the Congress government 
did nothing to alleviate this difficult and dangerous position. 
Its labours did in fact increase the tension if anything for they 
proved to be a most unsatisfying compromise which disappointed the 
91. 
kisans while alarming the zamindars. 
The lkisan groups' both within Congress and in other organ-
isations and parties expected, not without cause, 239 much of the 
new Ministry. They anticipated delivery "in toto on the campaign 
promises ... and were eager to press forward towards tenancy reform, 
debt reduction and rent relief". 240 The government, however, 
contented itself with moves which, although in some cases swift, were 
essentailly palliatives.
241 Congress assumed office in July 1937242 
and on 2 August 1937 the appointment was announced of two committees, 
"one to consider reform of the Tenancy and Land Revenue Law 
and the other to examine proposals for relieving rural 
indebtedness ... This was followed very shortly by Government 
instructions for stay of proceedings for recovery of 
arrears of rent previous to Rabi 1344 Fasli, for prohibiting 
ejectment or enhancement, for the recovery of debts due by 
farmers and small tenants. To give due validity to the stay 
of proceedings for old rental and civil debts, the Government 
introduced two Acts, one affecting the revenue courts and 
the other the moratorium. The former was given effect to 
on 22nd September while the latter came to effect from 
1st January, 1938" .243 
To the kisan organisations, however, "the budget was the first 
important measure of the new provincial government, and agrarian 
relief did not figure in it,, .
244 Moreover, the second budget, 
introduced in March 1938 contained only 
"extremely moderate plans for ... patchwork amelioration of 
rural living conditions mingled with the assumption that 
92. 
the villages could solve their own problems if a little cash 
and a few inspired organisers were sent to them ... there 
was nothing in the new budget that would disturb the most 
conservative zamindar in the province ... None of the 
provisions of the (Election) Manifesto were provided for by 
the Budget proposals" .245 
Such dalliance with the long-felt grievances and newly-aroused 
• aspirations called forth a great deal of criticism which the terns 
of the United Provinces Tenancy Bill did not stem. The President 
of the National Congress noted at the Hamipura Session of the 
Congress in 1938 that the record of the Ministry had not "COMB up to 
public expectation" .246 The Agrarian Sub-Committee of the Provincial 
Congress Committee dismissed the proposals as "modest ... inadequate 
(and) falling far short of the proposals enunciated in (the) 
Agrarian Programme and the recommendations of the Provincial 
Congress Committee". 247 Even kisan leaders who were prepared to 
admit that the ministry had problems in introducing 'revolutionary' 
legislation felt that the ministry had not "exhaudid all the 
possibilities" for adequate reform. 248 
Other commentators were less kind and more outspoken. 249 The 
opinion of kisans was clear from resolutions passed at rallies which 
demanded the amendment of the Bill to provide for their 'minimum 
demands' - 
"abolition of the zamindari system, non-ejectment of a 
tenant under all circumstances, wiping out of all arrears of 
rent and the grant of hereditary rights to sub-tenants" . 260 
93. 
Paradoxically, this 'inadequate' legislation was enough to 
alarm the zamindars. Their protests that the provisions were 
"derogator y" 251 and that they undermined "their rightful position" 252 
were, however, only the agonised squawks of a vested interest which 
realised that an old order was fast passing. In reality there was 
little in the Bill to cause genuine alarm. RafiAhmad Kidwai, the 
Finance Minister, the minister responsible for the Bill, admitted 
that 
"the changes proposed were not revolutionary ... The Bill 
merely reduced the zamindar's power of tyrannising over 
tenants and did not affect the zamindari system". 255 
The Government in fact accepted as one of the "outstanding principles" 
of the Bill "the maintenance of the proprietary rights of the 
landlords, i.e. the maintenance of the zamindari systee. 254 
This was the real weakness of the Bill, for it meant that the 
Congress had decided to do merely what had been done An the preceding 
eighty years, viz, to repair the agrarian system within the confines 
of the landlord-tenant system. This made enevitable a complete 
clash with the kisans. Further it denied any chance of success in 
solving the agrarian problems of the province. 
This is not to deny that Congress had many problems. The 
zamindari element within Congress had itself to be placated 255 - 
or circumvented.
256 
As well any legislation had to run the gauntlet 
of the Legislative Council, the Upper House, which still represented, 
very largely, the propertied interests. 257 The greatest hurdle, 
however, lay in the provisions of the Constitution of 1935. Article 
AL, 
94. 
299 made the previous sanction of the Governor of the Province 
necessary for any bill to abolish or modify the zmnindari system 
in anyway. 258 Such a restrictionyvas tantamount, as Congress had 
seen before it assumed office, to removing any hope of changing the 
agrarian structure. There remains, however, even when allowance has 
been made for these difficulties, the doubt as to whether Congress 
at this stage wanted to change the existing struoture. Even the 
the Act 
259 
This was plainly insufficient to meet the needs of a society racked 
by the failure of its land tenure system. 
Mile, therefore, the disappointment of kisan hopes was serious 
enough, it was the lesser of the failings of the Congress ministry. 
Far more serious was the fact that they failed to make the system 
any more workable. They, the first responsible Indian ministry, 
achieved no more than the alien administrators of the Raj, because 
they aimed no higher than them and because they followed the same 
methods. Perhaps the most important achievement was to consolidate 
the law for both provinces so that the distinctive nature of the 
talugdars was destroyed and the tenant groups could become rather 
more homogeneous. 
The actual provisions of the United Provinces Tenancy Act, 
Act XVII of 1939, followed the pattern of previous legislation. 
The concern was largely with the lands of the landlords, the status 
of the tenants and the relationship between the two agrarian groups 
which are expressed Largely in a rent relationship on the one hand 
and a tenure relationship on the other. The Act was not aimed at 
Advocate General claimed that IN did not modify any right in land. 
95. 
any one ovedall objective such as the greater protection of the•
tenants or the reduction of the landlords for both groups lost 
and gained rights and advantages. 
The 'larger' landlords - those "assessed in the United Provinces 
to a local rate of more than twenty five rupees" 260 - were most 
affected by the sir provisions of the new Act. The sir of the 
smaller landlords, who did not fall into the above group, was left 
alone •
261 
The larger landlords, however, lost the sir which they 
had gained from the legislation of the 'twenties, unless it was sir 
which had been acquired by an exchange of other sir held before 
those Acts were passed.
262 In addition, iftheypossessed "fifty 
acres or more than fifty acres of sir which (was) not let and which 
did not cease to be sir under any of the previous provisions", 
any tenant of sir holding fromthtm became an hereditary tenant, which 
was the protected tenant class introduced by the Act.
263 
If after 
the withdrawal of that sir which had been acquired after 1921 or 
1926 the large landlord had less than fifty years, tenants of his 
let sir only became hereditary tenants after the assistant collector 
had reserved for him 
11so much of (his) sir and of his khudkasht as amounts to 
fifty acres or the area of (his) sir whichever is less: 
Provided that only so much of the sir-holders sir which is 
let shall be demarcated as is necessary to make the total 
area demarcated as sir equal to fifty acres or the area of 
(his) sir whichever is less" 
As was usual, exemption from these provisions was granted- to estates 
96. 
under the Court of Wards and to certain classes of persons Who were 
unable to cultivate their lands
265 
- "a female, a minor, a lunatic, 
an idiot, or a person incapable of cultivating by reason of blindness 
or physical infirmity or because he is in the military, naval or 
air service of the Government" .266 
There was no provision in the new Act for the future acquisition 
of sir either for small or large landlords. 267 The landlords had, 
however, the right to apply for the acquisition of land held 
"(a) by an occupancy or an hereditary tenant, if such land 
is situated within the limits of any municipality, cantonment 
or notified area, and is required for building purposes, or 
(b) by a hereditary tenant if such land is required by 
(the landlord) for his awn residence, or a garden or a 
grove for his own enjoyment". 268  
The application was made to the Collector who could grant up 
to five acres or as much as, together with the landlord's existing 
house, garden and grove, would make five acres.
269 
 Occupancy 
tenants received compensation at the rate of ten times, and 
hereditary tenants at the rate of six times "the valuation of the 
land acquired at the rates applicable to hereditary tenants", in 
addition to compensation for improvements and trees.
270 
If the 
land was not used for the purpose for which it had been acquired, 
within three years, the Collector was to order that "the land be 
restored to (the tenant) without the payment of any compensation". 271 
These provisions were thus broader in the sense that they removed 
272 
the Collector's discretionary power over applications for acquisition 
97. 
but yet more restrictive in that they allowed higher compensation 
and were more limited in scope. 
The Act adopted section 17 of the Oudh Rent Amendment Act of 
1921 for the whole province and it therefore became illegal for a 
landholder "to take a premium for the admission of a tenant to the 
holding" or to make it a "condition of any tenancy that the tenant 
(was) under any service to do any work for the landholder, whether 
for wages or not".
273 
As well the landlords last the power to have 
arrears recovered by the arrest and detention of a tenant. 274 A 
suit or notice from the tahsildar remained the only methods for 
the recovery of arrears. 275 
The tenant group was further expanded by the 1939 Act but not 
in any novel way. The statutory tenants of the 'twenties disappeared 
and were replaced by hereditary tenants: the statutory rights 
which had been heritable for five years had in fact been expanded 
to a fully inheritable tenancy. Henceforth, hereditary tenancy was 
to be the basic tenant position. "Above" were the privileged groups, 
the debris of the early settlements and legislation, ranging from 
the permanent tenure holders or Avadhi permanent lessees, through 
the fixed-rate tenants, the tenants holding under "a special agree-
ment or a judicial decision" in Avadh, to the exproprietary and 
occupancy tenants whose tenures continued to differ as between the 
276 
two provinces. "Below" remained the residual "non-occupancy" tenants. 
Hereditary rights were for those who had had no right other 
than the statutory tenancy, before 1939, and for tenants of the sir 
of large landlords which ceased to be sir under section 6 or which, 
98. 
being let sir, remained outside the arrear demarcated by the assistant 
collector under section 16.
277 
Areas of unstable or special cultivation 
were of course excluded, as in the past. 278 The hereditary tenancy 
was heritable but not transferable 279 except that it could be sublet 
for a period of up to five years 280 or sold to realise arrears of 
rent which had been decreed by the court. 281 
Initial rents were still to be by agreement282 and they could 
be enhanced or abated on grounds similar to those provided in Agra 
in 1926.
283 Pre-eminent still as the measure of the "adequate" level 
of rents for occupancy and hereditary tenants,was the roster year 
system, renamed the "rent rate system !,284 and fixed for a period of 
twenty years unless the settlement of the area fell in or extra-
ordinary economic conditions prevailed.
285 
The procedure followed 
41, 	closely that of the roster years, with the additional provision that 
the rent-rate officer had to consider, along with the financial and 
agricultural circumstances of the district, "the expenses of 
cultivation and the cost to the cultivator of maintaining himself 
and his family". 286 
Unless there was a re-assessment of the revenue, or the tenant's 
holding increased in size or was improved by the landlord, occupancy 
and hereditary rents could be enhanced only once in ten years. 287 
Non-occupancy tenants were liable to enhancement once in every five 
years. 288 There was, however, a constant awareness - even to the 
point of being unnecessarily repetitive - expressed in the Act, of 
the likelihood of another economic calamity of the scope of the 
1929-33 Depression. Rent rates could be altered because of "a 
99. 
substantial rise or fall in the price of agricultural produce or 
any particular form of produce" 289 and although, as in 1926, the 
"rise or fall in the average local price of staple food crops" was 
not a ground for enhancement or abatement as such, the legislators, 
conscious of the problem, made provision for such an occurrence. 
If the Government was satisfied that there had been, from some 
"extraordinary cause", a sudden and substantiated rise in the price 
of agricultural produce or that "an emergency" had arisen in any 
• 
area, it could appoint a special officer and "invest him with all 
or any of the following powers: 
(a) The powers of a rent-rate officer; 
(b) Power to fix, commute, abate or enhance rents in accordance 
with the sanctioned rent rates; 
(c) Power in an emergency to abate rents summarily otherwise 
than in accordance with such rent rates"  290 
As well, the occurrence of an "agricultural calamity" allowed the 
Government to "remit or suspend for any period the whole or any 
portion of the rent of any holding affected by such calamity" and to 
"remit or suspend for a like period the whole or aportion of the 
revenue assessed on such mahal".
291 
The hereditary tenant was no freer from ejectment during his 
tenancy than his statutory predecessor or the earlier occupancy 
tenant. The landlord could have the tenant ejected for default in 
the payment of arrears of rent,
292 a course which the Government 
hoped would be only "an extreme process for getting rid of an utterly 
bad tenant". 
293 
The tenant was also liable to ejectment for misusing 
100 . 
the land or acting inconsistently with a lease or agreement. 294 
Moreover, a tenant who transferred or sublet his holding "otherwise 
than in accordance with the provisions of (the) Act" was "on the 
suit of the landholder ... liable to ejectment from the area so 
transferred or sublet". 295 Trespassers - persons illegally entering 
onto a holding - were liable both to ejectment and to pay damages 
of up to four times the annual rental value. 296 A non-occupancy 
tenant was liable to ejectment, as in the past, when he was in arrears 
or when his tenancy expired.
297 
A tenant wrongfully ejected could 
sue for re-possession of the holding and/Or compensation.
298 
 
In an attempt to provide a measure of protection for a class of 
tenants who were traditionally left unprotected - the tenants of 
sir - the Act allowed those who did not become hereditary tenants 
under section 6 to retain possession for five years from the commence-
ment of the Act, or, in the case of tenants admitted after the Act, 
from the date of their admission to the holding.
299 
Only the most privileged tenant groups - the permanent tenure-
holders, fixed rate tenants, and Avadhi occupancy and "special 
terms" tenants - had unlimited rights to make improvements. 300 
Exproprietary, Agra occupancy, and hereditary tenants could plant • 
trees and make any improvement except to erect buildings on a 
holding or construct a tank. 301 These latter could be built only 
with the written consent of the landlord because hewas liable to pay 
compensation for them if the tenant was ejected. 302 Conversely, 
however, the landiolder had to obtain the tenant's consent to make 




Such was, therefore, the attempt of the Congress Ministry to 
meet the demands of the agrarian situation. Some points of the 
Agrarian Programme of 1936 received recognition; many did not. The 
Act moved to make premia illegal and to give "heritable rights along 
with the right to build houses and plant trees" 3°4 but it made "no 
radical change in the antiquated and repressive land tenure and 
revenue systems". 305 Nor did it treadjust" rent and revenue to 
"present conditions" or make a "substantial reduction in both".
306 
- 
Many of the ideals withered in the hard realities of administratiml; 
uneconomic holdings ware not exempted from rent or revenue, arrears 
of rent were not wiped out, ejectment remained for arrears. 307  Such 
shortcomings are understandable. That is less so is the "undue 
concern for legalisms and for the rights of the zamindars ° °8 which 
bedevilled the Act. The Congress continued to deal in that curiou s  
brand of legal naivety by which an impoverished and often illiterate 
man had to seek redress in a court against an economically more secure 
opponent. 309 Indeed, so ineffectual did the Act appear when it was 
enacted, that one commentator was moved to remark that while the 
taluqdars had 




Act which have curtailed their customary rights and weakened 
their hold on tenants ... it is unlikely that in wallmamaged 
zamindaris of Agra the old position will be seriously disturbed. 
It is not being sufficiently realised haw little the tenant 
has really gained by the new Act". 310 
A sad commentary indeed on the efforts of a 'national' government. 
TABLE V. 
HEREDITARY HOLDINGS and TOTAL HOLDINGS, U.P., 1944-1945. 
(acres) 
Division Hereditary Total 
Meerut 12,33,492 39,37,655 
Agra 12,70,403 41,22,578 
Robilkband 18,74,978 52,17,647 
Allababad 11,05,335 44,19,496 
Jhansi 15,46,297 42,98,753 
Benares 5,12,027 35,03,622 
Gorakbpur 9,26,375 48,50,199 
Lucknow 39,09,607 50,95,885 
Faizabad 38,49,399 54,69,151 
U. P. 1,62,27,913 4,09,14,686 





The provisions of the Act as regards tenancy were implemented 
from 1 January 1940 and although they could not be recorded in 
1939/40 because the khataunis had already been completed, the new 
hereditary*mancies were given practical effect as from that date.
311 
Settlements which were finalised during the Ifaties illustrate the 
extent of the hereditary tenancies in the districts. Of the sample 
thus provided the proportion went as high as 35.2 per cent. in 
Aligarh
312 and was generally one-fifth to one-third. 313 This is 
illustrated by Table V, which also shows the variation between these 
districts which were in the western region of the Province and the 
'eastern' districts of the Benares and Gorakhpur Divisions on the 
one hand, and the districts of Avadh on the other. The much greater 
proportion of hereditary holdings in Avadh is a result of the 
predominance of non-occupancy tenancy until the 'twenties in that 
Province which meant that the greater part of the area of the Province 
became statutory and hence, hereditary tenancy land. The very law 
proportion of hereditary holdings in the eastern districts is conversely 
due to the relatively larger amount of land held by tenants with 
occupancy rights - particularly occupancy tenants in Gorakhpur and 
fixed-rate tenants, together with bccupancy tenants, in Benares. 
314 
The landlords held a large amount of land in these districts as well. 
Closely linked with the rise of the hereditary tenancies was the 
radical reduction in the non-occupancy or 'ordinary' area in both 
provinces. This was proof that the Act had been of positive value 
104. 
TABLE VI. 
NON-OCCUPANCY HOLDINGS, UNITED PROVINCES, 1939/40 - 1944/45. 
(acres) 
Division 1939/40+ 1944/45 
Meerut 2,96,368 24,691 
Agra 2,38,295 11,787 
Rohilkhand 4,40,388 37,272 
Allahabad 2,53,143 36,068 
Jhansi 3,23,537 32,835 
Benares 2,04,177 16,016 
Gorakhpur 2,77,579 20,648 
Lucknow 13,82,340 26,141 
Faizabad 12,59,320 13,670 
U.P. 46,65,157 1,79,317 
+ includes heirs of atatutory tenants. 
SOURCE: Revenue Report 1939/40, 66A-83A; 1944/45, 48A-75A. 
I. 
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for otherwise the new tenancy would have represented nothing more 
than a lengthening of the statutory tenancy. That it was more than 
this can be seen from Table VI. 
There is no evidence from the statistics to show that the sir 
provisions were effective. In both provinces sir actually increased 
between 1940 and 1945 and while in Avadh there was a parallel 
decline in the area of khukkasht, this area remained static in Agra. 
This trend was fairly uniform, only the Benares and Lucknow Divisions 
showing a contrary movement. (6f. Table VII;* below). 
Overall, however, apart from its technical implementation, the 
Act did not provide a lasting answer to the tension between the 
rural classes. The first nine months of 1940 were a transition 
period when 
"the general public, and in BOMB respects the courts themselves 
were doubtful as to the implications and correct interpretation 
of some of the new sections of the Act".
315 
There was an improvement "to some ex -tent" in relations but this was 
credited to a decline in political agitation rather than to any 
increased cordiality for the Act had "deprived petty agitators of an 
excuse for going round the villages ... inciting the tenants to seize 
their landlords' grass or timber".
316 
Rent collections were 
generally satisfactory
317 so that litigation and ejectments for 
arrears declined.
318 However, there was considerable ejectment as 
the landlords moved to rid themselves of those who had 'trespassed' 
in the hope of gaining from the new Act.
319 The Board endorsed the 
feeling that the break from "the old feudal ties between the 
320 
zamindars and tenants" was final 	but there was little to suggest 
106. 
TABLE VII. 
SIR and KEMDKASHT AREA, UNITED PROVINCES, 1939/40 - 1944/45. 
(acres), 
1939-1940 1944-1945 
Division Sir Khudkasht Sir Khudkasht 
Meerut 7,10,519 5,23,466 7,13,962 5,85,709 
Agra 3,65,157 2,19,403. 3,86,836 2,13,827 
Rohilkhand 3,00,634 2,78,272 3,40,110, 2,45,184 
Allahabad 2,91,151 2,.26,656 2,99,772 2,25,014 
Jhansi . 4,74,184 6,19,269 5,78,847 5,73,309 
Benares 5,13,934 2,04,745 4,87,619 2 18,323 
Gorakhpur 7,37,860 7,11,785 7,56,545 7,33,537 
Lucknow 5,25,839 1,56,329 3,22,145 1,55,942 
Faizabad 3,16,509 2,99,065 3,78,054 1,41,944 
U.P. 40,35,787 27,93,696 42,63,890 27,94,903 
SOURCE: Revenue Report 1939/40, 66A-83A; 1944/45, 48A-75A. 
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that any real improvement could be expected. 
In the next year, there was a continued improvement in 
relations, owing to the lessening of political activity rather than 
to any change in outlook.
321 It was reported that generally the 
Act had not been tried fully by the tenants: while they were 
prepared to contest ejectment suits filed by the zamindars
322 
they had not to make use of the longer period allayed for the 
payment of rent for fear of losing their new security.
323 
Hereditary 
tenancy resulted in a general increase in the value of tenant 
holdings and tenants were, as a result, anxious to have their rights 
defined. 324 If there was to be conflict between landlord and 
tenant in the future, the depth of its bitterness would be measured 
by this attachment to hereditary rights. As yet, however, there 
had been no spark. 
Nor was there in 1941/42325 although the first signs of trouble 
appeared as the zamindars in some areas began to use - and misuse - 
section 171 which allowed for the ejectment of a tenant who illegally 
sub-let his holding. Tenants complained that they were being 
evicted even if they, as the tenant-in-chief, had commence an 
action to evict their sub-tenant.
326 
In these circumstances, it was 
reported, subleases became "comparatively valueless". 327 
The influence of war-inflated prices began to be apparent from 
1943 and this enabled the cultivator to preserve a "prosperity" 
which kept agrarian unrest at bay. 328 There was always, however, 
in the thinking of revenue officials, the spectre of the fate of 
the inflated enhancements which had followed the boom of the 
108. 
'twenties. The Commissioner of the Faizabad Division feared the 
reaction which might follow a downward trend in prices. Despite 
the calm, it was a disquieting time. 329 The prosperity, however, 
continued through 1944 and 1945,
330 so that rent payments - despite 
an increase in rental demands - continued with little trouble •
331 
The Board regarded this as a distinctly qualified mark of the success 
of the new Act, however: "whether the existing provisions of the 
Act regarding collection of rent would have worked so well even 
during a period of normal or law prices" remained, they felt, a 
moot point. 332 
Other grounds for conflict indeed, were not so well cushioned 
by the economic conditions. There was an increased ejectment of 
tenants Who had sublet illegally which in turn led to redoubled 
efforts on the part of the tenants-in-chief to rid themselves of the 
sub-tenants.
333 
Although the Board expected in 1943 that ejectments 
under section 171 would fall "rapidly" in the future, 334 in 1945 
they were still reporting "wholesale ejectments" on this ground.
335 
That this was so despite the reported reluctance on the part of the 
tenants to sublet
336 was explained by the Board's order requiring the 
patwari to obtain the signature of the tenant-in-chief before 
entering': a sub-tenancy in the records to prevent "ejectments 
facilitated by the collusion o patwaris". 337 
Congress had had no hand in administering the Tenancy Act as 
it had left office in October 1939 in protest against the policy of 
the British government on national independence and Indian partic-
ipation in the world war.
338 During the war the province was 
109. 
administered by the Governor and it was not until after the 
339 elections of March 1946 that a Congress government again held office. 
Its action when it did return to power were a measure of the defects 
in the Act 
"which had made it possible for the landlords to eject a 
considerable number of tenants on flimsy pretexts, thus 
defeating the main object of the Act which was to secure 
for the tenants a stability of tenure". 340 
The Home Minister, Rafi Ahmed Kidwei, ordered a stay of execution 
for all ejectment proceedings under sections va and 175, 341 as a 
result of which ejectment suits fell from over 90,000 to 77,752. 342 
Immediately afterwards a Tenancy LWAT Regulations Committee of three 
members (Charan Singh, Ajit Prasad Jain and Radha Mohan) considered 
the need to amend the 1939 Act. 343 
As a result of their deliberations, Act X of 1947 attempted 
to remove the worst defects. The power of the landlord to acquire 
land for houses, gardens or groves under section 51 was removed 
completely.
344 
Moreover, a tenant whose land had been acquired 
could apply, within six months of the commencement of the Act, for 
its restoration on the grounds that it had not been used for the 
purpose for which it was originally acquired. 345 As well, certain 
classes of ejected tenants were permitted to apply for reinstatement. 
There were four groups: firstly,tenants ejected for an amount of 
arrears less than one quarter of the rent; secondly,ten&nts ejected 
under section 171 "otherwise than on the ground of an illegal 
transfer byway of sale or gift"; thirdly, a tenant ejected as a 
110. 
trespasser despite the fact that he had been officially recorded as 
an occupant after January 1938 and, lastly, any tenant of sir who 
had become an hereditary tenant under section 16 but who had been 
ejected or dispossessed 
"in consequence of any fraud, misrepresentation, undue 
influence or coercion practised upon or against him by the 
346 
landholder or by any person acting on behalf of the landholder". 
All had six months from the commencement of the Act to seek redress. 347 
For the future, a tenant whose ejectment had been ordered because 
of arrears, was to be given one month to ddpost the full amount 
before the order was made final.
348 
In addition, to give further 
protection to non-hereditary tenants of sir, they were made exempt 
from ejectment for a further period of five years from the beginning 
of the Act.
350 
These amendments relieved the position to some extent. The 
Board noted that 
"tenants who had been ejected on insufficient ground or for 
technical reasons were enabled to obtain possession again. 
Tenants of sir and certain tenants who would otherwise have 
been liable to ejectment got a fresh lease of life." 351 
The fact remained, however, that more far-reaching measures 
were needed. Piecemeal legislation had not brought security to the 
tenants for it had left untouched the existing structure of the 
village. Legal complexity but not rural peace had been the result of 
ninety years of legislation. Henceforth radical change, in the 'magic 
formula' of zamindari abolition, was the touchstone for the brave 
new agrarian order. 
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Report of the Budaun District, U.P., 1929 by A.A.Waugh (Allahabad: 
Superintendent, Government Press, U.P., 1930), 9: "It is a question 
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CHAPTER IV. 
THE AGRARIAN STRUCTURE, 1951. 
(i) 
The legal fact of the ownership of a piece of land consists in 
the aggregate of a set of rights or privileges relating to that 
piece of land. These rights may, of course, vary under different 
systems of law. Under Anglo-American law a person who owns a piece 
of land in fee simple has 
"as against each of an indefinite constantly changing number 
of persons a claim that they refrain from certain kinds of 
acts - trespasses ... - with reference to the land. In 
addition he has the privilege or liberty of using the land 
in all lawful ways. He also has the legal power or legal 
ability to transfer or otherwise cut dawn the ownership. 
Finally, he has an immunity from having his ownership destroyed 
or altered without his consent except in certain specified 
ways, as, for example; by the exercise of the power of 
eminent domain by the State. ul 
Subject to the absolute ownership of the State expressed in the levy 
of land revenue; this, was an approximation of the rights conferred 
on the "landlords" by the administrators of Company and Crown in India. 
If each of such rights is thought of as a unit in an ownership 
"bundle", then the agrarian legislation enacted from 1859 to 1947 
served to distribute those units between the groups within the 
agrarian structure: the State, the landlord and the cultivator or 
140. 
tenant. Generally it gave to different groups a specific right - 
the right to revenue, to rent, to occupancy and so on. Sometimes 
it shared specific rights between the groups, breaking the units, 
as it were, into irregular portions. Yet, although the units thus 
became separated, they still represented, in sum, the fact of 
awnership. 2 There was not, in the Indian context, anything very 
revolutionary in the mere fact of separation or sharing of rights, 
for this, to all intents and purposes, had always been the case. 
The State, in the person of the Raja, had traditionally exercised an 
ultimate suzerainty by levying land revenue, while the landholder - 
who was ipso facto the settlement holder - retained the remaining 
rights. 3 What was different in the efforts of the nineteenth and 
twentieth centuries was the range over which the rights were 
distributed, "the elaborate sets of inferior claims" 4 which were 
defined. 
The result was that in the Indian agrarian system there was no 
"owner" possessing the totality of rights which are accepted as the 
standard of "western" ownership. The zamindar's position was 
compromised by the State 'above' and the rights which were recognised 
'below' him 5 and yet these inferior-right holders fell short of 
ownership themmelves.
6 Instead there was 
"a layering of rights from these of the State as superlandlord 
(or ultimate owner) dawn through those of the sub-landlords 
(penultimate owners) to those of several tiers of tenants". 7 
This was the position in 1950. It had not been as well defined 
at the time of the passing of the first tenancy acts, however, and 
3.41. 
the importance of the various measures discussed in the preceding 
chapters lies in their action in creating the later structure. 
When the Bengal Tenancy Act of 1859 was applied to the North-Western 
Provinces and the Sub-Settlement Act of 1866 and Rent Act of 1868 
were enacted for Avadh, the majority of the residual rights of 
ownership beyond those retained by the State were vested in the 
zandndar, or taluqdar - the person with itom the revenue settlement 
was concluded. Only in a relatively few cases had the rights of 
holders below these "landlords" been recognised. In the following 
eighty years, while the landlord retained his basic right - to collect 
rent - he gradually lost, to his tenants, most of his rights which 
bore directly on the occupation and use of the land. 8 As has been 
shown in the chapters above, each new phase of legislation was the 
result of the specific economic and political pressures during the 
period in which they were passed. It is apparent now, however, that 
they were not an aimless movement stretching over nearly ninety 
years but a series of consistent attempts to keep pace with a 
continually changing agrarian society, 9 a progressive and logical 
extension of the rights of ownership to the limits of the agrarian 
structure. 
Any assertion of a landlord-tenant "systee in U.P. needs 
qualification for 4.3banitiaM2rEt there was no homogeneity within either 
group, "landlords" or "tenants". 10  There were in fact a wide variety 
of landlord-tenant "systems", e.g. between taluqdar and occupancy 
tenant, zamindar and hereditary tenant, permanent tenure-holder - and 
11. 	 tenant, or any of the other possible permutations and combinations 
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of tenures. 
Such a qualification defied the use of "western" concepts of 
land-ownership, but it did not preclude an alignment of social 
groups based on land. Within the village, agrarian groups fell 
into such alignments - zamindar and kisan, malik and raiyat - which 
were landlord-tenant groupings within the framework of the tenures 
which existed in the particular village however variant the groups 
were on the provincial scale. Even the tenant, by sub-letting, 
could create a quasi-landlord relationship, often accentuating, in 
the process, the worst features of the system under which he 
himself held land. As one commentator noted: 
"it is a melancholy fact that the kisan, in Oudh at any rate, 
is the worst of landlords when he sublets his land, the worst 
of usurers when he lends money and the worst of bullies when 
a little prosperity enables him to ride roughshod over his 
less prosperous brethren in the village". 11  
The terms "landlord" and "tenant" were thus purely relative in the 
agrarian structure of the United Provinces; they existed only in 
the context of the tenures of a specific village or set of villages. 
In any other way they were merely indefinite generalisations. 
Of the group which, because they stood in a proprietary relation-
ship to a tenant, can be termed landlords, the taluqdars of Avadh 
had the most favoured position. They had, largely as a result of 
the manner of their acceptance and protection by the post-1857 
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administration, wider powers than the zamindars of either Agra or 
Avadh. 12 Under the terms of their sanims they had "a permanent, 
heritable and transferable right" 15 whichwas "transferable and 
heritable by a single heir". 14 They could create sub-proprietary 
rights within their estates and had the "privilege of engaging with 
the government for the revenue of a whole taluqa instead of for 
one mahal". 15 Their uniform character, based on the sanads, was 
moreover fostered by institutions such as the British India Association. 
The zamindars were more diverse, at least in legal terminology. 
This distinguished between those estates which held as one unit and 
those held in shares, as well as between different forms of sharing. 
There were proprietors who, usually by purchasing an estate, held 
the whole of a mahal on their awn account and were therefore denoted. 
'single zamindarif. 16 Then there were families which held the whole 
of a mahal undivided. This was 'joint zamindaril. 17 AB well there 
were the co-sharing tenures, the bhaiyachara and pattidari comm-
unities. In the first of these the lands were held by the descend-
ants of a common ancestor, usually in common but with shares defined 
on a traditional basis. In the second, where the lands were usually 
held in severalty, there was a definite scheme of distribution based 
on the law of inheritance. 18 As a further elaboration, both 
bhaiyachara and pattidari tenures could be designated 'perfect' or 
'imperfect': perfect when the form was complete, imperfect if part 
of the mOcal was held in commonwhile the rest was in severalty) 9 
This terminology was not of any great significance pin itself, in 
understanding the position of the landlord group for they were, as 
Baden-Pawell points out 
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"adapted for such convenience as might have resulted from it, 
in the first days when inquiry into tenures began to be 
important. But except as regards the term tbhaiacharat it 
has no place in the language or thought of the people, the 
terms being mere vernacular - office equivalents of English 
terms indicating 'landlord' and 'divided share'. And it really 
has but little significance ... all these estates are 
Izamindaril, i.e. there is one person, an individual or a 
legal body, that is between the actual ... soil worker and 
the State". 2° 
The only vital distinctions between a zamindar who awned the 
whole and one who awned only a share for this affected material 
position and, hence, social status. In the same way the distinction 
between the taluqdars and the zamindars was one of legal notation 
(which lessened anyway after the 1939 Act) and degree rather than 
of kind. 	There was diversity in the landlord group, of course, but 
the distinctions were economic, not legal. 
The gulf from these "penultimate owners" to the underproprietors 
or subproprietors and then to the thekadars, the permanent tenure-
holders, the permanent lessees in Avadh and the fixed rate tenants 
in Agra, was much greater. These groups stood in varying degrees 
(Actually, in a descending order 'very much as listed) in an inter-
mediary proprietary position between tenants and proprietors.
21 
The underproprietors and subproprietors, the former in Avadh and the 
latter in Agra, were the strongest of these 'intermediary-landlords'. 
Their tenures were heritable and transferable and in Avadh the 
superior proprietor was deprived of a right of re-entry. 22 many, 
V 
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moreover, had a right to a subsettlement and were redorded as 
pukhtedars, the holders of sub-settlements. 23 
The position of the other tenures was more difficult. The 
thekadars had no rights beyond their thekas and these could vary 
considerably, some being heritable and transferable, others being 
mere temporary leases. 24 After 1939 thekas could last only for ten 
years. 25 Whatever their rights in this regard, hcwever, the thekadars 
were alike in being the lessees of the rights of a proprietor, and 
tt • in particular of the right to receive rents and profits" .26  They 
were thus in the usual Indian proprietary position. Moreover they 
could in many cases exert a great deal of influence in a village and 
acquire many other attributes of proprietorship. Gertrude Emerson Sen 
gives an illustration from a village in the estate of the Maharaja 
of Balrampur in Gonda District. 
"Until Lela Babu, Superintendent of the Maharaja's elephants, 
was appointed Thekadar fal5 Pachperwa ... the village had been 
spared a rent contractor. Tenants had paid their rents 
directly to the tahsil treasurer. They were not overjoyed 
at the change since the rent collector, who receives as
payment from a tenth to a quarter of the rents, can exact 
labour and certain other taxes from them. Most unhappy of 
all, by general rumour, was the rich Mohammedan tenant Who 
had to give up half of his land for the creation of sir land 
for the (thekadar in) Pachperwa. ... The tenant was compensated 
by receiving an appointment as rent contractor for another 
village but he did not feel that he had benefitted by the 
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exchange. From this and other sources, a block of a hundred 
acres was set apart for Leda Babu-” .27  
Yet, despite such ocasionally wide powers, the thekadars had the 
'dual character' of the intermediary landlords in that they were• 
"more or less like a tenant in relation to the lessor and proprietor 
in relation to the cultivating tenant". 28 
In this they were akin to the other 'intermediary landlords' 
although the remainder of this group had stronger positions than. the 
average thekadar in that they had tenures which were heritable and, 
except for the Avadhi permanent lessees, were traneerable. 29 In 
other respects however these tenures differed amongst themselves. 
The 'proprietary' nature of the tenure of the permanent tenure-holder 
and the permanent lessee was emphasised in severalways. Cultivators 
holding from them were tenants and not subtenants. 30 Moreover, the 
pepmanent tenure-holder's 
"rights to manage the land and receive rents and profits 
thereof (were) unlimited. He (had) the right to grant leases, 
make improvements, use lands for any agricultural or non-
agricultural purpose. He (could) plant groves without becoming 
a grove-holder and acquire sir and khudkasht rights in land 
under his personal cultivation. ... His interest (devolved) 
according to his personal law. He (could) not be ejected 
from his holding and the landlord (had) no right of re-entry 
upon his land. It (could), however, be sold in execution of 
a decree. ... Actually he (had) an advantage over the 
31 
underproprietor inasmuch as his rent (was) fixed in perpetuity". 
However, even the position of the fixed rate tenant, it was admitted 
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by 1926, had become "pradically, though not legally, closely 
analogous to that of a sub-proprietor". 32 The nicety of legal 
definition denied them subproprietary 'rank' because cultivators 
holding from them were only sub-tenants 33 but this was one of the 
few - and minor - marks of their previously inferior status which 
persisted. They could not acquire sir as the permanent tenure-holders 
but they had tenures which were completely transferable and which 
devolved in accordance with the tenant's personal law. 34 They had, 
moreover, acquired some of the less savoury characteristics of 
'landlords'. Khan Bahadur Maulvi Fasih-ud-din claimed in the 
Legislative Council in 1926 that a fixed rate tenant paying eight 
annas per bigha would very likely charge a subtenant as much as 
eight rupees and ten .annas per bigha. 36 
The 'intermediary landlords' therefore, despite their &owe 
Pcmplex character, must be considered as a part of the, in law, 
extremely diverse proprietary group: 
A more valid division of the proprietary body was that which 
was based on the material condition of the groups. This had reference 
to the size of estates rather than -tenures although there is a 
correspondence between the two. The scale descended in the main from 
the talucdars and single zamdndars through the co-sharers to the 
'intermediary landlords'. The Settlement Report of the Gonda district 
establishes the upper limits of the scale in its statement that 
"the two northern parganas of tahsil Utraula, Tulsipur and 
Balrampur, covering an area of 864 square miles, are (with 
the exception of nine small villages) permanently settled 
TABLE VIII. 
AVERAGE SIZE OF PROPRIETARY ESTATES, UNITED PROVINCES. 
(acres). 





Sultanpur 7,344.0 151.0 10.0 6.0 4.0 
Sitapur 2,765.5 274.0 46.1 23.4 23.2 
Bijnor - 243.0 23.0 8.0 2.6 
Bareilly - 187.0 17.0 8.6 4.9 
Shahjahanpur - 262.0 28.9 10.6 4.6 
Mainpuri - 362.0 25.0 14.3 7.4 
Meerut - 227.7 16.8 7.3 4.0 
SOURCE: S.R.Sultanpur 1940, 15. S.R.Sitapur 1939, 36. Final 
Settlement Report of the Bijnor District by W.F.G.Brawne (Superint-
endent Printing and Stationery, U.P., Allahabad, 1939)2 7 . 
S.R.Bareilly, 1942, 5. S.R.Shahjahanpur 1943, 21. S.R.Mainpuri 1914, 
7. S.R.Mberut 1940, 56. 
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with the Maharaja of Balrampur for services rendered by his 
family in the Mutiny". 37 
Other settlement reports gave an indication of the variation within 
the proprietary grades - taluqdari, zamindari and the co-parcenary 
communities. These are seen in Table VIII. 
Some idea of the average holdings of the 'intermediary landlords' 
may be gained from the figures collected by the Zsmindari Abolition 
Committee in 1948. These are compared in Table IX. There were, 
naturally, differences between districts in these figures. In Mirza-
pur, sub-proprietors held nearly twenty-seven acres on the average 
while in Unao, where 15,799 underproprietors held 22,368 acres, the 
average was less than one and one-half acres. In Azamgarh the 
average for the same group was less than one acre, 4060 sub-proprietors 
holding only 3,509 acres. 38 
These differences may be examined from another source - the 
revenue payments which, being based on land holdings, gave an idea of 
the variations in holdings throughout the provinces. As the average 
land revenue rate was about Rs. 1 and 8 annas per cultivated acre, 39 
the following table confirms the immense range of holdings amongst 
the proprietary-tenure holders. At the OM extreme were nearly 
eighty-five per cent. of the zamindars whose revenue payments rep-
resented average 'estates' of between thirteen and fourteen acres; 
at the other, settlement holders paying revenue for average estates 
of more than twenty-seven thousand acres. (Cf. Table X) 
The holders of these varying estates belonged to very different 
social grades: at the one extreme was "Maharaja" and at the othe-r 
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TABLE DC. 
AVERAGE HOLDINGS OF INTERMEDIARY LANDLORDS, UNITED  











1. Underproprietor and 
subproprietor. 2,41,100 6,97,027 2.8 
2. Permanent tenure-holders. 831 1,912 2.3 
3. Fixed rate tenants. 4,67,921 7,10,817 1.5 
SOURCE: Columns a, b, c, from Report, II, 7-8. 
TABLE X. 
ZAMINDARS BY AMOUNT OF LAND REVENUE PAYABLE; U.P., 1946/7.  
Revenue Payable (Rs.) Zamindars. 
■•••IP 
D3SS than 25 17,10,530 
25 - 	250 2,76,111 
250 - 	1000 24,249 
1000 - 	5000 5,089 
5000 - 	10000 414 
10000 - 	50000 323 
Over 50000 67 




"Thakur Sahib .". Yet they were also in very different economic 
positions. To say that 
"in no other period of Indian history can we find so large, so 
well-established, and so secure a group of wealthy landholders 
as that which grew up and flourished between the 1790's and 
the 1940's" 4° 
is to talk of only a portion of the landholding group. The 
Settlement Officer of Sultanpur noted in 1940 that "many petty 
proprietors and sub-settlement holders are in a worse position than 
the cultivators'; 41 a remark echoed in the Gonda Settlement Report 
four years later: the pukhtedars were seriously indebted, "financially 
they are hardly better off than the ordinary tenants". 42 One of their 
number, pleading their case in a letter to The Leader, claimed 
that many had so little land that they had to find employment outside 
the village in such avenues as government service, to maintain 
themselves. What was more this writer places those paying tp to Rs. 
500 per annum as petty proprietors. 43 Bernard Cohen noted a similar 
trend among the Thakurs of a Jaunpur village: 
"since 1900 more and more Thakurs had begun to derive incomes 
and prestige from working outside the village as teachers, 
police inspectors, printers and businessmen" .44 
Those Who did this were not always the poorest; Kunuar Jagdish 
Prasad, for some time Chief Secretary to the U.P. government, was by 
no means a "petty proprietor". 
Less tangible were the differences within the zamindari ranks 
which sprang from caste. Not that caste operated to any greater 
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extent among them than in normal society. It may have been lessened 
to some extent by the community of interest implied in a common 
tenure status, although there is no means of proving this except to 
point to the fact that associations such as the Agra Province 
Ramindars Association and the British India Association were wholly 
tenure alignments. The fact is worth noting, however, simply to 
demonstrate that there was no "landlord caste" in the sense that 
landholding was restricted to one group. And that being so, caste 
can be counted as a diffusing factor in the structure of the landlord 
group. 
Caste often was, moreover, an indicator of other factors such 
as the origin of the tenure. Some castes carried traditions of 
ancient connections with the land; . others were simply pureasers from 
recent times. The Jats of Aligarh, Marriott found, were 
"descendants of the same Jat chieftains who seized control 
of the region some three hundred years ago. They are the 
heads of the leading families of their localised lineages, 
the principal proprietors of the land and, by the same token, 
quasi-officials of the State. Ancestors of the present Jat 
headmen, being in de facto control of hundreds of villages, 
had secured rights of revenue collection under provincial 
officials of Shah Jahan and Aurangzebe". 45 
Certain castes in other areas, e.g. the Pathans of the north-western 
districts such as Shahjahanpur and the Thakurs, widely throughout 
the province could trace a similar history. 46  
On the other hand were the moneylenders, principally Vaishes, 
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who had built up estates in very recent tines by foreclosure and 
purchase. Even in the areas where there had been attempts to 
prevent them acquiring land - as in Bundelkhand where the IAxad 
Alienation Act olf1903 prevented the transfer of land to 'non- 
agriculturalists' for credit purposes - Vaishes and Jains tried 
"by hook or by crook to evade the provisions of the Act and 
to acquire even a minute fraction of a share in a village ... 
(and then worked) themselves into the position of leuribardar 
or made the other zamindars assign to them the job of rent 
collection". 47 
In other districts Brahmans did the same work as the major moneylending 
group. 48 . 
This lack of homogeneity was also apparent in the attitudes 
which different zamindari groups adopted towards their tenantry. To 
talk of attitudes is, of course, to deal in dangerous generalisations, 
but there are some report4 which make it clear that these existed. 
.The older established groups often, as Marriott noted of the Aligarh 
Jats, "loved the soil" and maintained their contact with the village 49 
with "an ideal of paternal despotism". 5° The Thalcurs of Jhuansi 
retained, even to 1947 
"their old characteristics: conservative and reactionary, 
extravagant and wilful they struggle to maintain their ancient 
feudal rights and fight all attempts at independence or 
insistence on their legal rights on the part of their tenants; 
nor can they often be found in the van of agricultural 
progress or as pioneers of scientific methods of farming. 
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But when all this is said it must be freely admitted that the 
cultivators prefer them to a Vaish and it is probably due to 
them that the district is so remarkably free from the general 
course of litigation. The best Thakur landlords regard it as 
derogatory to their awn honour to sue a tenant in court for 
rent or ejectment: theirs is an ideal of paternal despotism 
which, though it may have many faults and be unsjited to 
modern trends of thought, yet carries with it a great deal of 
graciousness" . 51 
The 'mercantile landlords' on the other hand often 'looked) on 
their estates as a monetary investment and upon their tenants as 
mere rent payer0. 52  Often absentee 53 and unbending landlords, they 
were "harsh with their tenants and prone to charge interest in true 
54 
moneylending style on their arrears of rent". 	The difference in 
attitude may in fact be that between agricultural and non-agricultural 
castes, for in Sultanpur Kayastha (clerk) landlords were noted as 
"harsh and indolent".
55 
Finally, it may be noted that not all landlords were Indian. 
At the time of zamindari abolition there were one hundred and ninety 
four foreigh landlords in U.P., 177 of whom were Englishmen. They 
appeared to hold estates mainly in Meerut and Jhansi Divisions. 56 
Insignificant perhaps in the overall picture, they were indicative 
of the conglomerate character of the 'landlords'. 
The tenant group was no more unified. Indeed it suffered from 
similar causes of diffusion. As with the 'landlords', there were 
many legal variants reinforced by economic and caste distinctions. 
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Legal terminology defined a chain of tenures which, although widely 
separated at the extremities, were often only slightly variant from 
the tenure immediately 'above'. Thus, the chain which descended 
through tenants on special term in Avadh, exproprietary tenants, 
occupancy tenants, groveholders, hereditary tenants, the holders of 
rent-free grants or grants at a 'favourable rate of rent' and non- 
11 
	
	 occupancy tenants, falls essentially into two groups, distinguished 
by the Zamindari Abolition Committee as (i) those with rights of 
occupancy and (ii) those with temporary rights. 57 The Committee 
included fixed rate tenants with the first of these groups but here 
they have been left with the proprietary group as belonging, despite 
legal status, to that part of the agrarian structure. 
The first group - those with rights of occupancy - included the 
tenants on special terms in Avadh, exproprietary tenants, occupancy 
tenants, groveholders and hereditary tenants.
58 
All these subdivisions 
had basically a similar right: to retain possession of their land for 
as long as they did not become liable to ejectment under the 
provisions of the Act, and on their death, to pass the holding to 
their heirs. There mere, however, differences within this general 
right. An Avadhi 'special terms tenant' while normally liable to 
ejectment on the same grounds as an occupancy tenant, could gain 
exemption on the grounds that there was a contrary agreement in the 
terms of his tenancy.
59 Then too, the holdings of all Avadhi 
tenants with rights of occupancy, (except hereditary tenants), whether 
they were tenants on special terms, exproprietary tenants or 
occupancy tenants, devolved according to personaelaw 6° and not 
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according to the order of succession laid dawn by the Act in sections 
35 and 36. Moreover, while the 1939 Act removed many of the diff-
erences between exproprietary and occupancy tenants belonging to the 
two provinces in matters such as rent, mortgages and the eligibility 
of land for certain rights, 61 differences did remain between the 
provincial groups. Rents and the right to make improvements were 
examples. Avadhi special terms and exproprietary tenants had a 
privileged rent rate of two annas in the rupee below those of occupancy 
tenants 62  while Avadhi occupancy and special terms tenants had an 
advantage over other occupancy groups in that they could make any 
improvement without the consent of the landholder, including the 
erection of a building on their holding and the construction of a 
tank. 63 
The groveholder, a tenant who had turned his holding into a grove 
by planting trees, held that land (unless he was a permanent 
tenure-holder, a fixed rate tenant, or an Avadhi special terms or 
occupancy tenant) 64 by a right generally similar to that of the 
occupancy tenants, for as long as the grove continued as such. 65 
Apart from the fact that the holding was transferable - voluntarily 
as well as in execution of a court decree - 66 a groveholder was 
subject to the same provisions as occupancy tenants. 67 
The distinction between occupancy and hereditary in Agra rested 
wholly on the time of their creation. Until 1926 Agra tenants were 
moving towards occupancy rights. In that year occupancy rights 
were 'frozen' and statutory rights, which carried only limited 
heritability were introduced. After the 1939 Act, however, when 
159. 
statutory rights were made fully heritable, little real difference 
remained between the pre-1926 occupancy tenant and the post-1939 
hereditary tenant. Neither tenancy was transferable 65 and the 
rights of devolution,
69  subletting70 and the making of improvements 
on the holding71 were the same for both. The rent-rate system was 
designed to preserve existing differences in rents between occupancy 
and hereditary tenants. Where the rent-rate officer could find no 
distinction, the sane rates were to apply to both. 72 It was the 
hereditary rates which were basic and occupancy rates were to be 
calculated by reference to them. However, only in Avadh, where it 
was laid dawn that occupancy rates were to be two annas in the rupee 
less, was any definite distinction made. 73 The gap to the Avadhl 
occupancy tenant was, of course, very much greater. 
Of the tenures Which comprised the other group of tenants, those 
with limited or temporary rightsrrent -free or favourable rent 
grantees, and the various non -occupanCY tenures, subtenants, tenants 
of sir and tenants of land used for temporary cultivation, - the 
first were in the strongest position, at least with regard to rent. 74 
They had the privilege, implied in their title, of paying either no 
rent at all or of paying a 'favourable' rent - one less than the 
aggregate of revenue and local rates. 75 As well as this they had the 
rights of an hereditary tenant in making improvements and the same 
protection against illegal ejectment." Moreover, when the favoured 
nature of the grant ceased, the grantee reverted to the status of 
an hereditary tenant. 77 There were disabilities, however, in the 
grantee's position. Except for grants of long standing, 78 rent, or 
on certain cases, revenue, 79 could be fixed on grants. 80 When 
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this happened the grantee could be ejected if "by the terms of the 
grant or local custom" it was held 
"(a) at the pleasure of the grantor; or 
(b) for the purpose of some specific service, religious or 
secular, which the landlord no longer (required); or 
(c) conditionally or for a term, when the condition (had) 
been broken or the term (had) expired".
81 
The grantee's position could, therefore, be made very uncertain. 
Provided that he did not become liable 't,0 ejectment, he might 
become an hereditary tenant82 but the element of doubt reduced many 
grants to a position inferior to that of the occupancy-right holder. 
Even so their status was superior to that of the third group, 
non-occupancy tenants, i.e. those who were not included in any other 
tenant group. The non-occupancy tenant's right of heritability 83 was, 
for instance, largely a right to succeed to a tenancy limited by the 
other provisions of the Act. A subtenant's position was, of course, 
limited by the terms of the lease which he held. Avadhi special 
terms or occupancy tenants and permanently disabled tenants could 
sublet for indefinite periods but subtenants holding from 
exproprietary, hereditary or Agra occupancy tenants were limited to 
a tenure of five years, 84 while those holding from non-occupancy 
tenants on unstable lands could have only an annual tenancy. 85 
In addition, the extinction of the interest of the tenant-in-chief 
meant the extinction of the sublease. 86 Subtenants had no right to 
make improvements, 87 nor any protection against enhancement because 
sub-tenants, along with sir-tenants, were excluded from the benefits 
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of section 97 which restricted non-occupancy rent enhancement to 
once every five years. Subtenants and sir-tenants were at a further 
disadvantage in that a differential of 33 Ord per cent, was 
maintained between their rent rates and those for other non-occupancy 
tenants 88 
Although Act XVII of 1939 extended hereditary rights to some 
tenants of sir89 there were still many tenants on these home-farms 
who remained non-occupancy tenants. 90 These were given, first in 
1939 and then again in 1947, 91 protection against enhancement for 
five years but this in noway gave them a secure tenure. Their 
tenancy was in fact the unprotected and unprivileged tenure which 
had always been deemed to be consistent with the personal lands of 
the landlord. 
The last of the non-occupancy groups were those who ssL lands 
were either areas of temporary cultivation or public lands.
92 
Except for protection against too frequent enhancement their position 
was little better than that of subtenants or sir tenants. In fact 
the very nature of their tenure signified their insecurity. 
The picture of the -Want group was further confused by the fact 
that tenants often belonged to more than one grade: in 1945 there were 
1,22,78,289 individual holders of rights in land but they held 
S6 
2,15,56,617 "interests in land".
, 
	BOMB of this duplication occured 
among the proprietary classes 94 for these figures were drawn from 
the first part of the khatauni, the patwarils account which recorded 
all those "cultivating or otherwise occupying land" in the villages. 
The disparity is too great, however, to be explained entirely in 
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this way and it is obvious that many tenants held different interests 
in land. 
This was supported by evidence from other sources. Tenants in 
Bijnor were often occupancy tenants of some land and non-occupancy 
tenants for the remainder of their holding. 95 The Report of the 
Zamindari Abolition Committee noted that the holders of rent free 
and favourable rent grants included grades "ranging from a proprietor 
or under-proprietor, a highly privileged tenant ... dawn to a tenant 
with only a temporary right". 95 Further, on the evidence of the 1951 
Census, cultivators most commonly resorted to further cultivation as 
a secondary occupation. 97 
Tenure itself was, however, only one factor working to vary the 
tenant group. As with the landlords, the fundamental disunity of the 
group was stressed by the differences in size of holdings. Table XI 
which compares the average holdings of tenants demonstrates the 
overall range as well as confirming the division proposed earlier of 
two broad tenant groups. The figures are, of course, only averages. 98 
They are, however, useful for purposes of comparison. It will be 
seen. that there was a clear relationship between the size of the 
average holding and the security of the tenure. The occupancy right 
holders and hereditary tenants had average holdings between two and 
two and one-half acres. Tenants on special terms in Avadh had above-
average holdings of slightly more than three acres but they were an 
almost negligible g-roup in the provincial tenant structure. 
Groveholders diverged in the opposite direction, but as they could 
also be exproprietary tenants, hereditary tenants or occupancy tenants 
TABLE XI. 165. 
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Special Terms 2,569 0.01 8,019 3.10 
Exproprietary 3,96,183 1.79 8,21,981 2.10 
Occupancy 60,38,361 27.01 1,24,32,563 2.05 
Hereditary 70,49,717 31.69 1,63,40,541 2.3 
Groveholders 12,04,638 5.41 7,02,029 0.50 
Rent free grants 5,35,132 2.36 3,55,243 0.64 
Favourable rate 3,277 0.01 10,031 3.06 
+ 
Sub-tenants 17,79,432 7.99 17,47,726 0.98 
Sir-tenants 11,86,075 5.33 10,67,084 0.89 
Non-occupancy 
t 
2,28,547 1.02 2,35,433 1.03 
Trespassers 35,79,285 16.00 22,46,108 0.62 
Total 2,22,45,348 c.100.00@ 3,59,66,758 1.60 
+Includes tenants holding from permanent tenure holders, grantees 
at favourable rates and grantees of rentfree holdings, as well as 
holders of subleases from tenants. 
Includes "occupiers without the consent of the person entitled to 
admit" recorded in the khatauni. These fit into no tenant group as 
they are without legal rights. If no action was taken against them 
within a specified limitation period, they became either hereditary 
tenants or, if they were a co-sharer trespassing in the mahal, a 
khudkasht holder; vide XVII of 1939, sec. 180. 
@Does not include "lessees under sec. 252" recorded in Part II of 
Khatauni. 
SOURCE: Report, II, 7-8. Statement No. 6. 
II 
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in Agra, the statement requires little qualification on this account. 
The group of tenants with limited rights of security generally 
held between one-half and one and one-half an acre of land. The 
holders at favourable rates deviated from this general pattern but 
they were a neglibible group, holding less than one per cent. of 
all land. 
The size of the tenant's holding did more, however, than merely-
reinforce legal distinction. It was generally "a fairly reliable 
index of the economic status of a farmer and accordingly of his 
standard of living", 99 and this wax perhaps the most fundamental of 
all the variations. Narendra Deva stressed these divisions in his 
Presidential Address in 1939. 100 Such class distinctions were well 
expressed in an article in Amrila Bazar Patrika in 1954. The writer 
distinguished four groups within the village: the "big zamindar" - 
"hathiwallah" or elephant owner; the rich peasant - "ghora-wallah", 
horse 'owner; the poor peasant - "bell wallah" or bullock owner and 
finally the kisan who was "be-zamin", without land. 101 
The final divisor of the tenant group was caste which manifested 
itself in position, rent and holdings. Although, as Table XII 
shays, there were 78.5 per cent. of scheduled caste members engaged 
in agriculture as compared with 74.2 per cent. of the general 
population, scheduled castes formed the bulk of the unprivileged 
classes. 
They were, in contrast to the general population, more likely 
to be labourers or lessees than owners of agricultural land. They were 
most infrequently proprietors 102 and although two-thirds of them were 
TABLE XII. 
LIVELIHOOD PATTERNS, SCHEDULED CASTES AND 






All agricultural classes. 74.2 78.5 
I. Cultivators of land wholly or 
mainly awned. 62.3 52.5 
II. Cultivators of land wholly or 
mainly unawned. 5.1 8.4 
III.Cultivating labourers. 5.7 17.2 
IV. Non-cultivating owner of land 
and rent-receivers. 1.1 0.4 
SOURCE: Census 1951, Vol. II, Part IA, op. cit., 425. Table 393. 
165. 
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owners of the land which they cultivated, this compared unfavourably 
with the 84 per cent, of agriculturists in the general population who, 
under the Census classifications, were owners of their land. 
Moreover, as these inferior agricultural ranks were those which 
•held the smallest average holdings, it followed that law caste 
agriculturists who were forced to lease land, generally had small, 
and ipso facto, insufficient, holdings. This was amply ddmonstrated 
by the position of the Chamar farmers in Cohen's Jaunpuri village 
which contained over one thousand acres of cultivated lands 
"As the tenant of a Thakur, the average Camar family cultivates 
only a little more than one acre of land. (The average 
Thakur family cultivates six times as much). Out of the 
total of 107 acres which the Camars cultivate as tenants only 
9 acres are lands on which they hold permanent tenancy rights; 
on the rest of their tenancy holdings in Madhopur they are 
temporary tenants at will. 103 
The same general disability was reflected in rentals. Since the 
heaviest rent rates coincide remarkably with the most insecure tenures, 
it is evident that the scheduled castes were in an unfavourable 
position. The lowest rents were paid by such well-established 
agriculturists as permanent tenure-holders who had average rates as 
low as Rs. 1.15 annas in 1948. 104 On the other hand, non-occupancy 
tenants paid on the average, Rs. 7 - 1 - 2 which, while it was higher 
than the average for all classes of Rs. 5 - 8 - 6, was yet lower 
than the average subtenant rents of Rs. 8 - 5 - 2, 105 As well, 
rents were generally weighted in favour of the higher castes.1" 
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Rental privilege was not always, or only, a matter of caste but 
circumstances generally told against the law caste agriculturist. 
Partly this was because, privileged rents were usually aligbed to 
relationship with the zamindari body - by caste, kin or service l07 
and partly because the lower castes were the better cultivators. 108 
Caste therefore acted as a depressing factor in rural society, 
inextricably mixed as it was with the bases of agrarian economy. 
It thereby aided the other divisive elements at work in the tenant 
group. 
There was, therefore, no simple division of the agrarian 
society of the Province into "landlord" and "tenant". The village 
with its "maze of legal tenures, informal understandings and customary 
relationships of dominance and dependence 4°9 still further comp-
licated an already diversified scene. This lack of simplicity, 
however, far from precluding a clash of interests probably helped to 
foment trouble once customary ties began to break daun. 110 
The conflict occurred along a property axis because of the 
maldistribution of land in a society which pressed too heavily on 
available resources. Its manifestations were much wider than this, 
however, and by the end of the 'forties social, material and even 
the possibility of political differences had been joined to this 
basic agrarian aspect. It was present in all facets of village life 
turning the village, as the Zamindari Abolition Committee Report 
rather dramatically put it, into "a vast battleground of craven 
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intrigues ... a war of each against all". 111 There is some reason, 
however, to regard the village as an arena of class struggle. 112 And 
the conflict was essentially "a problem of relationship between men 
and men (rather) than between men and land. The struggle between men 
... (was) charged with,tensions and emotions unfamiliar to people 
under more fortunate circumstances" .113 
This 'warfare' expressed itself in litigation, the remedies 
prescribed by the tenancy legislation. The Acts were framed and 
operated within a system which reduced all problems to a legal 'common 
denominator'. If a man was illegally dispossessed or subjected to 
extortion he could find his redress in a court; likewise if he failed 
to pay his rent or if he misused his land he was liable to answer 
before a court. It was the attitude implicit in Sir Samuel O'Donnell's 
reply to complaints about the power of the landlord to exact money 
from the tenants: 
"if the landlord resorts to methods of that kind a criminal 
complaint will lie against him for intimidation or for illegal 
confinement, for assault or for extortion •.•" 14 
It was also the attitude of Rafi Ahmad Kidwai in 1938 when, admitting 
that the Congress government was aware that the landlords were 
attempting to eject tenants, he refused to take further action on the 
plea that the "law provided remedies"
.115 
In theory, even in practice in a materially wealthy society 
where there was little inequip_ty in the distribution of wealth, this 
attidude might be admirable. In U.P. its effect was calamitous. In 
1949/50 it resulted in the institution of three and one-half lakh 
0) TABLE XIII 
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CASES INSTITUTED IN 1949 / 50 UNDER ACT XVII OF 1939 
SECTION OF ACT DESCRIPTION NUMBER 
144, 	148, 	163(5), 	228. 
	
224-227, 	230-231. 
Arrears of rent. 
Arrears of revenue or profits 
1, 06, 670 
9,210 
108, 	117, 	118. Enhancement of rent. 42 3 
108, 	114, 	115, 	116. Abatement of rent. 1,425 
94, 	108. Determination of rent. 5,423 
108, 	113. Commutation of rent. 4,695 
190, 	192, 	194, 	195. Resumption of land. 1,104 
183, 	236. Compensation. 772 
183. Recovery of possession. 6,345 
49, 	55, 	59-61, 	63, 	85, 	140, 	149, 
154(46), 	174, 	182. Miscellaneous suits. 1, 06,28 5 
49 Relinquishment. 9,523 
15, 16, 	70, 	71, 77, 79-81, 91(4), 	95, 126A, 
137, 138(4), 	142, 154, 160, 294. Miscellaneous applications. 16,362 
Miscellaneous applications not under 
Schedule IV of XVII of 1939. 20,362 
52. Entry of exchange in records. 178 
53. Exchange for consolidation. 575 
54.4. Acquisition of land by landlord. 7 
171. Ejectment for illegal transfer. 894 
172. Ejectment for detrimental act or breach of 
contract. 529 
180. Ejectment of trespassers. 32,278 
163 	with 165. Ejectment for default of arrears by 
exproprietary, occupancy or hereditary 
tenant. 7,820 
169. Ejectment for default of arrears by 
non-occupancy tenant. 484 
168. Ejectment on decree of arrears of ex- 
proprietary, occupancy and hereditary 
tenant. 80 
170. Ejectment for decree of arrears of 
non-occupancy. 207 
175 with 178 and 179. Ejectment, non - occupancy or other grounds. 1,209 
Total 3, 33,185 + 
IC Section 54 repealed by X of 1947. 
+ Total is less than figure cited above because only the 43,501 ejectment cases disposed 
of are included. This is 16, 780 less then number instituted. 
SOURCE: Revenue Report 1949/50, Statement XXA, p. 17A; Statement XXB, p. 18A; 
Statement XQC(a) p. 20A - 22A. 
170. 
suits or applications under the provisions of Act XVII of 1939. 116 
These, added to the cases pending from the previous year, gave a 
total of over five lakh cases for disposa1. 117 And these figures 
represented a decrease from 1948/49 of some 40,000 casesI 118 
The extent of this litigation can be seen in Table XIII which 
breaks down the totals into the various classes of actions. It is 
not suggested that part at least of these cases were unwarranted or 
purely mischievous, or that a system of impartial courts is not the 
logical method of settling disputes between ment. It is obvious, 
however, that the system of legal safeguards and remedies provided by 
the agrarian legislation in U.P. had not solved the basic problem of 
antagonism and had, rather, provided a means of furthering those 
antagonisms. The courts in fact became a weapon for use in the class 
war, a means of harassment rather than of remedy. 
Ejectment provides an excellent illustration of the fact that 
litigation had lost much of its original, remedial, function. It is 
obvious that a great Many ejectment suits were ungustified for the 
courts ordered ejectment in less than one-third of the cases heard. 
This did nothing to relieve the burdens imposed on the tenants in 
having to defend these suits or the heightening in tensions within 
the village which these legal processes must have represented. 
Moreover, the damage often lingered and accumulated. Cases at times 




DETAILS OF EJECTMENT CASES, U.P., 1949/50. 
Details. Number. 
Cases pending at end of 1948/49. 48,922 
Cases filed during 1949/50. 60,281 
Cases disposed of in 1949/50. 43,501 
Cases in which ejectment ordered. 15,469 
Area from which ejectment took place, (acres). 16,321 
Cases pending at end of 1949/50. 66,602 
SOURCE: Revenue Report 1949/50, Statement XX C(a), p.22A. 
The law, then, instead of reconciling the groups within agrarian 
society, had simply "set landlords against tenants •
119 
The 
complexity of the tenure system aggravated this tendency. The 
settlement officer of Sultanpur district in 1940 remarked on the fact 
that litigation increased in proportion to the number of proprietors 
in the tahsils of his district: 
"It is not an unfair assumption to make that the number of 
indebted cultivators, the amount of their debts and the 
percentage of loans incurred in litigation varies directly 
with the proportion of co-parcenary communities. And that 
is why there are only 31 per cent. of indebted cultivators 
in Amethi (tahsil) which, although largely precarious and 
little superior to Xadipur, has a strong talucidari interest. 
172. 
It may be that litigation is the 'only fine art the people 
cultivate' in Kadipur but clearly law suits are the 
inevitable accompaniment of 'decently complicated khewats 
which sometimes weigh as much as 15 or 16 pound'. ... It 
cannot be pure coincidence that the figures for Sultanpur 
and Kadipur, which are thhsils full of petty proprietors, 
underproprietors and sub-settlement holders, should approx-
imate and that both should differ markedly from those of the 
other two tahsils where the proprietary tenures are less 
intricate" .120 
In this connection it is interesting to notice . that the figures, 
as seen in Table XV, for the Avadh divisions were much Lower than 
those for Agra with the exception of Jhansi, in 1949/50. Avadh was 
predominantly taluqdari, the large landholders, par excellence. 
This is not to say that large landholders - taluqdars or zamindars - 
did not indulge in litigation but simply that the greater the number 
of 'landlords', the greater the chance of litigation. 
Ruinous and disconscerting though litigation was, it nevertheless 
remained a preferable alternative to the open violence which did 
at times break through. This was sometimes but not always the 
outcome of agrarian tension 121. 	The chronic problem was not violence 
but a nagging conflict between the villagers, centring around land 
or crops. This increased in the latter half of 1946 after the 
re-election of the Congress Government. Reports came particularly 
from the districts in the eastern part of the Sta te. The report of 
the secretary of the U.P. Provincial Congress Committee Thakur Phool 
TABLE XV. 
CASES INSTITUTED UNDER XVII of 1939, U.P., 
1949/50, BY REVENUE DIVISIONS. 
DNISION 
r 








Total Agra Province 4,30,266 
Average Agra Province 61,466 
Lucknaw 31,642 
Faizabad 39,779 
Total Avadh Province 71,421 
Average Avadh Province 35,710 
Total Uttar Pradesh 5,01,765 
SOURCE: Revenue Report 1949/50, Statement XXI, 24A-25A. 
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Singh, from Gorakhpur was typical: 
"There were numerous complaints against the zamindars who 
were getting false entries made in the names of their 
relations and forcibly taking possession of crops. Fallow 
lands so far used as threshing floors, thoroughfares, grazing 
grounds and even lands appurtenant to tenants' houses (were) 
being brought under cultivation by the zamindars who have 
engaged badmashed for the purpose". 122  
Reports of strife cam also from Jhansi, 123 Basti 124  and Gonda125 and 
one report mentioned a clash of zamindars and tenants in which three 
men were killed. 126 
Social differences in India mean largely caste differences. It 
has already been suggested that the 'inferior' castes tended to 
occupy the less secure tenures. It did in fact go even further. 
Thorner remarks: 
"the belief that law castes (were) born to labour with their 
hands and high castes to enjoy the fruits of others' labour ... 
(drew) sanction from and (served) to reinforce the caste 
structure of rural society" .127 
The structure of the proprietary groups when analysed by castes, 
gives confirmation to this point. The caste groups which figured 
most frequently were Thakurs, Brahmans, Jats, Vaishes, Kayasthas and 
Muslims. The lower caste groups were generally so small that they 
were, if they existed at all, grouped along with such miscellaneous 
groups as dedicated, government or cantonment lands, as "others". 
Broadly speaking only Kurmis, Ahirs and Khattris gain separate 
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recognition with any frequency. The following table gives a 
comparison of figures from districts settled since 1939. (Table XVI) 
Caste itself was sufficient to sustain the landlord's power in 
many cases for it removed agrarian relations, which are essentially 
economic, to an altogether different plane. In Nadhopur for 
instance, "the lessee of a Thakur is called 'prajal, literally a 
'subject', 'dependent' or 'child'. 128  
The proprietors did not rely only on caste. Their powers 
were rooted in the whole economic and social life of the village. 
They owned the abadi, the site on which the village houses stood, 129 
130 
as well as the waste land and the trees within the village boundaries. 
At one time it was possible to say that "the landlords were the law 
for all purposes beyond the caste councils". 131 They had 
"maintained their own court and record room, and dealt 
summarily with offenders through the strength of their 
dependent followers. One or another landlord always held 
the office of police headman (mukhya) ...Village crimes and 
disputes could reach formal trial in the district courts 
only with the support of one of the landlords or principal 
tenants 132 
This had changed to WNW extent by the late 'forties - 
"unrivalled economic eminence ... slipped from the hands 
of the petty landlords ... and they (saw) their power 
and influence jolting downward". 133 
The darbar which the landlord had, perhaps, once held at Dasahra
134 
and other forms of symbolic dominance may have disappeared or 
TABLE XVI. 
PROPRIETARY CASTES IN SELECTED U. P. DISTRICTS 
(Figures show percentage of land held in proprietary tenure 
by each caste in the district at time of settlement. ) 
CASTE 13IJNOR BAHRAICH SULTANPUR MEERUT BAREILLY MAINPURI SITAPUR SHAHJAHANPUR GONDA 
Thakiir 22.9 59.9 67.2 7.5 13.1 43.8 52.0 37.0 60.0 
Brahman 11.7* 0.7 10.7 16.5* 11.6 23.9 4.0 11.9 23.0 
Jat 16.5 8. 4 + - 24.7 0.6 - - - - 
Vaishia 17.3 0.5 1.5 14.7 15..5 7.4 1.0 12.0 - 
Kayasth 1.6 1.1 	. 1.9 - 8.9 4.4 5.0 4.4 - 
Muslim * 16.4 25.0 14.6 15.2 21.3 1.7 27.0 19.0 10,0 
Ahir - - 1.7 9.3 - 3.0 - 
Kurmi - 0.2 - 5.9 - 1.0 1.7  
Khattris - 0.1 - - 2.9 1.1 5.0 3.5 - 
Other + 11.5 4.1 4.1 21. 4* 18. 5* 8.4k 3. 0* 7. 5* 7. 0* 
* Includes Taga or ''pseudo-Brahman. 
4- Includes Sikhs. 
Includes Pathans, Shaikhs and Sayyids where separately listed. 
40 In Bijnor, Sultanpur, Meerut and Gonda, may include Ahirs, Kurmis and Khattris. 
* Includes dedicated and/or government lands. In Meerut includes GujarS. 
SOURCE: S. R. Bijnor 1939, 8, para. 11; S. R. Bahraich 1939, 46; S. R. Sultanpur 1940., 14, para. 21; 
S. R. Meerut 1940, 13, para. 2; S. R. Bareilly 1940, 4, para. 12; S. R. Mainpuri 1944, 8, para. 20; 
S. R. Sitapur 1939, 36; S.R.Shahjahanpur 1943, 21; S. R. Gonda 1944, 2. 
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lessened, but the more substantial forms did not wilt so easily. 
One of the most important of these was the zamindarts auxiliary 
role as money-lender. The zamindar was usually one of the two most 
important sources of rural credit. There were differences between 
the districts, however, and in Sultanpur, for instance, they surpassed 
the professional mahajans although still running second - in this 
case to the other agriculturists J35  The power which a zamindar-
mahajan could wield was exceptionally great in the subsistence-
agricultural economy of the village. 136 Rent and debt could become 
so entangled as to leave the tenant virtually in the position of a 
permanent debtor. For the tenant it was perhaps the worst combination 
with which he could be faced. 
In line with this dominant position went higher standards of 
material comfort. Thorner summarised their superior position: 
"they live in larger houses, wear finer clothes, and eat a 
better diet than the rest of the villagers. They may send 
their children to higher schools, subscribe to newspapers, 
listen to battery radios and awn bicycles". 157 
Accounts have been published of even more specific differences 
in these facets of general living standards. Jafri spoke of the 
"great pile of brick ... towering above the pigmy huts at its feet" 155 
which denoted the houses of the oldest and strongest landed families. 
In U.P. these are called haveli (cf. Plate 1). The houses of the 
smaller landlords were "commonly made of mud, but occasionally with 
SOMB part of masonry. Attempts (were) made to make them somewhat 
pretentious". 140 Jafri also found distinct differences in the 
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0 	 bedding and household implements which the villagers were able to 
provide for themselves. 141 
A later survey in Shahjahanpur District by B.N.Datta, revealed 
similar distinctions in food and clothing. The eating of rice, 
vegetables, milk, meat or fish and spices was normally the basis of 
distinction between different agrarian groups. 142 A "big peasant", 
11. 
cultivating as much as 100 bighas of land, ate from the whole range 
of foods, drank milk daily and used spices, ghee and molasses; he 
made 
"breakfast with sharbat and gur, (took) dal and roti at 
noontime; in evening dal, roti or rice, vegetables. Fish 
and meat ... sometimes a month". 143 
The poorest groups, on the other hand, had a "daily ration" of 
"bread and dal; sometimes he (did) not get dal even, (and) 
he (finished) his meal with bread and chutney. In evening 
he (ate) dal and roti. Full dinner (was) taken mace a day 
in the evening ... No milk or ghee or oil or spices in food. 
Only salt, chilley and khattai (sour condiment) (were) used 
in food. Gur, potato (were) also taken in food". 144 
Another index of social and economic status was the capacity 
to afford shoes and umbrellas. 145 Then, too, where the well-to-do 
had shirts, the poorer groups had kurtas and while the former used 
as many as four dhotis in a year the others had to make do with two. 146 
(Cf. Plate 2). The materials used in clothing were moreover of 
distinctly different grades, no less for the women than themen.
147 
The more powerful social groups used their position to entrench 
themselves even more firmly. They had generally smaller families, 
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as Table XVII shows. 
TABLE XVII. 
CHILDREN AGED 0 - 4 YEARS PER 1000 FEMALES AGED 15-44 YEARS, 
BY AGRICULTURAL CLASSES, UTTAR PRADESH, 1951. 
Class Number of Children 
I. Cultivators of land wholly or 
mainly owned. 642 
II. Cultivators of land wholly or 
mainly unawned. 697 
III. Cultivating labourers. 640 
TV. Non-cultivating owners and 
rent-receivers. 494 
01 	 SOURCE: Census 1951, Vol. II, Part IA, op. cit., 82, Table 67. 
From these figures it is obvious that while there was little 
difference between the figures for the cultivating and labouring 
groups, there was a very definite gap between these and the 
proprietors in Class IV. The family affected the farmer intwo ways. 
In the first place, ax he had to provide for it, a large family 
increased his day-to-day burdens. In the second place, it affected 
the most important possession of his family - the land - and it 
could consequently act either to retard or enhance the conomic 
position of the family. In this respect it is important to note 
that the groups with the most insecure hold on the land which they 
cultivated - Class II - was also the group with the largest families. 
In this way the trend towards the dispersal of necessarily meagre 
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resources by the weaker agrarian groups aided the proprietors at 
_the same time as it worked against those groups. In addition, the 
prOprietors tended to act so as to conserve their resources, and 
so assure their position. 
The modus vivendi of the landlords, including such factors as 
schooling, newspapers and radios, which ThOrner mentions, points 
to more than mere affluence, though it was essential. They indicate 
as well, however, a higher level of general education among the 
landlord class as a whole. Of all the differences which can be 
measured between the agrarian groups, indeed, this is the most 
striking - and the one most calculated to stand in the way of any 
change in rural society. Both the male and female members of the 
class were far above the levels of education for both the general 
population and the other rural groups. Table XVIII completes the 
picture. 
TABLE XVIII. 
NUMBER OF LITERATES PER 1000 RURAL POPULATION BY AGRICULTURAL 
CLASSES, U.P., 1951. 
Class Male Female 
All classes, including non-agricultural. 136 15 
I. Cultivators of awned land. 139 13 
II. Cultivators of unowned land. 69 4 
III. Cultivating labourers. 32 2 
IV. Non-cultivating owners, rent receivers. 313 75 
SOURCE: Census of India 1951, II, IA, 397. Table 367. 
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The landlords were, of course, in a much better position to educate 
the members of their family. They could, for instance, send their 
children to school rather than to work in the fields. 148 The 
important fact was, however, that they were doing so because this, 
together with the backwardness of the education of the weakest rural 
groups assured them of continued supremacy in many village matters. 
Caste, education and living standards all reinforced the "deeply 
entrenched tradition of rural inequality". 149 
It seemed for a brief instant, in the late 'forties, as if there 
might be added to these, a difference in political allegiance. 
There had been, as was seen in the last chapter, a growing feeling 
of political difference even while the 'national struggle' had been 
the central theme of Indian politics. This had been due firstly, 
to the opposition of the zamindars to socialist ideas likely to 
endanger their own position, 15° and secondly, to the belief on the 
part of the masses (a belief half-shared by the zsmindars) that the 
propertied classes were the "props of British rule". 151 
At the end of the War, when the Congress was re-elected to the 
government and possibilities began, for the zamindars, to assume the 
unpleasant'appearance of facts, there were attempts to form a 
zamindars' party, or conversely to ally with the established parties 
in opposition to the Congress. As early as 1945 there were reports 
from Jhansi that the zamindars were forming a party to "oppose the 
Congress leftists' slogan for Zamindari Abolition", 152 and a Zamindari 
Party actually sat in the Legislative Assembly during the debate on 
the formation of the Abolition Committee in 1946.153 
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The attempt to forge an alliance with either of the opposition 
parties most likely to support them - the Muslim League or the 
Hindu Mahasabha - despite the accusations of Nehru, 154 were unfruit-
ful because of the problem of reconciling class interests with 
political tactics. 155 The zamindars therefore continued for some 
years to cherish the hope of forming 
"a strong party wedded to the institution of private property, 
private enterprise and the establishment of a society in 
which the people can lead free, happy and honourable lives 
156 
undivorced from their ancient culture, customs and traditions". 
Such aspirations were not, however, bedded deeply in the 
zamindari group. They were, in fact, the aspiration of the wealthier 
upper strata. The mailer zamindars were generally apathetic, 157 
feeling, as many had in the past in working for the Congress, that 
they had more to gain by uniting with the masses. Moreover, where 
political affiliation was an important factor in social status
158 it 
was Obviously politic to be a member of a well-founded, important 
party rather than of a small, unimportant and possibly discredited 
group. The larger landowners who no longer resided in villages were 
not subject to this feeling, of course, but the smaller men were. 
The Congress or one of the opposition parties - Socialist, Kisan-Mazdur 
Praja Party, Hindu Mahasabha or Jan Sangh - therefore were more 
attractive to politically minded zamindars and political division 
along a strict zamindar-tenant line failed to make much impact 
outside the village. At the same time, of course, this in itself 
represented a change from the older order when the zamindar was the 
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political leader of the village. This change had been apparent 
in the thirties: 
"... in the political field (the zamindars') age-long 
influence over their tenants waned and they, before their 
very eyes, saw in a majority of cases their awn tenants 
voting against their wishes." 159 
Narendra Deva forecast still greater changes when he made his 
presidential address to the All-India Kisan Sabha in 1959: 
"Whatever may happen the peasantry is not again going to 
look up to the landowning class as its natural leader. The 
political influence of this class is surely on the wane 
although its social basis may not have been wiped out. It 
would be difficult to restore it 	. The present measures 
mark the beginning of a new era of such successive changes 
in the agrarian organisation as are sure to undermine their 
position of eminence and shatter their social basis 
completely."160 
A decade later his vision was realised. The post-war Congress 
ministry went ahead with its plan to abolish the zamindars. A 
committee was established to determine how and in August 1948 
tabled its report. By 24 January 1921, after protracted challenges 
in the courts by the zamindars, the U.P. Zamindaxi Abolition and 
Land. Reforms Act, Act I of 1951, had become law and 150 years 
of agrarian history in U.P. drew to an end. 
I. 
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ACT I OF 1951, THE VEHICLE OF CHANGE. 
(i) 
The reasons given for enacting the Zamindari Abolition and 
Lend. Reforms Act, as: withmost post-independence "land reform 
legislation71 ranged from the obvious and severely practical to 
the grandiloquent and purely theoretical :2 
"without a radical change in the existing land system no 
coordinated plan of rural reconstruction can be undertaken 
to ensure agricultural efficiency andancreased food. pro-
duction, to raise the standard of living of the rural masses 
and. to give opportunities for the full development of the 
peasant's personality.0 
There was, indeed, often little distinction between hopes and aims 
and the legislation in fact embodied and/or carried with it a 
multitude of aspirations which encompassed the economic, agrarian, 
political and social problems of the newly-independent State. 
Tenant farming was uneconomic under Indian conditions 4 so 
reform, by improving the status of tenant cultivators, would give 
them the feeling "that they (owned) the land and (could)enjoy the 
fruits of their labour and. would induce them to work harder, raise 
production and thus earn more" 5  while cooperative farms would "remedy 
the inefficiency and waste involved in the cultivation of existing 
uneconomic holdings." 6 India's was a "landlord-ridden econamy7 7 
the landlords were either redundant or positively harmful? they 
were "in the truest sense of the term. parasites or drones doing 
no good in the public hivee They were uninterested in agricultural 
198. 
development: 
"the rarest figure in the modern Indian countryside has been 
a genuine capitalistic producer ... Indiaxilandowners have 
found rent and usury, as opposed to capitalistic profit, 
easier, safer, more congenial and more lucrative:1° 
If they disappeared "the land would still remain and continue to 
yield the same products as beforel li Satisfactory "reform", therefore, 
involved"the extinction, as a class, of those persons who came 
between the cultivator of the land and the Government: 12 Moreover, 
with an economy in which "the majority of the popmlation was 
engaged in agriculture which had a very low yield in relation to 
15 both manpower and acreage", India was fertile ground for a "repetition 
of Russian agrarian history 	the expropriation of landed property 
014 
... culminating in collective farming. 	Reforms, by decentralising 
political power, would 
"foster social responsibility and (a) community spirit among 
the rural population leading to the establishment of a 
cooperative and self sufficient democracy in the U.P.'s 
country-side."15 
They would then be "a more powerful instrument for fighting Communism 
than many well-armed, well-trained divisions1 16 
It is difficult - and unnecessary - to decide which amongst 
these 'aims' was the most important or the most valid.- Indeed 
this study is concerned with none of the foregoing; without prejudice 
to the earlier view it singles out the social aims of the legislation, 
the view that 
"the landlord-tenant system ... should, with the dawn of 
199. 
0 	 political freedom, give place to a new order which restores 
to the cultivator the rights and freedom which were his and to 
the village community the supremacy which it exercised over 
all the elements of village life." 17 
That is to say, the interest is in Act I of 1951 as an instrument of 
social change. 
The zamindari abolition act was not a piece of legislation 
existing in 'splendid isolation'. It was part of the chain of 
legislative events stretching back to 1859 which have been examined 
in the preceding chapters. In one sense it was a continuation of 
the series for it complted the task of distributing to the majority 
of cultivators secure tenant rights. As little as it did in this 
regard it was, nonetheless, the logical conclusion of the process 
of sharing the attributes of ownership between State, landlord, and 
tenant. It did in fact arrogate to the State and the cultivator all 
the attributes of ownership and the landlord as an intermediary, 
disappeared. And this was a culmination, not a departure: a 
culmination, that is, of the process of interfering with the legal 
relations of landlord and tenant, albeit by terminating them. 
Ihccontrast to its legislative ancestors, however, the Act 
was concerned with the extra-legal relations between the agrarian 
groups. For the first time legislation entered the social sphere 
in the village by removing land, the overt basis of the of the 
landlords' social position; from their control. It was not merely 
that without an estate the former landlord was, materially, a less 
impressive figure (the great majority of zamindars who held only 
small estates were not liable to be greatly affected in this way) 
200. 
but that the landlord without an estate had no tenants: he collected 
no rent, could eject nobody, had, in fact, no power over anybody, 
was nobody's lord. This is the true sense in which the Act was 
revolutionary. After ninety years of repairing the landlord-tenant 
system from within, ninety years in which the administration refused 
or was unable to admit that the agrarian system as it developed. was 
unsound in itself, this Act posed a solution to break through the 
vicious circle of successive degeneration and reform, by breaking 
the system itself at the point over which it could exercise power. 
It remains to be seen, of course, whether or not the landlords had 
in fact acquired a dominance independent of their land. If they 
had, the social position might very well remain largely unaffected 
for such a position would very likely be less amenable to legislative 
change. This problem however, is left to the next chapter; the 
immediate task is to examine the methods by which the legislation 
moved to accomplish the social aims which it set out to achieve. 
(ii) 
The two elements which have been outlined. above were inter-
dependent. The completion of the work of tenant security was possible 
only by the removal of the landlords and their powers. Zamindari 
abolition was the basic proposition; without it, the land reforms 
would remain inoperative, as they had. done in the past. The format 
of the Act, as well as its title, emphasised this. The Act was 
divided into two parts, the first of which removed the obstacle - 
the landlord-tenant system - while the second erected the new village, 
agrarian and revenue fords which the Government desired." : 
A) 




intermediaries21 in their estates in Uttar Pradesh were vested in 
the State Government 22 As result the Government acquired all 
"land (cultivable or barren), groveland, forests ..., trees 
other than trees in village dbadi, holding or grove, fisheries, 
wells (other than private wells ...), tanks, ponds; water 
channels, ferries, pathways, abadi sites, hats, bazars, melas 
and ... sub-soil rights ...".
25 
I' 
All "rents, cesses, local rates and sayar" became payable to the 
State Govenunent
24 but the intermediary remained liable for all 
arrears due from the estate.
25 All estates were taken "free of 
encumbrances"26 so that all grants an the land or the revenue ceased, 
legal proceedings against the estates were debarred and usufructuary 
mortgages were reverted to simple mortgages.
27 The intermediary's 
right to collect arrears owing to him was not questioned although 
these could no longer be satisfied by ejectment.
28 Be could also 
continue to work mines which he had been operating directly, as a 
lessee of the government.
29 
All intermediaries became entitled to compensation from the 
date of vesting.
50 
Compensation, whether in cash or bonds
51 
carried 
interest of two and a half per. c nt. until paid or redeemed
32 and, 
in addition, if the compensation had not been determined, within 
nine months the intermediary was to receive interim compensation 55 
which would be adjusted against the amount finally determined.
The determination of compensation required firstly the 
calculation of the gross assets of the mahal - the "aggregate gross 
income of the land or estates comprised in the mahal." 55 From this 




liabilities for the agricultural year prior to vesting. 56 Compen-
sation was then to be paid at the rate of eight times the net assetsr 
A thekadar received compensation in proportion to his interest in 
58. 
the estate. 
In addition to this compensation, all intermediaries, other 
than thekadars, who had paid less than Rs. 10,000 per annum as land 
59 
revenue, were eligible to apply for a rehabilitation grant. This 
was designed to assist the smaller zamindars to readjust their 
position and it was determined upon a sliding scale of multiples 
of the net assets which were in inverse proportion to the revenue 
payable by the intermediary r This scale is set out in Table XIX. 
With the elimination of the intermediaries and the vesting 
of their estates, the State became the sole proprietor of all land. 
It was therefore in a position to reallocate the lands to produce 
a new system of tenures. As the Act put it, it could"settle" certain 
lands with certain persons under the form of tenure which it defined. 
The vesting did not alter the status of the tenants,of course, and 
in fact the basic principle of the reforms was that no-one in 
cultivating possession should be deprived of his land. 	A 
recognition of the position of the State and of this principle makes 
clear the process by which the tenures were reorganised. 
The Act defined four agrarian groups, three classes of "tenure-
holders: viz., bhumidhars, sirdars and asamis, who were to be 
42 
permanent features of the system, and a temporary group, viz., 
adhivasis, who were to be a tenant group which would eventually 
45 disappear. The rights, privileges and. liabilities of these groups 
TABLE XIX. 
SCALE OF REHABILITATION GRANT PAYABLE TO 
INTERMEDIARIES UNDER SECTION 08. 
Land revenue assessed 	on 
intermediary's estates.(Rs) 
Multiples of net assets 
for rehabilitation grant 
Up to 	25 20 
Exceeding 25 but not 	50 
" 
17 
50" 	"100 14 
" 100 	" 	" 	250 11 
11 250 	" 	" 	500 8 
. 	 II 500" 	"2000 5 
ft 2000 	" 	" 	5500 5 
ti 5500 	" 	" 	5000 2 
it 5000 	" 	" 10000 1 
SOURCE: I of 1951, Schedule 1. 
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varied, widely and they represented not entirely new groups but a 
regrouping of the existing tenure structure. 
The bhumidhari tenure was a collection of the most privileged 
existing groups. In the first place the ex-intermediaries became 
bhumidhars in respect of their unlet sir, khudicasht and grove land 4 
To these were added the fixed-rate tenants and the rent-free grantees 
and any occupancy or hereditary tenants; or tenants of sir on Patta 
Damani or Istimrari who possessed a right to transfer their holding 
by sale, all of whom acquired bhumidhari status in "the lands held 
45 
by them as such". 	As well, Avadhi.special terms tenants, 
exproprietary, occupancy and hereditEtry tenants and sub-tenants who 
had previously purchased bhumidhari rights by paying to the government 
46 
ten times their annual rent• were confirmed in that status. The 
bhumidhari tenure was reserved, therefore, in the first instance, 
for those already in a favoured and secure position and those who 
were prepared, even before abolition had. been enacted, to pay for its 
privileges. 
The sirdars were the remainder of the tenants who had a 
secure position before abolition. These included tenants on special 
terms in Avadh, exproprietary, occupancy and. hereditary tenants and 
privileged tenants of sir who, not having a right to transfer their 
holdings by sale, did not become bhumidhars, in addition to grove- 
holders, tenants with holdings of more than half an acre in tea estates 
and sub-tenants holding leases of long standing.
47 
Certain groups 
were defined as hereditary tenants by the Act so that they also 
acquired sirdaxi status. Such were tenants of an intermediary paying 




land in which no other rights were recognised and thekadar 
who had personally cultivated landp4ithin their thekas
50 
and. these 
were made sirdars in the "lands which they held as such". They 
were minor extensions, however, and the sirdari group remained as 
the bulk of occupancy- or hereditary-right holders created under 
the previous legislation. 
Those who bedame sirdars under section 19 at the commencement 
of the Act had, however, the right to purchase, within a period of 
limitation, bhumidhari rights in the same way as they had been 
purchased under the Agricultural Tenants Acquisition of Privileges 
Act, Act X of 1949. The sirdar thus had to pay to the Government 
ten times his annual rent; or twelve times the rent if he paid in 
51 
instalments. A cultivator admitted to land as a sirdar after the 
commencement of the Act could also purchase the superior status 
but only by paying, in a lump sum, ten times the rentP 
The third permanent group of tenure-holders, the asmnis, 
were those who held land. which, because of its nature, was excluded 
from the growth of fully secure rights, or those who hada lease 
from an occupant of land. In the first group were those who had 
been non-occupancy tenants because their holding ASS land under 
unstable or shifting cultivation, pasture, water-covered land. or 
55 
an area being re-afforested. 	The other group was an agrarian 
miscellany: non-occupancy tenants of the grove land of an inter-
mediary; the subtenants of groveholders; subtenants of persons who 
had been ejected under XVII of 1959 but reinstated by X of 1947; 
the mortgagee "in actual possession" of a tenant; tenants of sir 
of an intermediary who paid less than Rs. 250 per aammn as land 
206. 
54 
revenue and the occupants of the land of disabled persons. 
Guseredars, persons who held land recorded as sir or khudkasht 
"in lieu of maintenance allowance" were also asanis "for as 
long as the right of maintenance allowance (subsisted)."55 
The individual asami's position was not necessarily 
permanent for the right ended if the disability of the tenure-
holder disappeared or if the land ceased to have an unstable 
character, or if the land. was recovered by the bhumidhar or 
sirdmr for his own cultivation.
56 Asamis would always be a feature 
of the agrarian system, however, because the circumstances which 
called for asami-cultivation of land wcdld continually arise. 57 
The position of the adhivasis, the fourth and residual 
agrarian group, was designed to be merely transitional, a temporary 
ranking for tenants with no stable rights in lane They were, in 
particular, sir- or sub-tenants who had not been included in any 
other tenure group and the occupants of land. not included. previously 
59 in any tenant holding. Their position was temporary in the sense 
that after five years - or sooner on the notification of the 
Government - they were to deposit fifteen times their annual rent 
to the credit of the Government and become bhumidhars; if they 
failed to do so they would lose aOight to the land and 
"become liable to ejectment ... on the suit of the landholder 
as if ... (they were persons) taking or tetaining possession 
otherwise than in accordance with the provisions of (the) 
Act and without the consent of the landholder." 60 
The landholder was to receive compensation 61 on the scale set out in 
Table XX if the adhivasi acquired bhumidhari status. 
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TABLE XX.  
COMPENSATION PAYABLE TO TENURE-HOLDERS OF  
ADHIVASIS ACQUIRING BHUNIDHARI STATUS. 
Tenure Holder. 
Compensation from: 













SOURCE: I of 1951, sec. 256. 
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The tenure arrangements of the abolition measure were, 
therefore, a rationalisation of the former complex systems. On the 
one hand there was a large group with proprietary status who, 
holding from the Government, paid land revenue 62 equal either to 
revenue or rent paid in their former position as an intermediary 
or tenant or, in the case of those who purchased bhumidhaxi rights, 
65 
equal to one half of the former rent. 	On the other hand there was 
a group of tenants who existed either where it was impossible for 
the landholder to cultivate or where for the time being existing 
arrangements were retained; these cultivators naturally paid rent. 64 
The new proprietary tenures received few new rights except 
for the power to make improvements of any kindS 5 Bhumidhars had 
the right to use the land in any way, agricultural or non-agriculturall 6 
and they could, except where a person would gain a holding greater 
than thirty acres thereby and except in the form of a usufructuary 
mortgage, transfer their holdings.
67 
 The bhumidhaxs were also 
allowed to bequeath their holdings." 	The sirdar, however, had 
none of these privileges: he could use land only for agricultural 
69 70 
purposes; his holding was not transferable; and.his holding 
71 
devolved according to the order of succession laid down in the Apt. 
He was, indeed, liable to ejectment for the transgression of the 
most important of these conditions of his tenure and particularly 
for illegally using or transferring his land 72 while the bhumidhar 
was not liable to ejectment in thisiway.75 In other respects, 
however, there was little difference between the two grades. Neither 
could sublet to any sublenant other than a "recognised educational 
institution".74 Both could exchange their lands with the permission 
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76 
of the Assistant Collector
75 
and could sue for partition provided 
their holding was larger than a defined "fragment" - ie, 3.125 acres 
77 for most of the State. 
There was no need for a settlement of the revenue following 
the establishment of the new system of tenures for the revenue was 
implicit in the tenure itself: the former rent or revenue or half 
the former rent as the case may be. The revenue was, moreover, to 
be made more stable than during the period of the British - admin-
istration since the settlement was to last for forty years,78 except 
for changes necessitated by variations in the size of the ho1dinZ 9 
an increase in productive power due to fluvial action 8° or the effect 
of an agricultural calamity or prolonged abnormal price movement. 81 
All the tenure holders of a village were jointly and severally 
responsible for the revenue assessed on the village82 and the Act 
provided that the Collector could attach a village for arrears and 
keep it under his own management for "such period as he may consider 
5 necessary" up to three years? Arrears of revenue from an individual 
tenure-holder could be recovered by writ, or by attachment and sale 
of the defaulter's property and holding." 
The asami was in an essentially weaker position than either 
of the other groups of tenure-holders. The tenure was heritable but 
as with the sirdar, only in accordance with the order of succession 
5 
laid down? In several other ways as well he resembled the sirdar. 
He could make any non-detrimental improvement to the holding but 
86 
could not use it for a non-agricultural purpose and he could 
nor neither transfer 	sublet it. xam 
 
Moreover, he was liable to ejectment 
88 
for illegal use or transfer. 	His fundamental insecurity, however, 
210. 
was stressed by the fact that, as compare 4 with the sirdar, he could 
be ejected on many more grounds. He was liable to ejectment for 
unsatisfied arrears of rent 
89 
 the extinction of the tenure from 
90 which he held, or the disappearance of the reason for his tenure- 
thetenure-holder's disability, for example, - served to terminate 
his own rights. However, in certain cases, if the asami was not 
ejected even though the reason for the tenancy had gone, he could 
become a Birder.92  In any case, the ejectment of an asami meant 
that the tenureholder could not let the land to another asami for 
a period of two yearsr Like the tenants of the past, an asami who 
had been wrongfully ejected could sue for repossession and compensation? 4 
The adhivasis were to retain the rights and liabilities which they 
had at the date of vesting.
95 
The tenure was heritable
96 
within the 
overall restriction implied in the Act. Ejectment could be had an 
the usual grounds of arrears, illegal use or transfer 97 and also if 
the tenure-holder had less than eight soles and witihed to bring the 
adhivasi's holding under his personal cultivation.
98 
 These provisions 
did not apply, however, if the tenure-holder was permanently disabled 99 
and in this case the adhivasi became an asani after a lapse of five 
100 years. 
This reorganised tenure system was the product of the redistrib-
ution of the lands which the State Government had acquired from the 
intermediaries. There were, as welly rights to trees, waste land, 
house sites and other common utilities which had been taken from 
the landlords. 
The responsibility for these was lodged with the second 
important branch of the reform which the Act carried out in pursuance 
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of its social objectives: the creation of local village 'government', 
the Gaon Sabha. This consisted of all adults ordinarily resident 
in the area for which the Gaon Sabha was establishee l Through 
its executive committee, the Gaon Panchayae2 the ‘iaon Sabha was 
given control of vacant or waste land in the village, forests inside 
the village boundaries, isolated trees, fisheries, fair sites on 
public ground; village irrigaton works, ferries, pathways and dbadi 
sites, to etjer with the task of developing these resources.105 The 
Gaon Sabha had the right to admit cultivators as sirdars or asamis 
on the waste lands vested in it or on lands in which tenure rights 
were extinguished and which thus fell into its carer4 Landless 
agricultural labourers, tenureholders with less than an economic 
holding (ie, 61 acres) and cooperative farms, in that order, were 
• 	given preference to these holdings dispensed by the Gaon Sabhal °5 
The final but by no means the least important reform of the 
Act was to remove the power of the patwari by simplifying the record 
system so that his ability to confuse - or confound confusion - to 
mislead and to deceive, disappeared. The records which had been 
kept before 1951 consisted of a series of registers: the khewat for 




their tenure, holdings and rent, and in Avadh, other forms of 
registers for underproprietors and special lessees.14°6 As well there 
was the shajra or village map and its index, the khasra. 107  All 
changes in the lands and tenures of the village had to be noted in 
the records and the records had to be =bat fully corrected and 
revised each year.108 The result of this complexity was fully 
illustrated when the implementation of the new tenure scheme was 
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begun. Triloki Singh, the leader of the Fraja Socialist Party in 
U.P., cited a government admission that in one tahsil alone there 
had been found some 50,000 incorrect entries.
109 
110 
Under the new system simplicity was the keynote: "the 
record of rights shall consist of a register of all persons 
cultivating or otherwise occupying land ... for each village ..."111 
This single register was to specify the class of tenure and the 
rent or revenue of each holder and any additional information which 
the State might require112 In future it was to be 
"the simple duty of the patwari 	to ascertain merely the 
fact of possession on the spot and to report all changes of 
possession which (came) to his notice to the higher 
authorities for necessary enquiries."115 
The patwari would no longer make any changes in the recthrds on his 
own authority; he merely recorded changes in the remarks column and 
then notified the kanungo, the Gaon Panchayat and the persons 
concerned. Changes could be made only on the orders of a Court. 
As well, the records left the patwari's hands within a month of the 
end of the agricultural year; previously it had remained for one 
(dangerous) year in his possession.124 
In a way these changes in the patwaris' position were 
symbolic of the new forms which emerged after the zamindars disappeared. 
They were by no means 'cure-ails' but they appeared to have some 
opportunity to re-shape rural life and village society. 
(iii) 
Since its enactment, Act I of 1951 has been amended or 
supplemented on numerous occasions. Acts and ordinances have been 
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introduced to remove minor difficulties of interpretation or to 
reshape specific points of policy. The general pattern of 
abolition and reform has not altered but there have been several 
important amendments. 
A supplementary act of 1952 115 provided for the position 
of cultivators of land included in the holdings of bhumidhars or 
sirdars who had not been recoeded. Complaints had been made to 
the Government that many of these cultivators had been forcibly 
116 ejected. 	They were consequently given rights in the land which 
they cultivated: if the tenure-holder was disabled as an asami with 
117 an annual lease; otherwise as an adhivasi. 
The amending act of the next year introduced, two changes of 
policy118 It made alterations found to be necessary after experience 
119 of the act in actual operation. 	It also'promoted* groveholders 
120 
to the status of balumidhars. 	This change, which was retrospective 
to 1 July 1952, was an important one as the groveholders, who had 
been sirdars, acquired this higher status without any additional 
payment. Secondly, it removed the hitherto unlimited power of 
sirdars and asamis to make improvements and thereby retracted the 
most important advance which the act had meant for the former 
121 tenant groups. 
The most far-reaching of the amendments, however; was embodied 
in Act XX of 1954. This provided for the immediate conversion of 
the adhivasis into sirdars. A whole new chapter, IX-A, was inserted 
in I oft 195122 by which, in a procedure patterned an the earlier 
abolition and reforms; the lands of tenure-holders held by adhivasis 
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was vested in the Stat125 from 50 October 195 24 then to be 
resettled with the former adhivasis as 
5 . 3 	125 Their rents 
126 then became revenue and they acquired all the "rights and 
liabilities of sirdars:
127 
The tenure-holders whose land. was thus acquired were eligible 
128 . 
for compensation 	in accordance with a scale (set out in Table 
XXI) based an pre-1952 tenure status. The compensation was payable 
in cash in from five to ten annual instalments with interest at 
o* per cent129 In all, more than 44 lakh adhivasi khatas were 
removed from their "anomalous position" and given the security of 
150 
sirdari tenure at no cost to themselves. 
The same act, XX of. 1954; provided also that a sirdari whose 
holding had before been untransferable except if he was disabled, 
151 
could transfer to a recognised educational institution. 	A later 
amendment added a furthergaWeacto transfer rights for all 
tenure-holders which prohibited the transfer of a fragment, ie; a 
152 
piece of land less than 3.125 acres in extent in most of the State. 
The most recent amendment passed through the upper house, the 
Vidhan Parishad, without amendment, on 50 September 1958. This 
provided for a decreased limit of 121 acres on all holdings in the 
155 State. 
By these amendments the original intentions of the abolition 
and reforms measure have been fulfilled as tar 'asthey can be by 
legislation. The tenure system has been rationalised. All 
cultivators are under the ultimate ownership of the State, the great 
bulk of them with a heritable but not transferable tenure; paying 





COMPENSATION PAYABLE TO TENURE-HOLDER GP  
LAND IN WHICH ADHIVASI WAS GRANTED  
SIRDARI RIGHTS BY ACT XX of 1054. 
Tenure. _ 
Compensation 
AAmultiple of as multiple of from other 
rent at hereditary 
rates. 











were fixed rate, 
occupancy,hered-
itary or privil-
eged. sir tenants. 
20 nil, nil. 
5.0ther bhumidhars. 10 10 nil. 
(but at least 5 
times actual rent) 
4.Sirdars. 10 nil. nil. 
(but at least 5 
times actual rent) 
SOURCE: I of 1951; sec. 240-E. 
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'above' the norm are those in a more privileged position, having 
rights of transfer and unlimited rights of use and improvement; 
'below' the norm stands the sole form of tenancy allowed to remain. 
The position was "pregnant for the development of a sense of 
154 
democracy and a community of interest"; 	the village remained 
the final the ultimate; testing ground. 
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THE MEASURE OF CHANGE. 
(i) 
The charge that the tenure system of Act I of 1951 is 
inadequate has come from various quarters. A communist writer 
claimed that the changes were 
"nothing more than change of name 	The status quo is 
retained not only as regards land but also as regards the 
legal rights of the peasantry." 1 
Thorner remarks that the old and the new are "all too recognisably 
similar" 2 and Socialist members protested strongly in the debates 
on the Bill against the creation of a new class syttem. 3 Even 
commentators of the Right, or those who were relatively uncommitted, 
however, discounted it as a major reform. The zanindars, naturally 
enough, felt that "benefit was doubtful and ruin was certain" 4 but 
even Moore and Freydig concluded that "to some extent 	simplifi- 
cation of the system Of tenures ia. more apparent than real." 5 And. 
considering the small number of the asamis, Nealefs claim that 
this group gained the most from the changes can be read as damning 
with very faint praise. 6 
Whatever might be the truth or otherwise of these assertions 
- and it will be the aim of this chapter to make an evaluation of 
the changes which will reflect upon them - they cannot gainsay the 
claim that the new system has been widely implemented. 7 
The initial vesting order brought 6,02 crore acres of land, 
some 85 per cent. of the total area of the State, under govern-
mental control. This included cultivated and fallow lands, cult- 
226. 
• 	ivable and uncultivable waste, groves, forests and public lands 
such as abadi sites and pathways.
8 The subsequent application of 
the reformulated tenure system took place in 95.5 per oent, of the 
total holdings area of 4,52,95,233 acres.
9 Thus, 4,32,89,330 acres 
were grouped under the new tenures while 20,05,903 acres remained 
under the older titles.
10 The area not brought under the Act 




made; the hilly region of South Mirzapur, the swampy grasslands of 
the Vaini Tal Ural, former independent states such as Rampur and 
Banaras where tenures differed, areas which had been excluded from 
normal administration, and government estates.
11 Supplementary 
legislation since 1952 has extended I of 1951 to these areas.
12 
There were, of course, distinct differences in the effect 
of the application of the new tenures. Based on the tenures of 
the preceding period, the new system served largely to highlight 
the regional differences which had asserted themselves in the 
state. 
The bhumidhari - sirdari area was at once the most notice-
able and the most important of the new divisions. As Table XXII 
shows, these two groups held between them almost the entire area 
under cultivation. In fact the amount not held by one or the other 
of these groups was less than one per cent of the total holdings 
area in all but the Jhansi division. Moreover, these tenure-
holders remained personally responsible for the cultivation of a 
proportion of the land as high as 97 per cent, in the Meerut 
division and nowhere less than the 88 per cent, so controlled in 
the Banaras Division. (This is not to say that the tenure-
holders personally cultivated their holdings in all oases, but 
TABLE XXII 
CLASSIFICATION OF HOLDINGS AREA AFTER INITIAL VESTING UNDER ACT I OF 1 95 1. BY REVENUE DIVISIONS 
(aere•) 
DIRECT HOLDERS OF LAND I SUB - HOLDERS OF LAND
1 
- 	..-• 
T. % ASAMI OF % OCCUPIERS le TOTAL ASAMI OF 7. 7. LAND OF BHUMIDHAR Tv TOTAL s1.111- 
DIVISION 	BHUMIDHAR TOTAL HOLDINGS SIRDAR 	TOTAL HOLDINGS GAON SABHA TOTAL HOLDINGS WITHOUT TITLE TOTAL HOLDINGS HOLDINGS AREA BHUMIDHAR OR TOTAL HOLDINGS ADHI VASI TOTAL HOLDINGS OR SIRDAR FIELD TOTAL HOLDINGS 11OLDIN6s 9322 135 
ROAR WITHOUT CONSENT 
MEERUT 24, 37, 093 50.5 16, 48, 707 	40.2 8, 455 0.16 966 0.02 40,93, 301 5,154 0.12 65, 779 1.6 30, 650 0. ?s I. 01, 383 
AdRA 14.42, 615 33.4 28, 60, 544 	66.3 8,204 0.2 994 0.02 43,12,299 I 4, 389 0.33 I, 19. 899 2.8 58, 359 I. 3 1.92 	575 
ROHILKHAND 10, 04, 180 17.9 45.53, 627 	81.5 23, 217 0.41 2,308 0.19 55, 83.332 I 5. 110 0.27 I, 98, 379 3.5 54, 602 0. 57 2, 68, 091 
A LLAHABAD 11,66, 976 24.8 35,13. 776 	74.8 32, 333 0.4 435 0.09 47, 03,520 12, 564 0.27 2.05. 410 4.3 18, 119 0. 38 2, 36, 091 
JHANSI 17, 70, 586 39.6 26,26, Ill 	58.2 87,104 1.5 609 0.15 44,64,410 8,740 0.17 2, 99, 987 6.0 86, 831 I . 8 3. 95, 538 
BANANAS 20, 45, 613 54.4 17.14. 046 	45.4 	. 5.816 0.15 8.779 0.2 37, 74,254 59, 954 1.5 2, 99, 409 7.8 47, 754 . 	1.2 4,07,117 
GORAKHPUR 21, 72, 793 42.5 29.24, 669 	57.2 10.161 0.2 873 0.02 51. 08,446 10.899 0.21 2. 63, 873 5.1 , 10.602 0.2 2.85, 363 
LUCK.NOW 9, 58 558 17.5 44,89, 255 	82.2 12. 542 0.23 1,964 0.07 54,60,319 39, 060 0.71 3, 09, 487 5.6 90, 418 I . 	t; 4, 30, 945 
FAIZABAD 13, 55, 553 21.0 44,66, 910 	78.2 8,637 0.15 342 0.05 57, 31,442 I 5, 070 0.26 3.52, 585 0.1 12, 030 0. 2 3, 73, 683 
NAINITAL DISTRICT IC 625 28.0 40, 112 	69.1 434 0.6 836 1.4 58,007 371 0.83 1.209 2.0 1.331 2. 3 2,973 
UTTAR PRADESII 1, 42,68, 5n 22.9 2, 88, 37, 837 	66.6 1, 64, 855 0.08 18.046 0.04 4. 32, 09,330 1 . 81, 296 	. 0.42 21.15. 971 4.8 4. 10, 696 0,5 27, 07, 963 
t THESE LANDS FORM PART OF THE HOLDINGS OF THE BHUMIDHAR OR SIRDAR FROM WHOM THE CULTIVATOR HOLDS. 
SOURCE: Revenue Report 195219, 52A - 59A. 
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simply that they were responsible for the cultivation, at least 
insofar as they directed the use of hired labour.) From the 
beginning, then, the asami and adlivasi tenures, which were the 
sub-holding tenures of the Act, were negligible. This position 
became even more pronounced with the conversion of the adhivasis 
to sirdars. This left little more than two per cent. of the 
land which was not directly cultivated or managed by the 
tenure-holder. Some exceptions remained no doubt in which this 
control was more apparent than real, such as in the case of the 
bhumidhari holdings formed from the sir and khudkasht holdings 
of the largest of the intermediaries - the average unlet sir and 
khudkasht of the 456 zamindars paying more than Rs.. 10,000 per 
annum had been 245 acres13 - but these were minor aberrations 
and in the main "ownership" and cultivation appeared more closely 
aligned than at any stage in the preceding 150 years. 
There remained as well wide variations in the relative 
strength of the bhumidhari and sirdari groups. Five divisions: 
Meerut and Agra in the west, Banaras and Gorakhpur in the east and 
Jhansi in the south, taken together formed a crescent with a high 
proportion of bhumdhari and a low proportion of sirdari holdings. 
Two divisions, Meerut and Agra, actually had larger aggregate 
bhumidhari than sirdari holdings which was contrary to the normal 
position in the state. The Divisions of the central ludo-Gangetic 
plain were the reverse. There, in Rohilkhand, Allahabad, Faizabad 
and particularly, Lucknow, sirdari holdings were much more extensive 
in area than those of the bhumidhars. 
The explanation of these variations lies in the composition 
of pre-abolition Agrarian society and the nature and attitudes of 
229 
the groups which then existed. Thus Meerut's large bhumidhari 
population was the legacy of the concentration of petty proprietors 
in that western division. Not only, as Table XXIII shows, did 
Meerut have the greatest number of zamindars, however; those 
zamindars also retained a much larger proportion of the lands 
of the division under their personal control than was the case 
in the other divisions. This can be seen in Table XXIV. 
TABLE XXIlk 











Uttar Pradesh 20,14,506 




SIR & KHUDKASET HOLDINGS, UTTAR PRADESH, 1951, BY REVENUE DIVISIONS. 
Division Total Sir and Khudkasht Total Holdings 0 
Meerut ' 	13,31,503 41,51,815 32 
Agra 6,14,434 43,66,026 14 
Rohilkhand 5,85,774 60,19,895 9 
Allahabad 5,18,129 48,05,716 10 
Jhansi 11,49,327 49,45,731 23 
Banaras 7,35,906 42,37,724 17 
Gorakhpur 14,79,382 50,56,137 29 
Lucknow 4,93,075 55,58,924 8 
Faizabad 5,29,171 57,92,791 8 
Uttar Pradesh 74 78,148 4,52,59,708 17 
SOURCE: Revenue Report 1951/52, 44A-45A, 49A, 60A-61A, 65A. 
In Banaras the permanent settlement was responsible for 
the large bhumidhari area, partly because it placed the zamindars 
in a strong position and partly because it placed a sizeable 
portion of the division in the hands of tenure groups, other 
than zamindars, who were, ipso facto, bhumidhars. Thus, as 
Table XXV shows, almost the entire area in the Agra Province which 
had been held by subproprietors, permanent tenure-holders and 
fixed-rate tenants was in this one division. 
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, TABLE XXV. 
HOLDINGS OF Sub-PROPRIETORS, PERMANENT TENURE-HOLDERS and FIXED-RATE 
TENANTS, BANARAS DIVISION and AGRA PROVINCE, 1951/52. 
(acres) 









SOURCE: Revenue Report 1951/52, 61A-62A. 
On the other hand, it can be seen from Tables XXIII and XXIV 
that the former proprietary groups of the central divisions, small 
numerically as they were in some oases, were yet deoidely uninterested 
in cultivation if this can be gauged by the extent of their sir 
and khudkasht holdings. Taken together they account for nearly 
one-half of the total cultivated area of the state but only one-
third of the sir and khudkasht area. The personal lands of the 
zamindars accounted for no more than ten per cent. of the holdings 
in any of these four divisions, compared with the state average 
of seventeen per cent. and the very high proportion held by 
zamindars in Meerut and Gorakhpur divisions - 32 and 29 per cent. 
respectively. They paid the price of this lack of interest, of 
course, when the new tenures were applied. 
Viewed from the aspect of the growth of sirdari rights these 
factors play an antithetical role. Where the zmnindari body was 
extensive and/or concerned with cultivation before abolition, there 
was a smaller growth of the occupancy-and hereditary-right tenures 
which formed the basis of the sirdari group. That tenant rights 
depended on the character of the zamindari body can be seen if these 
IP 
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two groups are taken together (for then the quirks of historical 
circumstance, such as are apparent in the small occupancy area 
in Avadh, disappear). Thus Rohilkhand, Allahabad, Lucknow and 
Faizabad had the heaviest concentration of occupancy and hereditary 
tenants and, hence, of siraars. This can be readily seen in the 
comparison set out in Table XXVI. There is of course no complete 
correspondence between the pre-abolition and post-abolition groups 
for some sirdars purchased bhumidhari rights and some occupancy 
tenants - those with a right of sale - were declared bhumidhars, 
but the general pattern of development throughout the state is clear. 
TABLE XXVI. 
COMPARISON OF HOLDING AREA OF OCCUYANCY AND HEREDITARY TENANTS 1951 52, 
AND OF SIRDARS, 1952/53, IN UTTAR PRADESH, BY REVENUE DIVISIONS. 
(acres) 





Meerut 23,64,184 16,48,787 
Agra 33,13,142 28,60,544 
Rohilkhand 47,36,259 45,53,627 
Allahabad 34,19,068 ° 	35,13,776 
Jhansi 24,40 14, 26,26,111- 
Banaras 15,72,438 17,14,046 
Gorakhpur 29,99,095 29,24,669 
Lucknaw 42,93,737 44,89,255 
Paizabad 42,98,086 44,66,910 
- 
Uttar Pradesh 2,94,26,149 87,97 725 




Despite these variations; it remains clear that Act I of 1951 
secured almost the entire cultivated area in direct relationship 
with the State. Moreover, the bulk of the twenty lakh acres which 
was not included in the first "abolition area" was almost as secure 
since it was. held by the strongest of the old tenure groups. This 
can be seen in Table XXVII . Only in 15 per cent. of the "non-abolition" 
area - in the holdings of non-occupancy and grain rent tenants and 
"occupiers without consent" - did the conditions of tenancy at will 
persist. 
TABLE XXVII. 
CLASSIFICATION OF AREA TO WHICH ACT I OF 1951 DID NCT APPLY IN 1055. 
Tenure. Area (acres) % 
Sir of zamindars. 45;264 2.2 
Khudkasht of zamindars. 89,981 4.54 
Thekadars';mortgagees' cultivation. 4,306 0.21 
Grantees rent free. 51,920 1.51 
Sub-proprietors' sir, khudkasht. 72,615 5.62. 
Occupancy right holders* 8,16;545 40.69 
Hereditary tenants. 6,54,115 51.61 	. 
Tenants at favourable mates,grove-
holders and other 	protected tenants. 16,951 0.84 
Non-occupancy tenants. 1;85985 9.17 
Grain rented land. 28,818 	• 1.45 
Occupiers without consent. 81,607 4.06 
20,05,905 
*Permanent tenure holders ,Fixed rate;ex@imprietary,occupancy,  
and "12 year" tenants. 
SOURCE: Revenue Report 1952/55, 13. 
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This area has been absorbed into that under the reforms 
legislation in the years since 1952. Neither its size nor its 
composition is such as to cause any major change in the structire 
which has been outlined. Its inclusion could only be part of a 
"rounding-off" process for the original abolition and reforms 
procedure had dealt with the major task of reorganisation. 
(ii) 
The reorganisation traced above, however, was only one effect 
of the legislation and to view the changes with regard to it alone 
is to see only matters of agrarian organisation. There are many 
other viewpoints - economic, agricultural, political, social - 
which are equally, perhaps more; important. The immediate task here 
is to determine what effect the changes have had upon social 
orgaiisation and relationships in rural Uttar Pradesh. 
There is an almost complete lack of published documentary 
material for such a task. Some material is presented in recent 
studies of villages in Uttar Pradesh14 and in general studies if 
Indian agrarian reforms15 but these are too limited a basis for 
any worthwhile assessment. It is necessary, therefore, to provide 
a number of first-hand studies which will cover this lacuna. It is 
impossible, however, that one person, and particularly a foreigner, 
could make a completely adequate and comprehensive survey of the 
state for this purpose. Such a survey has been conducted in 
Bombay and in Hyderabad but in both these instances the work had the 
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the resources of experienced research centres.
16 For the individual 
the physical difficulties are in themselves formidable: one can 
hardly expect to visit, let alone study, all sections of an area 
containing 1,11,722 villages in 51 revenue districts.
17 Nor are these 
all for there remains, after arrival in a village the natural 
reserve of the villager and the difficulty of imposing oneself on 
a naturally hospitable but poor people. In view of these 
limitations, then, it is possible only to construct a sample of 
village studies on as broad a base as personal contact will allow. 
The following pages therefore attempt to present nothing more than 
the observations on fifteen villages of Uttar Pradesh which were 
visited, during March, July and August 1956. 18 Where conclusions 
are drawn, no more is claimed than that these can be traced in the 
sample and might apply in general terms to the villages of the State. 
Of the villages in the sample, six were in the West Plain 
. region. 19  The largest of these was Rasalpur-Aurangabad in Meerut 
District which had a population of 2700 and a land acreage of 
nearly 3000 acres.
20 Although only seven or eight miles by the 
shortest route from the district town, Meerut, the village stood 
back several miles from either of the pukka (sealed) roads which 
lead to the town and it could in fact be approached only by way 
of deeply rutted kacca (unmade) roads. The population, as the name 
suggests, was communally almost equally divided. The Muslims 
were, however, the more important. Numbering half the total 
population, they were, as "Muslim-Rajputs", one of the four major "high-
caste" groups of the village. Moreover, while there were only two 
other Muslim groups - Sakkas (water carriers) and Fakirs (religious 
men) - the Hindu population, below the major groups - Brahmans, 
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Rajputs and Vaishes (merchant and. trading caste) - was divided 
10- 	 into no less than nineteen separate scheduled and backward caste 
groups. 21 This caste position was important in the light of the 
landholding pattern of the village for as the four major castes 
held almost all the land, the Muslim-Rajputs owned a more than 
proportionate share and were clearly predominant. This meant more 
than simply having the largest amount of land, however, for, apart 
from wheat and maize which were grown for subsistence, the 
agricultural economy of Rasalpur-Aurangahad was based on cash 
crops, cotton and sugar cane, of which the latter was the more 
important. A large landholder had therefore an opportunity to 
acquire much greater capital resources than was normal in a village 
and this could make possible a much greater display of material 
wealth on which to base social aspirations. This was apparent in 
the village. In a place where, for instance, pukka (brick) houses 
were almost common, the largest and many of the newest were Muslim. 
Moreover, the condition and appearance of the spacious masjid ("mosque"), 
on the admission of a Brahman farmer of th?village, contrasted 
strikingly with the small, almost uncared-for village temple. The 
Hindu landholding groups shared this greater prosperity and 
although numerically smaller their affluence was shown in Pukka 
chaupals (men's meeting places) and pukka ghairs (buildings on the 
outskirts of the village for keeping implements and cattle). One 
Brahman family, in addition to building a new pukka ghair, had roofed 
portion of their ancestral kacca (mud-walled) home with galvanised 
iron. Several streets in the village had been paved with bricks 
by the villagers. Rasalpur-Aurangabad was clearly the wealthiest 
and economically strongest of the villages in the survey. 
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Before 1952 the village had been part of the estate of a 
Gujar zamindar who resided in the town of Saharanpur to the north. 
His control had, however, been nominal for as he Was heavily 
indebted, his estate was managed by the Court of Wards. Rasalpur-
Aurangabad, therefore, along with some three hundred villages of 
the estate, had been left to the management of a zilladar (district 
level revenue official) and his peon (servant). These, according 
to the complaints of the villagers, had defeated the Court's. 
willingness to give greater freedom to the cultivators, by their 
extortionate behaviour. They claimed in fact that they could not 
have been more imposed upon if the zamindar had retained control. 
The results of the abolition measure in the village were 
impressive, in large part because of the economic strength of 
the landholders. The zaminder had been completely eliminated and 
the majority of his former tenants had purchased bhumidhari 
rights, for they welcomed the freedom to make improvements which 
the bhumidhari tenure gave them. The most impressive effort had 
been in the irrigation of the fields: previously almost totally 
unirrigated, more than 85 per cent. of the village lands had 
been brought within the range of privately owned tube-wells 
in the six years since abolition. Part of the capital needed 
for these works was borrowed from the State government (Taccavi 
loans), in some cases jointly by two or three neighbouring 
• landholders. But a sizeable portion came from personal accumu-
lated capital. Nor did improvement stop there. The periodic 
flooding of the river which ran to the west of the village, the 
Kali Nadi, had been a handicap to the cane growers for it had meant 
isolation from the sugar mills in Meerut. A pukka bridge standing 
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well above the reach of the flood waters, the result of the 
11' 
	
	 voluntary labour and contributions of the villagers, had solved 
this problem. (Cf. Plate 3) 
Some forty miles south from Rasalpur-Aurangabad, in the 
district of Bulandshahr, village Tomari was a very different 
village. It had a population of only 500, almost all of whom 
were Brahmans, the descendants of the man who settled the village 
during the 1820's. Several Harijan families had entered the 
village at a later date to act as the servants and labourers of 
the Brahmans. These provided the only other caste groups in the 
village, some being Chamar, some Bhangi. Neither had any social 
standing in the village, nor any economic influence for they held 
no land. In recent years some have acquired skill as bricklayers 
and the like and it is to these trades and to education that 
they continue to look for advancement. 
Tomari was agriculturally a poor village in comparison 
to Rasalpur-Aurangabad. It suffered most from a lack of water. 
Set well away from any river or canal, the village had to depend 
on underground water for irrigation. One-half of the village was 
linked to a tube-well which served, in all, three villages but the 
remainder had to rely on irrigation from persian wheels, a slow 
process by which water is raised from the well by bullock power. 
Such irrigation can cover only an acre of land in a day and is 
regarded by the villagers as inadequate to meet demands for 
increased production. 
Income derived from employment in schools and government 
service bolstered the economy of Tomari so that it was by no 
means a backward village. The large number of old pukka houses 
and the increasing use of bricks in new buildings was evidence 
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of a substantial economic base. The number of cattle and the 
use of improved implements such as fodder cutters emphasised this 
impression. 
Still, without the extensive financial resources, the changes 
since 1952 had. been far less spectacular. There had been nothing 
to compare with the expansion of irrigation in Rasalpur-Aurangabad. 
Indeed, in spite of the 4arly recognised need for another tube-
well in the village, no move has been made by the villagers to 
provide it. They have added to the traditional forms of well 
irrigation but the more extensive project has been left to the 
government - with no results and a growing conviction that the 
government builds such works only near main roads as show pieces. 
No attempt has been made to improve the village streets or the 
kacca road which links the village with the main highway five 
miles away. 
Yet abolition was welcomed in the village. Tomari was 
formerly held by an absentee zamindar and managed by a resident 
karinda (agent) who was one or tne villagers. The karinda, 
an astute man and a complete master of tile details of the village 
lands, had riot been a popular figure for while the zamindar  
had exerted little influence over his tenants, the karinda used 
his position to foment quarrels and rivalries. His eclipse 
following abolition stood as one of the measure's chief benefits 
to the villagers. The zamindar had not lost all of his contact with 
the village but the area of saline waste land which he continued 
to hold made him relatively unimportant. The most important result, 
however, was the purchase of bhumidhari rights by nearly three-quarters 
of the tenants. In Some cases this was a considerable area; 
• 
241. 
the leading family of the village for instance held 40 acres 
in which they had formerly been occupancy tenants, as bhumidhars. 
All land in the village was at least sirdari as there were no 
asamis. 
Village Bondera was a mile from Tomari which, in many 
ways it-resembled. The crops, for example, were identical. 	Its 
high-caste population was, however, except for a Single 
Brahman family, exclusively Jat. The Harijan castes who completed 
the village lived in a separate hamlet away from the Jats but 
the two settlements were almost indistinguishable in size or 
appearance. 
Before 1952 Bondera had been held by an absentee zamindar, 
reputedly the Raja of Saharanpur. A mukhya (headman) and a 
karinda had managed the village. Both were Jats and while there 
were fewer complaints against them than in Tomari, there was a 
feeling that the mukhya held a favoured position. After abolition,. 
their position and that of the zaminaar disappeared and the Jats 
purchased bhumidhari rights in their holdings. This accounted 
for almost all the land of the village but there were some sub-
let lands which were held, even in 1958, by "adhivasis".. 
Abolition had been an acceptable improvement in status to 
the Jats. Quarrels over land were reported a thing of the past 
among them. They valued very highly the right to transfer their 
holdings, which the new tenure gave then. Improvements had been 
carried out in the village through co-operative efforts. The most 
important of these, a mile long drain to carry off excess water 
from an area of swampy land, had been dug by teams of men from 
Bondera working in conjunction with others from a neighbouring 
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village which also benefitted from the work. 
The other villages on the West Plain which were included 
in the survey differed from these three in that they had been held 
before 1952 by groups of resident zamindars. 
Nariaval was five miles along the Bareilly-Slahjahanpur 
road from Bareilly city. With a propulation of 600 and a cultivated 
area of about 3000 kacca bighas (about 600 acres) it was slightly 
larger than Tomari but like the Bulandshahr village in that it was 
largely Brahman. 
A group of nineteen zamindars had held Nariaval but their 
shares in the village had varied considerably. One alone, the 
present pradhah (president of the village council), had held one-
third of the total area, in addition to a neighbouring village 
which he had purchased. Most of these zamindars remained in the 
village after abolition and formed the core of the bhumidhari 
group. Some other cultivators purchased bhumidhari rights but 
many former tenants remained sirdars. The village, in fact, had 
a complete range of tenures - bhumidhars, sirdars and asamis. 
Abolition had been unpopular with very dissimilar groups 
in the village. The ex-zamindars were bitter at their loss of 
dignity and at their loss of land. They claimed to be so reduced 
materially that they could no longer obtain outside service to 
supplement their income and that they were unable to farm "properly". 
The prospect before their sons was simply further reduction 
until they were brought to the final indignity; they would have 
"to cut grass". Their one consolation was a rumour that the 
Government was to reintroduct zamindarit There was in their 
claims more than a little hyperbole for the pradhan, as one 
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instance, still had sufficient resources to employ ploughmen on 
his fields. By the same token, however, he had been unable to 
complete a large new pukka house which he had commenced before 
abolition and the facade remained unrendered and even incomplete. 
Moreover, no new pukka buildings had been erected since 1952 and 
there were no more than a dozen of such buildings, according to 
the villagers, in Nariaval. 
The efforts to consolidate holdings in the village had also 
met with disapproval from the landholders. The reorganisation 
of the lands by grouping them in three classes and consolidating 
the holdings of individuals within those grades being considered 
inadequate. 
A group of labourers also complained of the changes. The 
loss of affluence by the zamindars and the reduction of zamindaxi 
holdings led to a fall in the demand for their labour and, as the 
lands of the village were fully cultivatdd, there was no way for 
them to become cultivators, or, under the new system, tenants 
or sub-tenants. Many travelled to Bareilly in search of employment 
but it was often difficult to find work there, and travelling 
either took time in walking or part of the day's wages in fares. 
Overall, they felt that decreasing opportunities had lowered their 
standards. 
Village Ajitganj in District Mainpuri was linked with the 
markets and the cattle fair in Mainpuri town by five miles of 
road which was in reality little more than the predominant track 
of the bullock carts. It had a population of nearly 1200 in two 
main settlements, the smaller of which was exclusively Brahman. 
The Brahmans were the largest group but there was a wide caste 
• 
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representation, the twenty-two smaller caste groups representing a 
varied range of specialist activities in addition to farming.
22 
Ajitganj was not the agricultural equal of the other Vest 
Plain villages, despite adequate irrigation facilities. A 
distributary of the Lower Ganges Canal ran between the two sections 
of the village and watered the best of the fields while the fields 
on the other side were irrigated from a privately-owned tube-well 
but the village was hampered firstly by a lack of land and secondly 
by a restricted agricultural programme. The total cultivated 
area was only 500 acres and the individual fields were small, the 
average being only about two kacca bighas (about half an acre). The 
crops of the village were largely for internal consumption. Little 
sugar cane was grown and food grains - wheat, rice gram (pulses) 
and peas - were the staple crops. 
As the proprietary body of Ajitganj had been large, the 
estates of the individual zamindars had been small. The largest 
holding had been only 25 acres and as important a personage as 
the lambardar (cultivator responsible to the Government for the 
revenue) held less than this. Combined with the fact of the 
subsistence nature of much of the agriculture, this meant that a 
large part of the lands, particularly of the smaller zamindars, 
was held as sir or khudkasht. Following their "abolition" the 
znmindars had remained as bhumidbars in this sir and khudkasht and 
as such they were the majority of the bhumidbars as less than a 
quarter of the tenant-cultivators purchased bhumidhari rights. 
Despite their continued predominance, however, the former 
zamindars resented the abolition measure for they felt their 
reduced position very strongly. The former lambarder had lost 
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the greater part of his former holding and had received in 
return Rs. 200 as compensation. Fortunately heirless, he had 
built a new temple and dharamshala (rest house) on the remainder 
of his land. Not all were in a position to pass off the changes 
in this way, however, and while most had not lost materially as 
greatly as this - the new pukka facades on the houses of some lkisanst 
(as the ex-zamindars now term themselves) indicated other than 
loss for some - (Cf. Plate 4) - most have felt their loss of prestige. 
NO longer the dispensers of aid to resourceless tenants, no longer 
masters without question in the village, their influence has 
declined before them. 
They complained moreover of their new relationship with 
the government. The system was rigid, particularly when repayments 
of taccavi loans or payments of revenue had to be made and corruption 
often undid the usefulness of government schemes: taccavi loans, 
for instance, might be lost in transit from government to cultivator. 
Much of this complaining seemed to come from a desire to complain. 
In conversation 'Icisans , often tended to be contemptuous of 
government efforts; in fact they seemed to have benefitted 
greatly from co-operation with the government - and to be sensible 
of this. The village had a bank, a .hospital, a government seed 
store and a depot for handicrafts and village products (a khadi 
bhandar), facilities which many villages might envy. 
Much of the criticism which they voiced was in fact a 
compound of misunderstanding and disillusionment: without fully 
understanding what the 'new era' was, they knew that it was still 
beyond them. Fertilisers provided a simple example. A subsidy 
in one year enabled villagers to use artificial fertilisers 
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with impressive results. The failure of this single application, 
however, to maintain increased productivity led to a discounting 
of artificial fertiliser and an increased wariness of all 
governmental schemes. Such suspicions could, moreover, be 
utilised by opposition parties to bolster their own political 
propaganda. 
On another distributary of the Lower Ganges Canal, three 
miles from Ajitganj, was the village of Sajamai. A former joint 
zamindari village, Sajamai closely resembled Ajitganj but a visit 
to the largest zamindar-become-bhumidhar revealed another 
grievance of the former zamindars. This man, who retained 
control of more than 60 acres, sufficiently well consolidated 
to allow the use of a tractor, objected to the power which the 
new village councils, and especially the pradhan, had over the lands 
of the village. He was supported by a group of smaller 
bhumidhars in his belief that petty village politics would enter 
into land management. 
The largest of the three villages on the Central Plain in 
the survey was village Kin i in the Avadh district of Sultanpur. 
Kin i had 1000 people distributed between the village proper and 
two smaller hamlets - Kawat and Arwal - which represented the 
pre-abolition "colonising" enterprises of the zaminders. There 
were some 500 acres of cultivated land and a further area of waste, 
jungle and private garden-land, attached to the village. 
Kin i was four miles by path from the road which joined the 
railway line running to the district town of Sultanpur. To a 
large degree, however, the village looked not to Sultanpur but to 
Faizabad, the main town of the neighbouring district where were 
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the mills which took Kin's most important crop, sugar cane. Cane 
was grown throughout the year while there were autumn (kharif) 
harvests of rice, maize and millet and spring (rabi) harvests of 
whaat, gram, peas and barley. 
The Chamars and the cultivating castes of KUrmis and Kewats 
were the largest groups but the Thakurs (Kahatriyas, the traditional 
warrior caste) were the most influential. There were, however, 
two small hUslim groups: Julahas and Fakirs, and eleven smaller 
Hindu groups, mainly occupational. 23 This wide range of 
specialist castes was responsible for an important feature of the 
economy and the landholding pattern of the village. Before 1952 
the whole village had been held by six Thakur families, the 
descendants of a common grandfather. The shares by gradations 
within that original family and were preserved until 1952. This 
monopoly meant that land could be held by other cultivators only 
through a tenancy from a Thakur. Mich of the land therefore was 
under normal tenancies but part was held by members of specialist 
castes in what was known in Kin i as the jagir system. This was 
an organised exchange of services for land (or sometimes produce) 
between the specialists and the Thakurs. Tenants also participated 
in the system at times but only to a limited extent. The jagir 
system of Kin i is in fact identical with the "jajmani system" which 
has been described from many other Indian villages. 24. 
The basic features of the system in Kin i was that services 
were not rendered for cash payment. The ironsmith (Lohar), barber 
(Nai), carpenter (Barhi) and washerman (Dhobi) all served the 
Thakurs in return for a grant of land either rent-free (jagir 
land) or at a concessional rate of rent. If at any time the service 
pr 
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was terminated, jagir land reverted to the Thakur but the rented 
land could continue - although without the concession. Other 
serving castes were paid in grain and in the case of very small 
zamindars or tenant farmers, all jagir arrangements were made in 
this way. Thus at harvest time the servant (the kaman or "worker" 
. 25 as Lewis calls him ) received from 12 to 16 seers (24 - 32 pounds) 
Of grain for each member of his family from each of his 'clients'. 
The grain payments of une larger zamindars were more complex. 
The ploughman, for example, received grain payments as well as jagir 
land: for each day's work he received one and one-quarter seers of 
grain, plus five per cent. of tne harvest and, during reaping, one 
bundle of wheat, gram or barley in each 17 bundles. Labourers 
employed during the harvest by the larger zamindars received 2 seer 
of grain, one Iota (a jug holding about one and one-half seers) of 
sharbet and some parched grain for each day's work. Smaller 
cultivators were usually unable to employ this additional labour. 
The implementation of abolition brought changes in the 
jagir system. The Thakurs of Kin i lost hold of 80 per cent. of 
their lands in 1952, including the land rented to kamans and that 
portion of the jagir land which had been recorded in the name of 
the kaman. The zaminders became wary, therefore, of granting 
more jagir lands and so the system, although the zamindars - 
would prefer to use it, has been greatly circumscribed. Where 
grain payments continue, they are made on the same basis as 
before. 
Following abolition, the Thakurs reorganised. The number 
of families increased to ten by partitions within the original 
six. One of the zamindars who resided in the village before 1952 
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left to take up practice as a homeopathic doctor but his 
departure was balanced by the return of one of the zaminders 
who, while he had retained control of his lands, had been employed 
outside the village prior to the abolition changes. 
The 20 per cent, of the village lands still held by the 
Thakurs was the only bhumidhari land in the village, the former 
tenants being content to remain sirdars. The Thakurs therefore 
.retained a distinct advantage for their revenue rates averaged only 
Rs. 2 per acre while the rates for sirdars, based on their former 
rentals, were Rs.10 per acre on the average. The Thakurs retained 
much of their influence in the village as well. 	Several families 
had sons in government service while others were studying at 
universities. One of the two pukka houses in the village 
belonged to the Soni (goldsmith), the other to 'Thakur Sahib', 
the wealthiest and most influential of the former zamindere. 
The Thakurs, while prepared to admit that abolition had 
some beneficial results - a "new sense of freedom", an improvement 
in economic conditions - were more convinced that the Birders 
would be ruined without their help and that the patwaris would 
work more mischief than ever without their control. And in 
the growing Communist influence among the Chamars they saw 
increasing tension in the village, to counteract which they 
remained Congress Party supporters. 
While there had been no pukka building activity since 
1952, co-operation with government Agencies had led to general 
improvements in the village. Several streets had. been paved, 
a co-operative seed store supplied the village and several 
cultivators had bggun to use the improved 'Japanese' method of 
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planting rice. A tube-well had failed and the irrigation on 
which the village depended to increase its production to keep 
pace with a growing population, was incomplete. Gypsum, used 
at the suggestion of a visiting expert, had brought saline waste 
lands into cultivation, an innovation which had been better 
received in the village than artificial fertilisers. 
The lands of Babhanpux, District Allahabad, were shared by two 
absentee zamindars and the Government before 1952. Situated 
nearly 20 miles from Allahabad city, the village had an average 
acre and a quarter of cultivated land for each of its 400 inhabitants. 
That figure, however, was deceptive for the land was excessively 
fragmented and cultivated in many very small plots. 
The two major food-grains were cultivated: wheat in the 
spring, rice in the autumn, with a variety of auxiliary crops: 
barley, gram, mustard, peas, and vegetables. With the exception 
of the sale of surplus grains or vegetables, however, there was 
little cultivation of cash crops. To some extent this was due to 
the lack of irrigation facilities. Walls were the prime source 
of water, a canal which skirted part of the village being of 
little use to the fields near it, which were on a higher level. 
Brahmans and Thakurs were the major castes and while 
there were some specialist castes - Kurmi, Ahir, Tell, Kumahar, 
.Nai Kacchi (vegetable gardener), Chamar, Dhobi and Pasi (pig 
keepers) - their number was not comparable to that in Kin, 
for instance. 
The Government had formerly held the largest part of 
the village lands, some 60 per cent. The two zamindars who 
had held the remainder had kept no sir in Babhanpur and indeed 
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they had had no influence at all on the social life of the 
village. They visited the village infrequently, if ever. As a 
result, antagonisms were not between zaminaars and tenants but 
between groups of tenants. The relative unimportance of the 
zaminAars also meant that their elimination had not, in itself, 
brought any noticeable change. 
Nor had the new tenure system altered the status quo. 
Tenants of the former landholders retained the land they had 
held before 1952, generally as sirdars for only the most well-
to-do families had bothered to purchase bhumidhari titles. 
The social hierarchy continued in fact to be based upon caste 
and although there had been signs of political awakening among 
the lower castes, traditional leadership, particularly that of 
the Brahmans, had not been challenged. 
Hajiganj was five miles closer to Allahabad City than 
Babhanpur and within a mile of the main Northern Hallway line 
running from Allahabad to Delhi. A more sprawling village than 
many, Hajiganj had several smaller , settlements near it, as well 
as the residence of the former zamindar. This man had owned 
part of the village, the rest being a Government estate. His 
house was a large pukka building with trees planted close to it. 
He continued to live there but as he had not bothered to acquire 
any sir or khudkasht, preferring in his heyday to requisition 
whatever produce he desired, his eclipse had been complete. 
The house was falling into disrepair and he himself attempted 
to earn a living as a vakil (attorney) in the District Courts at 
Allahabad. His former tenants, fully aware of his decline, spoke 
of him with derision as a beggar of food. 
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The tenants themselves welcomed the abolition move. hany 
were of low caste rank and these felt that they had an opportunity 
to improve their position. Lost had remained sirdars although 
often with a small bhumidhari holding. Thus, an Abir family 
had a holding of 50 acres but they had purchased bhumidhari 
rights in only two acres of this. For most of them it was education, 
not a higher tenure status, which they desired; literacy they 
felt, was their greatest assurance of justice and respect. 
Having been tenants of the Government, they were quite 
accustomed to this relationship and, as their enthusiasm for the 
Government's seed store indicated, were content with it. They 
did complain of the consolidation (chakbandi) operations, not 
because it was Unfairly implemented but rather that the patwari's 
records contained so many errors that the process caused serious 
quarrels within joint families. 
The most backward and poverty-stricken villages of Uttar 
Pradesh were, and are, on the East Plain region: "perpetually 
scarcity-hit, drought-smitten and flood-ravaged." 26 The villages 
of this area are, moreover, the most orthodox in the State. 	Castes 
generally live in separate hamlets, often with distinct names ;
27 
rules with regard to food and eating utensils are strictly 
utensils 
observed, strangers being served often on dispensable/in the men's 
quarters or on the verandah rather than in the home and high-caste 
women seldom venture outside the house if strangers are present. 
All six villages of the East Plain included in the survey were of 
this type. 
Bhilampur-Chhapra was eighteen miles from the district 
town, Azamgarh, on the road linking that town with Faizabad. A 
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twice-daily 'bus service linked the village with Azamgarh. That 
town, however, devoid of any industry, had little to offer the 
over-populated, under-employed village. Len from Bhilampur-
Chhapra often travelled to Kanpur of even Bombay and Calcutta 
in search of work. 
The village, divided into the two portions of its name, 
and several smaller hamlets, had 2000 people but only 850 
acres of cultivated land. Yost castes were represented but the 
Thakurs, the largest landholders, dominated the village. The 
economy was almost purely subsistive, rice and wheat being the 
major crops although smaller areas of sugar cane, cotton, millet 
and gram were planted. 
Bhilampur-Chhapra had been one of a group of eight 
neighbouring villages held by a group of sixty zanindars, all of 
whom had lived in Bhilampur-Chhapra. Eight of this group were 
zamindars with sizeable estates; the rest were much smaller. 
The greatest part of the land in the 'home' village had remained 
in the hands of the zamindars after abolition, and they 
constituted almost the entire bhumidhari population. Few of 
their tenants had purchased bhumidhari titles, being content to 
remain sirdars. 
While their power had declined since 1952, the Thakurs, 
fiercely proud, had not allowed the changes entirely to sweep away 
their traditional position as the leaders of the village. They 
disliked the new forms of village government, at least where they 
were unable to control them, especially where these bodies had power 
over land. One serious result of this dislike had been the 
reclamation of large areas of jungle and waste which had formerly 
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been used to graze much cattle. Lilk production had declined. 
because of this. 
Kakarahi was four miles from Bhilampur-Chhapra and reached 
from the highway only by a foot-path. Smaller than Bhilagicur-
Chhapra, its lands were even so overcrowded, 500 acres having 
to support 1000 people. The crops of the two villages were 
similar. Thakurs were the most influential caste although Kurmis 
and Chamars were numerically as strong. There were representatives 
of many other castes, groups of more-or-less equal standing 
dwelling in separate hamlets. 
The village had been the joint holding of a group of 
25 Thakur zamindars. Most had dwelt in the village although the 
been 
leading zamindpir had/employed in Lucknow in the Income Tax 
Department. Following the reforms, the Thakurs had remained in 
the village and continued to control the greater part of the lands. 
Where land left the control of the Thakurs it went to the mothers 
of three castes in the main: Brahmans, KUrmis and Ahirs, with the 
two latter groups being the largest gainers. Some of these had 
also become bhumidhars but this tenure remained largely a Thalcur 
monopoly. The ex-zamindars remained, in fact, the dominant 
force in the village and the lower castes had been able to make 
few inroads into that position. 
Village Parsoli-Narayanpur, District Ghazipur fell within 
the orbit of Jonathan Duncan's permanent settlement of the Bemires 
territory in 1795. It had unfortunately been none the better 
for that. With only 600 people and a cultivated area of 800 
acres, it was better provided for than, for instance, the 
Azamgarh villages; and being within three miles of a metre gauge 
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railway and a main road,tt had the opportunity of being well 
connected with markets if these had existed. There were, for 
example, no sugar mills in the area - the nearest of which the 
villagers knew was in Gorakhpur city, one hundred miles to the 
north - and so no cane was grown. Cultivation was for the food 
requirements of indivialial families to a large extent. There 
were only two pukka houses in the village, one of which belonged 
to a retired police officer who drew a pension. Moreover; both 
were simply brick facades. 
Three of the four zamindars with shares in the village had 
resided there. The shares were expressed, as was common, Met 
fractions of a rupee, each anna share being equal to one-
sixteenth of the value of the village revenua8 Thus, of the 
resident zamindars, the temple had a two anna share in the lands 
attached to Narayanpur, a Sanayasi (traditionally a religious 
mendicant) had an eight anna share in Parson and also in 
Narayanpur;while a Kayasth had a one anna share in Parsoli and 
a share anna share in Narayanput. The absentee zamindar, a Muslim 
from Ghazipur city had. awned the remaining seven anna share in 
Fhrsoli. 
After abolition the greater part of the lands passed to the 
former tenants who were mainly Bhumihar Brahman (a caste of 
agriculturists laying claim to be Brahman), Kori and Lodi (both 
agricultural castes). The Kayasth was the only zamindar to retain 
land in the village: the Muslim sold his share before abolition 
and. the Sanayasi returned to the traditional calling of his caste 
and became an ascetic, throwihgl up his lands to do so. Probably 
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because of the precarious economic level of the village, few of 
the former tenants purchased bhumidhari rights and the bulk of 
the village remained sirdari. 
The non-purchase of bhumidhari rights was not due to any 
lack of enthusiasm for abolition, however. Although the villagers 
felt that the zamindars, particularly the leadership and resources 
which they had provided, would be missed, they did not dismiss 
lightly the benefit of being without the demands for begar or of 
having a greater chance of obtaining the remission or suspension 
of revenue in times of distress. Nor did they forget that while 
the zamindar often allowed the rent to fall into arrears for three 
or more years, the final reckoning was always with compthund 
interest. 
More than zamiddari abolition, however, the sirdars of 
Parsoli=Narayanpur were concerned with the vagaries of the 
weather. They had experienced two erratic monsoons in succession 
by 1958. These they asctlbed to the anger of "Nature" who had 
been annoyed with human attempts to interfere in normal processes 
by building tube-wells. So perverse had "she" become that she 
let the newly-sown seed wither for lack of rain and then sent the 
monsoon when the seed stocks were exhausted. 
Lalpur, eleven miles by train from Jaunpur city, was a 
large riverside village. A group of its 2000 people were Mallahas 
(fishermen) who lived in a hamlet on the banks of the Sai Nadi, 
separate from the rest of the village. The Earijans, who lived 
in yet another hanlet, were the largest caste group but the bulk 
oft the 700 acres of village lands were in the hands of Thakurs, 
257. 
Ahirs, Brahmans and Khatiks (pig-keepers and vegetable gardeners). 
The Muslims and the remaining Hindu castes 29 had either small 
holdings, plied a special trade or were day labourers in the 
city. 
The search for employment outside the village Indicated 
the weakness of the village economy. A lack of irrigation facilities 
restricted agriculture: no rice was grown and the kharif harvest 
consisted of maize, millet and a small quantity of sugar cane. 
The rabi was almost entirely wheat although some barley, peas and. 
gram were also grown. There were few cattle in the village and 
this was an important weakness. The only pukka buildings in the 
village were in the Muslim section. 
A Kayasth lawyer from Banaras had held Lalpur in its 
entirety, in addition to shares in various neighbouring villages. 
The zamindar had: managed the village through a resident karinda 
but he had been a frequent visitor to the village. After abolition 
he retained only a small garden, the lands being settled with the 
tenants, many of whom had purchased bhumidhari rights. 
At least with the high-caste tenants the zamindar had not 
been an unpopular figure. They had little of which to complain 
and so, while they accepted their new status and welcomed the 
government's readiness to help them, they felt that the village 
had regressed in the years since abolition. It had only been 
in that period,for instance, that there had_ been a shortage of 
work in the village. Abolition they saw as only one past of the 
policy necessary for the village: without all-round development 
abolition would mean very little. 
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A neighbour to Lalpur was %Nada which had previously been 
in the possession of a group of 44 zamindars. The composition 
of this group was extraordinary: forty of the group resided in 
Nawada but they held only about 90 acres of Nawada's totil cult-
ivated land. of 725 acres, between them. These forty, however, 
all had large holdings in other villages while the four absentees 
held the bulk of the tawada lands. The main effect of abolition 
had been, therefore, to eliminate these four men. The resident 
zamindmrs had remained in the village and the evidence of pukka 
building activity suggested that for some at least the decline in 
material status had not been disastrous. 
The tenants had. gained from the new tenure status. There 
had been some purcha'se of bhumidhari rights but usually only in 
a portion of the holding. One man, with a holding of 14 pukka 
bighas, acquired bhumidhari rights in only four bighas. Many 
of the new sirdars, felt, however, that despite these gains, 
conditions in the village had deteriorated. They regretted., they 
said, the breakdown of the zamindar-tenant relationship which had 
seemed to maintain traditional values and security. These regrets, 
however; were for themselves, not the village in general. The 
labourers of the village,they maintained, had now status and 
freedom far greater than they had had before. It was the "middle 
classes", those with small landholdings, who were confronted with 
falling standards. It was, in fact, the values and security of 
this group which were in jeppardy. 
The three sections of village Mowiyai in District Mirzapur, 
were large enough to be separate villages. Each had, in fact, a 
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distinctive character: Lakhanpura was predominately Muslim, 
Mowiya was mainly Brahman and. Kurmi, while Jagdishpur, in 
addition to Brahmans and. Kumla had representatives of most 
30 of the other Hindu castes to be found in the village. The 
total population of the village was 4000. 
The village stretched for half a mile along the northern 
bank of the Ganges, almost directly opposite Mirzapur city 
although it was some distance from the ferry terminal which 
linked it with that city. A metre-pwge railway line connected 
it with Banaras and it was with this district, rather than 
Mirzapur, that the village had its strongest likeness. That 
is to say, it was essentially an East Plain village. 
• 	 From an agricultural point of view, however, it was one 
of the poorest villages of this group. The river was perhaps its 
chief asset for fishing was possible and the annual flooding made 
the sandy flats which fronted the river the best of the 1000 acres 
which belonged to the village. On these flats the sole valuable 
crop; wheat, was grown. This was, however, only a minor crop; 
barley and gram in the spring, arhar (pulse) and millet in the 
autumn, were the staple crops. Little sugar cane and no rice was 
grown. Indeed it was claimed that before 1939 little importance 
had been placed on much of the land because of the lack of 
irrigation • Then, the weaving of carpets, 96aditional Mirzapur 
craft, had been the major village activity. There had been twenty 
looms at that time, all of th;Zprivately owned with the weavers 
working on contracts from the city merchants. All the raw materials 
came from outside: jute for the base from Calcutta, wool for the 
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pile from Agra or Amritsar (in the Punjab) and cotton for the 
warp from Kanpur. There had. never been any thought of producing 
these things in the village, nor perhaps any possibility of 
doing so. 
Mowiya had been permanently settled in 1795. By 1952 
its lands were shared by a large nuMber of zaminAars of whom four 
were pre-eminent. The most important was Mr. Hakimuddin, who 
maintaineChis family home in the village although he occupied 
himself chiefly in a. carpet factory in Mirzapur city. The house 
was a large, two-storey, pukka building indicative, together with 
the walled grove and masjid near to it, of the standing of the 
family in the village and particularly, as they were Muslims, in 
Lakhanpura. Both the house and the masjid had been built by 
Hakimuddin's grandfather, the masjid for the use of all the village 
Muslims. Despite his outside commercial interests, Hakimuddin had 
maintained a large sir holding. The other three zamindars of 
consequence were Hindus: Mishri La]., Jagdish and Basant La].. All 
three had dwelt in the village. 
The . economic structure of the village altered cOhsiderably 
after Independence. The carpet industry had. declindd in import-
ance and only three looms continued to operate. These employed 
only six or seven men. Moreover, a new tube-well had increased 
the agricultural potential and it appeared likely that when the 
distributaries were completed, the land would have a new importance. 
Abolition, too, had affected the village economy. The 
zamindars retained the majority of the lands and Halcimuddin 
remained the largest single landholder in the village. Many of 
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the zamindars, however, had been reduced to cultivating their own 
land. The lands which the tenants had acquired were small in 
area. There vas, therefore, a general reduction in the demand 
for agricultural labour.. This; allied to the recession in the 
carpet industry in the village, had forced the labourers to search 
for employment outside the village, particularly in the city. 
Abolition, of itself, had brought little favourable economic changei 
and consequently little social change. 
Baragao4 sixteen miles from Jhansi City by motor bus, was 
fast becoming a small town although three-quarters of its 5000 
people were still concerned only with agriculture. The large 
group of shopkeepers and traders in the population, however, had 
erected their shops and tea stalls facing onto the road and 'bus 
terminal and this gave the village a somewhat commercial air. 
The most important of the agricultural castes were the Kachhis 
although Brahmans; Thakurs and Kayasths also owned land. There were 
several smaller groups: Chamar, Kori, Bhangi, Mali, Dhobi, Lohar, 
Barbi, Sonar, Julaha and Lodi. The 5000 acres of land adjoining 
the village were insufficient for the needs of the farmers and. 
additional holdings were rented by many in the neighbouring villages. 
An irrigation canal supplied the village but the cultivation was 
for subsistence, various pulses and jowar-bajra (a type of millet) 
being harvested in the autumn, and wheat, gram and barley in the 
spring. 
Prior to 1952 the village had passed through a variety of 
zamindari hands. It had originally been held entirely by a Bania 
or moneylender. It had then been purchased by a group of Canadian 
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missionaries who in turn sold to a group of four zamindars: two 
Marwari moneylenders from Jhansi City, one resident Kayasth and 
a resident Bazzaz (cloth merchant). Later still the Marwari 
shares were amalgamated when one purchased the interest of the 
other. Still later the Kayasth's share was purchased by a resident 
Kachhi. Thus it came about that on the eve of abolition an 
Eibsentee Marwari held a seven anna share; a resident Bazzaz held 
a four anna share and a resident Kachhi held the remaining five 
anna share. 
The lands were more widely distributed after abolition. All 
the zamindars retained some land: the Marwari and_ the Bazzaz about 
55 bighas each but the Kachhi very little. Other Kachhis had 
purchased land, however, and this grWp were the leading landholders 
particularly of the most valuable lands close to the village (the 
gyonrah lands) which bore the heaviest revenue assessmentV' 
Brahmans, Kayasths, Thakurs and. Chamars had all been active in 
buying land. So brisk had the trade been, in fact; that no pastures 
were left in the village. Moreover, it was estimated that two-
thirds of the lands were held on bhumidhari tenures, the majority 
of them by purchase of these rights. There were few asami holdings 
and as even the resident ex-zamindars cultivated for themselves, 
there was little opportunity for labourers in the village. 
The group which appeared to have gained most from the 
changes was the Kachhi. The members of this caste were building 
pukka houses, a display of affluence previuosly almost the monopoly 
of the trading Pahias. Abolition had generally been welcomed by 
those groups with land: the repressions and the powers of the 
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zamindars had gone and while there were complaints of the ways 
of the government they believed that overall the ordinary man 
had a greater opportunity of participating in development. That 
there was still a wide gap to be breached, however, was emphasised 
by a group of villagers watching the schoolchildren celebrating 
Independence Day (15 August). They commented that independence - 
from want? - had been achieved by so few. 
From the sample it is obvious that neither location nor 
economic condition were the major determinants of the reaction 
to abolition. These may often have modified reactions, of course, 
particularly economic wealth which, as in the case of Basalpur-
Aurangabad, could make post-abolition improvement more dramatic, 
and thus the changes themselves more meaningful. But the patterns 
of approval or disapproval did not follow either of these criteria: 
villages from all four natural divisions, with widely differing; 
economic conditions expressed like reactions to the changes. 
The pre-abolition tenure is the most important single factor 
in tracing the patterns of reaction for this determined both the 
role of the zamindar in the life of the village and the attitudes 
and position of the tenant body. And. itsis clearly the reactions of 
landlords and tenants which are the important considerations in 
evaluating the effects of the changes of 1952 for those changes were 
designed to affect precisely those who had land: the zamindars on 
the one hand and the tenants ow -the other. Dealing as it did with 
the redistribution of existing land rights, Act I of 1951 could 
hardly affect the problems of the "landless labourer" which were 
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more properly a subject for programmes such as land reclamation, 
collective farming in agricultural "colonies" and industrialisation. 
(That this should be so may, in fact, be a weakness of I of 1951, 
but that is not the issue here.) To those who were already connected 
with land, however, the changes were of great importance. The 
zamindars (or, to be more inclusive, the intermediaries,) by the 
very nature of the measure were involved in a tremendous change of 
status and one which they could not be expected to relish. Even 
had they believed that the sole aim of the measure was to convert 
thent.-into efficient agriculturists they could not have welcomed the 
prospect for many were singularly uninterested in agriculture. At 
the same time the other "landed" group, the tenanta r were subjected 
to an evAlly important change of status, not so much with regard 
to the quantum of rights involved in sirdari or bhumidhari tenure 
as in the relationship of that tenure to the superior title from 
which it was held. It was the difference between being an 
occupancy tenant holding from a zamindar as a relatively personal 
landlord and a Birder holding from the State as a 'super-landlord'. 
And as it was important to these two groups, its success or failure 
depended on them. 
Classified on the basis of pre-abolition tenures the sample 
falls into five main groups: 
(i) those held by a single absentee zamindar, viz. Rasalpur-
Aurangabad, Tonari, Bondera and Lalpur; 
(ii)that held by a single resident zamindar, viz. Hajiganj; 
(iii)that held by a group of zamindars who were uhally 
absentee, viz. Babhanpur; 
(iv)those held by a group of zamindars who were wholly 
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resident, viz., Ajitganj, Sajamai, Kakarabi, Bhilampur-Chhapra and. 
Nariaval; 
(v) those held by a group of zamindars, partly resident 
and partly absentee, viz., Nawada, Mowiya, Baragaon, Kin i and 
Parsoli-Narayanpur. 
In the first three groups, which will here be called the 
"uninfluenced group", either the zamindars or zamindar had been 
uninfluential before 1952 because they lived outside the village or, 
as in the case of Hajiganj, their former influence had been completely 
shattered by abolition. As a result abolition had meant a new 
accession of power for the tenants who had, consequently, welcomed 
the change. Where finances permitted and the nature of village 
society on a caste basis seemed to demand it, bhunidhari rights 
were freely purchased in order to assure social status. Thus 
there were important areas of bhumidhari tenure gained. by purchase 
in kasalpur-Aurangahad, Tomari, Bondera and Lalpur. In the first 
three villages this was largely a result of the economic position 
of the village while in ;Jaipur it was much more because of the 
need for distinction in a diverse caste society. However, in the 
two Allahabad district villages where neither finances permitted 
nor caste demanded it bhumidhari purchases were small and. restricted 
in the main to those who were traditional leaders,eg. the Brahmans. 
For the majority of ex-tenants in these villages of the Allahabad 
district however; sirdari tenure was sufficient advance or else 
the purchase of bhumidhari rights in simply a portion of the holding 
was enough. 
This was also, speaking generally the area of the most 
pr 
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wholehearted acceptance of the changes for, with the possible o 
exception of Lalpur where the zamindar was familiar because of 
his frequent visits, the elimination of the zamindar meant the 
removal of restraint without any marked alteration in the 
traditional structure of the village. Most of these villages 
were akin to the village of Karimpur recorded by the Misers, where 
a villager's comment on the absentee landlord was: 
"he proclaims his desire to be just 	and makes efforts 
to enforce his justice 	• But he is too buss with his 
many properties to take time for any one village. We have 
never seen him. All we know ehout him are the reports which 
our headman brings back from the big durbars to which he is 
invited once a year." 52 
The fact that the disappearance of such a landlord did not affect 
greatly the traditional village social structure was not invariably 
beneficial. Much of the lack of development in Tomari, for example, 
might be traced to the unchallenged strength og the Brahmans. At 
the same time it is possible that without the distractions of in-
ternal conflict the village might be able to concentrate on 
development, the feeling that all change helped the village and 
themselves being an added incentive. Such has been the case in 
Rasalpur-Aurangabad and Bondera. 
In the "uninfluenced" villages, therefore, it is generafly 
true to say that those who could be expected to gain most from 
the changes - the tenants - have done so. 
The other two groups classified above might be termed the 
"influenced" villages. A group of landlords, the majority of then' 
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resident in the village, awned all the land before 1952 and were 
able to wield almost complete power. Land was gained only from 
one of the zamindari group and the persons who became tenants in 
this way were directly under the zamindar's influence. This meant 
two things; firstly, the zamindars were socially superior; secondly, 
the tenants were inferior. Abolition affected these villages ra 
markedly for it wrought changes in the whole fabric of village 
society. The result has been a fissuring of that society. The 
tenants have gained but only at the expense of the zamindars, most 
of whom have remained in the village.. As a result the zamindars 
feel their loss of prestige, their loss of power, their loss of 
material wealth and their loss of lamAlver keenly. Their combined 
• dominance in the village has not been broken in most villages; only 
in Parsoli-Narayanpur where all but one of the original zamindars 
have disappeared and in Baragaon where the ex-zandndari holdings 
are small can it be said that the dominant position of the land - 
holding group of pre-abolition days has gone. What is more to their 
advantage, the ex-zamindars form almost the entire bhumidhari 
group in these villages and very often continue to hold a large 
proportion of the village lands. In the majority of cases, therefore, 
these zamindar-bhumidhars remain the most inflential section of 
village society. Nonetheless; they are disgruntled by their decline 
and irreconcilable to agrarian "reforms". 
The tenants of these villages are, naturally enough, 
appreciative of their new status. The continued presence of the 
zamindars has, however; inhibited their acceptance of the changes 
in many cases. Often they have now to face an actively hostile 
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dominant, uncooperative group in their former landlords. In many 
villages, too, they were confronted by an unusual alignment of 
ex-zamindari and. labouring interests for the labourers have been 
disconcerted by the falling demand for their services. It is not 
possible to tell whether this combined opposition has inhibited 
the tenants in the purchase of bhumidbaxi rights but it is a fact 
that in most of the villages of this kind the former tenants have 
most often remained sirdars. This may be due simply to a lack of 
funds for it would appear highly probable that the tenants of the 
influenced were poorer than those of the uninfluenced villages but 
there is no way of deciding which has been the more important factor. 
Another finding on the results of abolition in a former 
joint-zamindari village in eastern Uttar Pradesh confirms this view 
that the measure has not altered the power structure in such 
villages. Thus Cohen found that 
"zamindari abolition in 1952 did little to affect the economic 
and political dominance of the Thakurs either in Madhopur 
or in the immediate region, for it expropriated the 
landlords only from that part of their tenanted lands which 
had. not previously been registered as being under their personal 
cultivation. As long ago as 1906, half the lands of 
Chandwale Fergana, of which Madhopur is peat, had been 
recorded as being under the landlords' own cultivation. In 
1955, after landlord abolition, Thakur landlords still owned 
and cultivated approximately 70 per cent. of the lands of 
Madhopur. The few permanent tenants in the village were 
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enabled to buy out their parts of the Thakural landlord 
holdings by payment to the State Overnment of ten times 
the annual rent, but the landlords who lost land thereby 
are to be compensated by the government. Same ex-landlords 
moreover, - continue to receive rent from their now protected 
tenants at will. Although the old legal bases of tenantry 
under landlords ceased to exist in 1952; most non-Thakur 
families continue to gain access to land only as lessees under 
55 Thakurs.". 
Insofar as zamindaxi abolition in Uttar Pradesh aimed ilia to 
alter the bases of village society by reducing the position of 
the zamindars and bolstering the status of the tenants, it has been 
relatively ineffective. It has been effective only to the extent 
that it has benefitted those who could most confidently have been 
expected to benefit. To put it another way, it has so far worked 
best where it was least needed, ie. in the villages of the "uninfluenced" 
type. The real centres of zamindari-tenant conflict, the 
"influenced" villages, have been leastr , 1 influenced and,indeed, 
in many ways social tensions have been exacerbated to an even 
greater degree as traditional values disintegrate without being 
adequately replaced. In these villages, at least, social reform 
has not proved to be the natural corollary of the agrarian change 
implied in zamindari abolition. It may be that the social ferment 
begun by the changes will eventually carry these villages to a new 
era of constructive development but this remains mere supposition. 
On the basis of the survey set out above it is possible only to 
conclude that no important social change has occurred as a result 
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Plate 1. A pakka naveli, the home 
of the pradhan of village Ajitganj, 
district 1,lainpuri. 
Plate 2. Men of village Kin, 
district Sultanpur. "Thakur Sahib", 
sarpanch of Kin's nyaya panchayat, 
is fourth from the right. The diff-
erence in clothing and bearing of 
the two ex-zamindars (in the centre) 
and their former tenants, now 
sirdArs, is obvious. 
Plate 3. The bridge over Kali Nadi 
at village Rasalpur-Aurangabad in 
district Meerut, which was built by 
the voluntary contributions 01 tne 
cane growers in the village. 
Plate 4. The newly-constructed 
facade of the home of Ram Swarup, 
an 'ex-zamindari bhumidhar' of 
village Ajitganj,district Llainpuri. 
Note the holder for a street light, 
a panchayat improvement. 
• 
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of the "reforms" of 1 July 1952. 
The government of Uttar Pradesh returned to the traditional 
55 form of village government, the 1°.nchayai! the "council of five", 
in seeking to decentralise the administration of the villages of 
the State. The panchayat system envisaged by the Panchayat Raj 
Act, XXVI of 1947 and accepted by the Land Reforms Act of 195156 
as the basis of village self-government was, however, much more 
complex than this older "council of elders". The post-independence 
version had three main organs. The foundation, the gaon sabha 
or"village assembly; consisted of all the adult members of the 
village and, originally, any outsiders who held land in the villageF 
The members of the gaon sabha elected an ft executive committee; the 
58 59 gaon panchayat and a "chairman", the pradhan, for a period of 
five years. A deputy for the pradhan, the up-pradhan, was elected 
annually by the members of the gaon panchayat from amongst their 
awn number.40  The gaon panchayat was an administrative body; judicial 
authority rested with the nyaya panchayat, a tribunal selected 
41 from the panchayats of a "circle" of villages to hear petty cases. 
The panches of the nyaya panchayat elected their own chairman, the 
42 sarpanch, and his lieputy, the sahayak sarpanch. Panches and the 
officers of the nyaya panchayat held office for five years but the 
latter remained until actually succeeded in offic4 5 
These village-centred councils possessed great potential 
social significance. By diffusing the responsibility for village 
administration they could be vehicles for the social amelioration 
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of those who , as a result of abolition, had acquired a small 
holding intheir own right - a social toehold as it were - in the 
village and even for those who possessed no other claim to social 
standing, the low-caste and the landless. Social changes which 
agrarian reorganisation had failed to bring about could therefore 
be implemented, particularly in the "influenced"- villages. 
The nanchayats had many other facets, of course. Multi-
farious tasks in the fields of local self-government, village 
management and improvement and land management were assigned to 
them, tasks ranging from constructing and cleaning village streets 
to registering vital statistics, from regulating local markets to 
planting trees, from arranging for "a sound credit system" to 
44 caring for common lands and extinguishing fires. Their achievements 
in these fields, rnoreover, have been in many cases, considerable. 
They have played "an important role in mobilising man-power and 
directing the resources towards the general welfare of the villagers ° 
in many districts. Up to 31 parch 1955, for example, panchayats had, 
inter alia,built 20,302 miles of roads, constructed 2222 pukka wells, 
installed 2,595 radio sets and provided 67,692 lanterns for street 
lightingle The total value of their work was Rs. 7,85,12,081 of 
which Rs. 2,52,23,356 had been actual cash donations by the villagers? 
As well, the 89;082 gaon sabhas in operation in 1954 managed 93 lakh 
acres of public land18 while in the previous year 282 gaon sabhas 
of Rs. 8.89 lakh 
collected Rs. 8.39 lakh/entrusted to them as land revenue collecting 
agencies? And. to 30 September 1957 waya panchayats had decided 
19,91,908 of the 20,62,616 cases referred to them, including nearly 




These achievments; however, were largely independent of 
social change. Theoretically, of course, there was no reason why 
this should not be so. A continued monopoly of power, especially 
by that section of the village which had traditionally led, by 
reducing friction within the panchayat itself might even make it 
function more effectively. At the same time, an inadequate cross-
representation might deprive the village of potentially capable 
leaders and this has been officially admitted to be the ease. Seats 
were reserved on the gaon panchayat until 1960
51 
but even so the 
Revenue Minister, Charan Singh, reported in 1958 that "the absence 
of public spirited workers" in those gaon sabhas entrusted with 
revenue collection had "hindered their utilization as a ctalecting 
52 
agency". 	The writers of the Second. Five Year Flan, noting the 
same problem, suggested that penohayats might need to co-opt 
members to secure "a sufficient number of persons with qualities 
most needed in village reconstruction."
55 
If the panchayats have in fact developed in this way, achieving 
managerial success without social change, then part of the scheme's 
original aims, as embodied in the Statement of Objects and Reasons 
of Act I of 195154 will be defeated. The continued dominance of 
the ex-zamindars would represent simply the replacement of one form 
of inequality, zamindari, by another; panchayat raj. 
And indeed there is little evidence to suggest that the 
panohayat system has circumscribed the position of the traditional 
55 
village leaders or, as has been suggested, that it has made land 
reforms socially more effective. The facts elicited about the 
operation of the panchayat system in the villages of the random 
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survey, for example, showed that the trend had been decidedly to 
the contrary. 
Almost without exception pradhan elections had returned, in 
the first instance, a member of one of the formerly dominant 
landholding groups. Rasalpur-Aurangabad had elected a Rajput, 
a candidate presumably acceptable to High-caste Hindus amalMuslim-
Rajputs alike. The Jets of Bendera and the Thakurs of Kin, 
Bhilampur-Chhapra and pkwalli remained unchallenged. The elder 
son of the family which had traditionally supplied the mukhya became 
pradhan in Tomari. The traditional caste leaders retained power 
in Babhanpur and also in Mowiya where mach section of the village 
elected its awn panchayat and pradhan. The wealthiest of the 
former zamindars was pradhan of plariaval. In Ajitganj the pradhan 
was not only a former landlord but also the wealthiest man in the 
village and a leading district-level Congressman. The pradhan of 
Lalpur came from amongst the Thakurs, one of the four leading 
tenant groups before abolition. The utter ruin of the the zamindar 
of itajiganj had opened the way for an Ahir, scion of one of the 
leading landholding families, to become pradhan. Likewise in 
Baragaon the collapse of the Kachhi zamindars, the absence of the 
Marwari and the lonecaste character of the Bazzaz led to the election 
of the village Brahman who, as priest of the temple, controlled 
500 bighas of land. InPltrsoli-Narayanpurs while the sole 
remaining ex-zamindar had been passed over, the position had. gone 
a Bhumihar Brahman, a member of the chief landholding caste of the 
village and a former zamindar in another village. 
As the panches of the nyaya panohayat (more frequently 
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referred to in the villages as the "adalati panchayat" or "court 
panchayat") were appointed from amongst the members of the gaon 
panchayat, the composition of the tribunals reflected that of the 
village bodies. Only a few of the villages surveyed actually had 
the sarpanch resident in them, although all were component units 
56 
of pyaya panchayat circles. The sarpanches who were identified, 
however, belonged to the same groups as the pradhans. In Kini 
and Bhilampur-Chhapra, for example, the sarpanches were both the 
wealthiest and most influential of the ex-zamindars and, in both 
cases; Thakurs. Kakarahi also had a Thakur sarpanch. In Baragaon 
the panias dominated the nyaya panchayat but a Brahman was sarpanch; 
by a non-Bana group he was held to be the only honest man on the 
tribunal. However that may be he did come from a caste which had 
been one of the chief acquirers of land. since abolition. 
Some villages had seen the first signs of change. In 
Rasalpur-Aurangabad, the second election for pradhan brought a 
Chamar to power, the Chamars being one of the three scheduled castes 
to hold any land in the land in the village. The almost complete 
Thakur domination in Kakarshi, (Thakurs were the pradhan, sarpandh, 
patwari and secretary of the Gaon Penchayat), was broken by the 
election of a Kurmi up-pradhan to suceed a Thakur up-pradhan. 
Pert of that success may have been due to the pressure exerted in 
the village since 1946 of a Harijan Kisan Sabha or Peasant 
Association. These changes were hardly improvements, however, for 
they invariably produced friction. The electioneering which 
preceded the actual ballot - done, incidentally, by show of hands-
was often violent although it was claimed by villagers that only 
power. The vacuum thus created, however, was filled not by any 




personal factors and not broader political issues were involved. 
High caste men were, moreover, generally quite irreconciable to 
to low-caste success. The only case of any considerable success 
in the survey, that of the Chamar in Rasalpur-Aurangabad, showed 
that what appeared to be an important social change might in reality 
be a Pyrrhic victory for the election there had only resulted 
in a boycott of the panchayat by the Brahmans, Rajputs and Muslim-
Rajputs and a continual effort on their part to deride the pradhan. 
The few published studies of panchayats tend to confirm 
the evidence of the sample survey. McKim Marriott gives in two 
articles a detailed picture of the developments which took place 
in the Aligarh village of atria (for which he also uses the 
pseudonym 1Kishangarbi'). The first elections took place before 
zamindari abolition and resulted in the complete domination of the 
panchayat by the 'Sat zamindars. In fact, 
"the weekly meetings ... at a zamindar's house (constituted) 
a new formal convivial occasion, strengthening the supra- 
58 
local class solidarity of the zamindars". 
pnegroup but by a number of caste groups contending between each 
other and within themselves. The Brahmans, who were one-quarter 
of the population of the village and who held one-half of the 
lands of the village after abolition, tried to organise their 
own dominance and other castes which had gained economically by 
the changes tried to consolidate a higher position in the caste 
hierarchy. Most, however, were so divided by internal rivalries:; 
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that they could not even "agree to rise togethee. The result 
WAS that though the panchayat included a "fair sampling of members 
of many castes
„61 it fell into decay through sheer neglect and 
impotence. In the first place it hardly ever met; 
"the group that actually (considered) public issues and 
(used) the powers granted by the authority of the new Act 
(was) 	the old informal Brahman council." 62 
The Jats would have nothing to do with this Brahman body, however, 
and as a result it remained ineffectual while the panchayat faded 
into a dismal failure, unable to carry through any of the projects 
which it "haltingly undertook on the suggestion of its government-
appointed secretary” and without the standing necessary to enforce 
65 
its decisions in matters of discipline. 
The evidence from Paril thus emphasises the ineffectiveness • 
of much of the change introduced by the reforming legislation. A 
study by Morris Opler of the factors which influenced the election of 
the pradhan in a 3aunpur village, Madhopur, emphasises even more 
the irreconcilability of the upper classes to low-caste gains and 
the almost impossible task which the low caste groups face when 
confronted by the united opposition of those with traditional 
authority. 
When Opler made his study the village was organising its 
second panchayat elections. The first had. been held in 1949 and. 
the gaon panchayat then elected had dissolved in a complete fiasco. 
At that time 
"the low castes, stimulated by talk of the abolition of 
landlordism, abolition of untouchability and. the general 
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atmosphere of reform, created a People's Party. They 
nominated an impecunious and. undistinguished high-caste 
man who they felt they could control and ran him for 
executive officer (ie, pradhan). Most of the prominent 
high-caste villagers refrained from participating inthe 
election as either candidates or voters 	• As a result 
the candidates of the low castes swept the election. 
0 
Their high-caste figurehead, (however), proved a great 
disappointment 	At the first real crisis he abandoned. 
them in favour of his caste fellow4" 64 
and from then until the seconolection the village was administered 
by the hereditary officers who pre-dated the gaon panchayat. As a 
result of this experience the high-caste villagers stopped at 
nothing, not even coercion and intimidation, to prevent low-caste 
candidates from entering the field in the second election part-
icularly for the office of pradhan. The one man who thought that 
he might contest the pradhan election was informed that his age 
had been changed in the village records so that he was ineligible.
65 
This type of manoeuvre succeeded and the contest was fought between 
two high-caste candidates ("A." and "B"), both of whom were well-to-
do landowners. While they thus represented typical candidates for 
such posts, there were distinct differences between them. They 
belonged to the same kinship group in the village but the branch 
to which A belonged "fell upon hard days" following an unfavourable 
partition of the joint family. The eldest son of A's family, 
however, rettored the family fortunes by becoming first the 
manager of a zamindari estate and then a highly successful purveyor 
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of mechanical chaff-cutters. 
"Earnings from the business made it possible to improve 
the family landholdings, to acquire additional land in the 
village and to lend to the villagers at an advantage. 
Marriages ... to girls of prominent families of the area 
further improved the standing and connections of the familye
6 
B, the elder of the two men; was quite different. He was 
well-to-do but 
"his italth was in land and in stored grain. He was one 
of the largest landowners in the village and while he was 
one of the most progressive farmers in the area ... he was 
land-centred and village-centred. Neither he nor members 
of his family looked outward for income. His father had 
been a prominent leader of the village who was noted for 
his shrewd farm management and his son had followed the 
same path:
67 
B won the election but the result was of little importance 
for either way the dominance of the high castes and the landed 
interests was assured. As the election forced the candidates to 
"display an unparalleled friendly concern for the law castes" - so 
much so that it became a "source of amusement and aynical comment 
by the low castes" 68- so they made some gains. But being effectively 
excluded from any control or influence in the village, such gains 
were cold comfort. 
Figures published by Bhagwant Singh demonstrate another 
important facet of the relative failure of the panchayat system. 
He notes that 
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"during the last general elections of the Gaon Sabha, 
37,405 pradhans were elected unopposed, ie, about 52 per 
cent. of pradhans 	Similarly out of 11,75,128 menibers 
of the Gaon Phnchayats and Ranches (of the Nyaya Fhnchayats) 
8,60,128 were elected unopposed. This works out to be 
73 per cent.. 
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This means in effect that, given that the panchayats are dominated 
by the high-caste and economically secure, in a great many cases 
the low-caste and the economically weak do not even offer a 
challenge to the status quo. Or it may be that boycotts by 
the higher castes, such as was carried out in the first election in 
Madhopur, are commonplace. This situation is no better than the 
first for it has been shown that without the support and "authority" 
of the traditional classes, village government is either meaningless 
or impossible. 
It can be concluded, therefore, that the penchayat system 
has not achieved any marked measure of social change. Few cases 
of actual improvement in social status based on participation in 
panchayat raj can be found because even where election to the village 
council has provided a step to authority in the village it has not 
succeeded in securing, as well, the goodwill of the traditional 
leaders. And social advancement which is either ignored or opposed 
by those against whom the advance is made is, in a society in 
which only peaceful means of social advancement are permitted, 
illusory. Decentralised administration hhs therefore in no way 
overcome the social failure of agrarian reorganisation. On the 
contrary, the panchayats may, if they continue to bolster caste 
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antagonisms, become as Vinoba Bhave has warned, "powerful 
instruments of decentralised exploitation."
70 
(iv) 
It is possible to draw some general conclusions as to the 
effects of the post-Independence agrarian measures on the evidence 
of statistics, villages and panchayats presented in this chapter. 
In the first place, it is obvious that administratively the 
legislation has been fully implemented. By and large the absentee 
landlords have been eliminated.. Some small holdings remain, as in 
71 
Baragaon, but most of the great estates have disappeared. Certainly 
the absentee landlords are no longer the major feature of the 
agrarian system. The estates of many resident zanindars have been 
reduced, at times considerably although this is in direct relation 
to the zamindar's former interest in agriculture. At the same 
time, the new tenure system has become operative so that the 
land tenures have been rationalised into a large (though sub-
divided) proprietary interest and a small tenant interest. Moreover, 
mobility within the two classes of proprietary interest has been 
provided in the bhumidhari purchase scheme; theoretically tat leasti 
all land cbould eventually become bhumidhari. Then,too, local self 
government in the villages had; been reorganised and the forms of 
government: gaon sabha, gaon panchayat and nyaya panchayat have 
been brought into existence. Act I of 1951, technically, has been 
successfully carried through. 
This technical success, however, is but one aspect and it 
is equally obvious that the Act has left the social position within 
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the village unchanged. That there are potentialities for social 
change in the proprietary possession of land and the power of the 
franchise cannot be denied but these have not been translated into 
realities. In the "uninfluenced" villages those who traditionally 
held sway, the high-caste tenant groups, continue to do so while 
1.n the "influenced" group a resident zamindari group has retained 
power or has yielded it only to the next most important landholding 
group. And in those cases where inferior groups have challenged 
the traditional leaders the result has been a stalemate. 
As Thorner points out, the position of the ptikkahaveliwale, 
"the men who live in large brick houses", is unchanged: 
"despite zamindari abblition 	a handful of six to a 
doten families of resident, nonworking proprietors (maks - 
"owners") continue to enjoy their accustomed control of the 
kisans and mazdur-log (working people) who make up the typical 
village." 72 
That is to state the least of the Act's results. Yet at 
the most, as Charan Singh himself admits, it has "narrowed down 
rather than eliminated the traditional difference between classes 
in the village ." 
To point out this lack of social change stemming from Act 
I of 1951 is not to say that it will never occur or that the Act is 
a complete failure. I of 1951 has been no less, perhaps even more, 
successful than any of the other agrarian acts which preceded it in 
U.P.. It did all that it had legal power to do when it abolished the 
landlord-tenant system. If society has been less changed than was 
expected by this move it would seem, firstly, that society was not 
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as completely dominated by the system as had been held, that,in 
fact, landownership, while it was undoubtedly the basic factor was 
not the sole determinant of social status in the village. The 
reduction of landownership, therefore, while it could affect social 
status could not destroy it completely because caste, non-agrarian 
wealth; political and legal influence and a traditional leadership 
role were no necessarily affected by it to the same extent. And 
to the extent that these factors remained operative the traditional 
village leaders retained their power. In this lies the immediate 
explanation of the relatively minor social effectiveness of Act 
I of 1951. 
There remains, of course; the second and broader possibility: 
that agrarian legislation is fundamentally unsuited to be an 
instrument of social change. This is the question taken up in the 
succeeding chapter. 
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CHAPTER VII. 
COMPARISONS AND CONCLUSIONS. 
(i) 
The question remains the;, Will agrarian legislation always 
be socially ineffectual? The evidence from Uttar Pradesh suggests 
so. The mere fact that Act I of 1951 was necessary and was 
couched in terms of social amelioration proved that the legislation 
from 1859 to 1947 had failed to bring social harmony. It had 
changed tenures and shifted the balance of power within the village 
but neither it, nor the "reforms legislation" of the 'fifties, had. 
affected village society,within which the tenures and powers were 
operative. 
It may be held, however, that U.P. was a special case, that 
factors operated there which precluded any success. Yet the 
volume of agrarian legislation was not confined to U.P.. It was, 
it must be remembered, a Bengal Act which was first applied to 
the Northqiestern Provinces. A perusal of aden -Powell's 
monumental Land Systems of British India will amply demonstrate 
that where in the nineteenth century there was a landlord-tenant 
system agrarian legislation had to be enacted to regulate it. Ara 
another standard work, Patds Indian Land Problem and Legislation, 
shows the results: that throughout India the agrarian legislation 
enacted from the mid-nineteenth century to the mid-twentieth 
century amounted only to a backdrop for post-Independence "reforms" 
which were almost invariably social in intention. The legislation 
of the era of the British Raj had values, none will deny that, but 
they were not social. 
IP 
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If the other states of the Republic have enacted land 
reforms it can be asked, Has this legislation been more effective 
socially than that of Uttar Pradesh? A comparison of the answer 
to this question and the position in Uttar Pradesh could conceivably 
answers the question posed at the beginning of this chapter. In 
the studies of reforms in Bombay and Hyderabad mentioned above
1a 
means of comparison is, moreover, readily to hand. Not an exact 
comparison, of course, for neither the tenure systems,nor the 
legislation they engendered, were the same in these areas as in U.P.. 
The major part of Bombay had been settled under the 
raiyatwari system: 
"the revenue settlement which is made by the government 
officers with each actual cultivator of the soil for a 
given term, usually a twelvemonth, at a stipulated money 
rent without the intervention of a third party" 2 
and as there were, therefore, theoretically no landlords and tenants 
5 
no attention was paid to agrarian relationships until 1959. Through 
"the purchase of leisure" by subletting, however, there were 
landlords and tenants and the Bombay Tenancy Act of 1959, passed 
by a Congress ministry; moved to protect those tenants who had held 
their land for the six years preceding the Act by giving them 
fixity of tenure, protection from arbitrary eviction and. a system 
4 of regulated rents. 
The Bombay Tenancy and Agricultural Lands Act of 1948, "a 
comprehensive measure of unique character7 5 extended the original 
act. It made tenants under the 1959 legislation "permanent tenants;6 
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tenants with a record of substantial personal cultivation in 1948 
"protected tenants" 7 and assured all tenants of fixity of tenure 
for ten years.
8 
Protected tenancies were heritable and the tenant 
had the right to purchase up to fifty acres from the landlord at 
price determined by a government tribunal
9 
but both protected 
and ordinary tenancies were subject at the outset, to the 
landlord's right to resume land for his personal cultivation. 10 
Rents were fixed to a maximum of one-sixth of the crop or its value 
or, in some areas, three to five times the revenue assessment on 
11 
the land. Cesses or levies exacted in addition to rent were 
prohibited
12 
 and to encourage efficient agriculture, cooperative 
farms were given preferential treatment and subletting was 
15 
forbidden. 
The investigations of Dandekar and Khudanpur of the CaCkhale 
Institute at Poona are an alarming commentary on the operation Of 
this Act. 	They demonstrate, point by point, that it remained 
inoperative, ineffective or simply ignored: 
"it seems fairly clear, at any rate there is little evidence 
to the contrary, that the Tenancy Act has made little 
impression on the situation and that the conditions have 
remained more or less unaffected both in respect to the size 
and distribution of the owned and cultivated holdings and 
the relative care bestowed on the owner-cultivated and the 
tenant-cultivated lands. ... Except in a few districts, the 
Act has for all practical purposes, remained ineffective."14 
This was particularly so in the case of the rental limitations: 
"except in Thane and Kolaba districts, the provisions of the 
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Ant relating to the fixation of the maxim= rent have had 
no effect whatsoever. The Act had specified the maxima in 
terms of the share rent. These had. been enforced with some 
effect only in Thana and. Kaaba districts. In all other 
districts the share rents have remained largely unchanged 
and whatever changes have occurred in them are not related 
to the provisions of the Ant The Act fixed the maxima 
specifically in terms of the share. Therefore; in order to 
circumvent the provisions of the Act, one would have expected 
a certain shift from share to cash rents. Nothing of this 
kind has happened; the share rents have remained the share 
rents and very much at the old levels. It only means that 
the people have not found it necessary even to manoeuvre 
in order to evade the law. The legal fixation of the maximum 
share rents, the restriction on the transfer of lands and 
the general protection given to the tenants had also little 
effect an the cash rents. 600 There have been more cases of 
enhancing than of reducing rents. There have been cases of 
change of tenants to secure higher rents and in some cases 
where tenants had changed (normally), the occasion had been 
utilised to effect a rise in rents. 
15 
Such manoeuvres were, moreover, not confined to the landlords (in 
the strict sense). The Gokhale Institute eport records a case in 
which a tenant used a reduction in his awn rent to increase the rent 
of his (theoretically illegal) sub-tenant. 16 
Where so little has been achieved technically it would be 
useless to search for far-reaching social change. The authors 
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themselves conclude that 
"the relations of the landlords and tenants have thus 
continued to be governed. by very much the same considerations 
as in the earlier days and the overall impression that one 
gathers is that the provisions of the Act have either not 
reached the people concerned or they have not found it 
necessary to take cognisance of them." 17 
Hyderabad, a former "princely state", was a different 
proposition again. The lands had been divided in tenure between 
the government of the Nizam (the diwani lands) where the cultivators 
paid revenue direct to the government and the lands held. by 'aclass 
of intermediaries, the jagirdars (hence, th-94agir lands), where 
the cultivators paid revenue through the jagirdars. 18 The cultivating 
tenure of the diwani area was niminally raiyatwari but unrestricted • 
	
	
transfer rights had led to the growth of a class of non-cultivating 
owners (pattidars)1 9 
Reform in Hyderabad had two aspects, the abolition of the 
jagirdars being the first. This was not the same as zamindari 
abolition, however, because the jagirdar, unlike the zamindar or 
talugdar, 
"had no proprietary rights ... . The jagir wastinaliemble 
and the jagirdars were only entitled to the revenue accruing 
from the land over which they supervised." 20 
Jagirdari abolition, therefore, did not affect the relations between 
owners and tenants in the jagirs; 
"it tackled only the upper layer of relationship between the 
owners and the revenue collectors: it substituted one revenue 
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collecting authority for another - though a more efficient 
one for a less efficient - the Government in place of the 
jagirdar."21 
The jagirdars did hold some land in the villages, seri lands, 
but these were not affected by abolition and so the change meant 
nothing to the tenants in this way.22 The jagirdars were not even 
an important source of creditr they appear, in fact, to have held 
themselves aloof as an aristocratic minority determined to stand 
above the mundane affairs of material prosperity derived other than 
from landed property. Few had education or professional training 24 
and their traditional forms of investment were markedly feudal and, 
hence, unproductive: "houses, 	jewellery and personal effects like 
expensive clothing and furniture."25 
Even after their abolition as a class they retained their 
at 
traditioNattitudes. The measure was a serious now to their 
fortunes and their prestige26 but they made no effort to retrieve 
these either by careful investment27 or, because of a rather 
ridiculous pride, by judicious alignment with "the wealth, enterprise, 
and dynamism of the new rich" 8 They had been left, therefore; 
with neither continuing influence nor sympathy for their passing. 29 
50 They have become s consequently, frustrated, critical and bitter. 
Quite apart from jagirdari abolition, therefore, 
"the fundamental issue of tenant-landlord relationship 
needed to be tackled. The creation of security for the 
tenant and reduction of absenteeism had to be the immediate 
objective. Furthermore the question of regulating the size 
of agricultural holdings both at the upper and lower ends 
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was becoming important." 51 
To deal with these problems the Asami-Shikmi Act of 1945 
"created some tenants with permanent tenure subject to 
rent payment, gave fixity to all new tenants and gave power 
to the Government to fix minimum rents." 52 
The implementation of the Act was "very defective7 55 however, and. 
a new Tenancy Act, modelled on the protected tenancies of the 
Bombay Act of 1946, introduced similar rights for six lakhs of 
tenants cultivating one-quarter of the State, in 195d4 An amending 
act of 1954 provided for a "ceiling" and a "floor" limit to holdings 
based on the holding considered necessary in different areas for a 
family of five persons: four and a half times for the ceiling, one-
third for the floor. Tenancies were to be for at least five years 
and rents were limited to a maximum of five times the land revenue, 
depending on the type of land. Protected tenants were given the 
right to purchase their land but only after the owners had exercised 
a prior right to resume for personal cultivation55. These provisions 
were designed 
"to bring an end to insecurity of tenure as well as the evils 
of extreme absenteeism and create a body of small and middle 
peasant proprietors who (would) have a sense of possession 
and, hence, perhaps cultivate their lands efficiently. 
In course of time, it is hpped, ... cultivation and owner-
ship will merge together. 56 
The results of this legislation appear from Khusro's report 
to be more encouraging than in Bombay but there are nonetheless 
disturbing features. The landlords were antagonistic to the status 
F 
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of the protected tenants
57 and consequently they exerted strong 
pressure to retrieve their lands
58 so. that by 1955, after four 
years of operation, only 58 per cent, of the original protected 
tenancies remained in existence and a majority of those who had 
gone had been illegally evicted.
59 In view of the fact that rents 
had generally risen in the face of a fall in revenue rates therefore, 
Khusro's finding from sampling that only ten per cent, of tenants 
felt that the changes hal& been disadvantageous while 42 per cent. 
4 believed that there was more security' was, perhaps, surprising. 
It was, however, confirmed to some extent by the fact that tenant 
investment (although all investment was very law) had increased 
more rapidly than that of owner-cultivators.
42 
No direct comparison is intended between these two studies 
and the survey presented in the preceding chapter but the general 
impression left by the three is important. "Land reforms" need from 
the very first to be fully implemented and enforced because any 
substahtial omission or evasion reduces the whole structure to 
4N 
impotence, a condition
4  knwhich social change is impossible. The 
technical implementation of the reforms in Bombay and Hyderabad 
would seem to be poorer on the *hole than in Uttar Pradesh and as 
the available evidence there suggests that there has been little 
or no social change it might reasonably be inferred that little 
change can have occured in either of the others. There would seem 
too, to be no extenuating circumstances to prevent the legislation 
in Uttar Pradesh achieving its objectives if it is suited to do so; 
indeed, its relatively better implementation should have made it 
more capable of doing so. That it has not would appear to leave 
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only the assumption that agrarian legislation is of limited social 
value. 
That in fact seems to be the case is that to expect agrarian 
legislation, of the type discussed in the previous chapters, to 
bring social "progress", le. a movement towards social equality 
and harmony, is to work from false premises. Agrarian legislation 
can clear social debris from the scene and provide a framework 
within which progress might come; but it cannot of itself generate 
that progress. 
Social equality implies an assured position in the economic 
life of the community. The labourer who cannot demand a fair price 
for his labour or the farmer who has to be content to produce at a 
subsistence level can never effectively challenge the traditions 
which keep him socially inferior. The economically weakest are 
always the socially inferior groups and;as a corollary, marked 
economic improvement brings marked social advance. 
To achieve its social purpose, therefore, agrarian legislation 
such as Act I of 1951 would need to be economically influential. 
Ehrlich, however, has pointed out that 
"the State can furnish the basis for economic rights only 
by distributing economic values that are already in existence 
in a way different from the distribution that would be effected 
by the undisturbed operation of economic activity or by 
taking a value that has already been created or that is about 
to be created from one economic undertaking and placing it 
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at the disposal of another." 43 
This zamindari abolition did not do. By accepting the principle 
that none in cultivating possession should be dispossessed it 
did not redistribute anything; it simply confirmed what was held 
under a new legal title. Moreover, in all except the case of 
purchasers of bhumidhari rights, financial liability remained the 
same. Even in the exception,however,capital resources or credit 
had to be depleted to the extent of ten to twelve times the annual 
rent to effect a reduction of 50 per cent, in revenue. It is possible, 
moreover; that even if I of 1951 had been more radical in its 
approach to tenures it would have achieved no greater change for 
it has been pointed out that 
"transfer of ownership to the tenants is likely to 
stimulate agricultural production where the landlords are 
merely rent-receivers and the tenants have customarily 
provided implements, draft power, seeds, etc. and have 
managed the farming units with little or no supervision 
from the landlords. .44 
Such are; of course, the tenants of the "uninfluenced villages; the 
group which has welcomed abolition most heartily and who have made 
on the whole, the greatest advances since 1952. 
It may be concluded, therefore, that in agrarian reform 
programmes which aim at social progress tenure legislation is at 
best only a beginning. To say that what is most important in land 
reform is "water, manures and improved seed" 5 is to point ultimately 
to much more than agricultural development for this is in reality 
the only way in which village society will "progress". It is only 
an efficient and resilient agriculture that will support an 
egalitarian rural society. 
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NOTES - CRAFTER VII. 
lAbove, p. 284. (Note 16 in Chapter V1). 
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Appendix I. 
The village sample:difficulties and methods. 
As has been noted, there are definite physical problems to 
be overcome in visiting and studying a sufficiently large number 
of villages. To reach villages reasonably beyond the influence 
of the cities and district towns involves a resort very often to 
purely human means of locomotion. Having arrived, however, problems 
remain. Accommodation for instance for the most ordinary aspects 
of existence present an obstacle in an environment without restaurant, 
and without hotel. There is even the problem of remaining, for 
hospitality is a heavy 'burden to a materially poor bgt richly 
hospitable people, so much so that it must became an edbarassment to 
a visitor who is made a guest. 
Moreover, the natural reserve of the villager, particularly 
where the subject is land, is a problem which highlights the 
absolute necessity of personal contact in the village. A lack 
of such contact may lead to one being dismissed as a government 
investigator - for taxes, for example - or even as happened on one 
occasion, as a foreign spy. These problems were very much to the 
fore in the construction of the sample used in Chapter VI. 
The survey was undertaken largely in the months of July and 
August, 1958, at the beginning of the rains of that year. The 
information on the Allahabad villages, however, was obtained in 
March 1958. That for Bahhanpur came from an interview with Sri 
Brindaban Chaubey, the son of a Brahman landholder of the village, 
who had lived in the village until the age of 15. He had attended 
the University of Allahhbad and had had experience in agricultural 
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extension work with the Agricultural Institute at Allahabad and 
the India Village Service. The information from Bajiganj was 
collected during a personal visit. 
The other villages were visited in the company of Sri 
Satya Deo Sharma, M.A. (English and Hindi)(Alld.), who acted as 
liason and interpreter. The sample was, in fact based very largely 
on the personal contacts of Sri Sharma. This was so in the 
districts of Mainpuri, Meerut, Bulandshahr, Bareilly, Jaunpur, 
Sultanpur and Azamgarh. Other contacts were acquaintances of the 
writer. Sri Sharma's contacts were those of family, caste and 
student acquaintance. While there was an attempt to ensure that 
the sample was distributed throughout the State, the random nature 
will be obvious enough. 
Information was elicited by means of questioning. The 
questions (see Appendix II, below) were drawn up beforehand and 
this pattern was used as a basis but was varied in the circlimstances 
of each village. In nearly all cases both question and answer 
passed through Sri Sharma. The questions were usually asked of 
a group of villagers and the answer was, therefore, often a 
compound one. Notes were taken while the questioning proceeded if 
this did not arouse any antagonism. Otherwise they were written 
immediately following the interview or conversation. In cases 
where an individual was interviewed, the same conditions applied 
Little difficulty was experienced in operating this method although 
caste did at times prevent a completely adequate cross section being 
interviewed in any one village. To ask a Brahman to assist at an 
interview with a Barijan in a village in a village in which he has 
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to associate with his caste-fellows is to ask too much, even now. 
Throughout the sample, however, a wide diversity of opinion is 
represented. 
A village was visited on the average for two days. A longer 
stay than this would often have been an imposition. The opportunity 
was taken, however; whenever it offered itself, to visit a sedond 
village nearby which could act as a control for the first as well 
as a source of additional information. Sajamai, Bandera, Bhilampur-
Chhapra and Nawada were visited in this way. 
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Appendix II. 
General pattern of questions used in village survey, 
July-August ,1958. 
1. What was the population and land area of the village? What 
were the crops and castes of the village What Was the relation 
between castes and landholding? 
2. How was land managed and owned in the village before 1952? 
5. 	Does the zamindar still live in the village? 
4. 	How much land was retained by former zamindar or zamindars 
under bhumidhari title? 
5. 	How many former tenants are bhumidhars? How many former 
tenants are sirdars? 
6. 	Are there asamis and adhivasis? 
7. 	(i) Who is chairman of the panohayat (ie. who is pradhan)? 
(ii)Who settles disputes in the village? 
(iii)Who organises political functions and groups? 
8. 	Do the villagers go to court often? Are the cases usually 
over land? 
9. 	How many new houses, particularly pukka houses, have been 
built in recent years? Who builj; them? 
10. 	Does the government help farmers? Do government officials 
come to the village? Often? 
11. 	Are there more wells, tanks and. better roads now? Who buil* 
them? 
12. 	Do the people think that the government did. well to abolish 
the zamindars? 
15. 	Do the political parties organise themselves in the village 
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now? Which parties? Did:they organise before 1947? Who are the 
local representatives in the parliaments? 




The glossary is based on Wilson4iA Glossary of Revenue and 
Judicial Terms  ;and the glossaries appended to Moreland, The Agrarian 
System of Moslem India, Baden-Powell, Land-Systems of British India, 
Vol.III and Moore and. Freydig, Land Tenure Legislation in Uttar 
Pradesh. 
ARADI. 	The section of the village on which dwellings are 
erected. The zamindars awned the abadi and formal 
permission had to be sought to build. there. Normally 
cultivation carried with it a right to a site in 
the abadi. After abolition the abadi was vested . 
in the Gaon Sabha,q.v.. 
ABWAB. 	Cess, or charge in addition to land revenue. 
ADALAT. 	Court of Justice. 
ADALATI PANCHAYAT.Panchayat l q.v.,to administer justice. See also 
NYAYA PANCHAYAT. 
ADHIVASI. 	Tenant class created by Apt I of 1951, mainly from 
sub-tenants. Abolished by Act XX of 1954 when 
made sirdars 0 q.v.. 
AHIR. 	Cowherd, shepherd. (Caste name). 
ANIL. During Nughal times; either a government revenue 
collector or a contractor ("farmer") for the revenue 
of a specified area. 
ANNA. 	The sixteenth past of a rupee,q.v., and used to 
denote that fraction of anything. 
ARHAR. 	Cystisus cajan, a kind of pulse or legume. 
ASANI. A cultivator, a tenant. The only permanent tenant 
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group recognised by Act I of 1951. He may hold 
from a bhumidhar,q.v.,sirdar,q.v.,- or a gaon 
sabha,q.v.. 
ASSANEE. 	See ASAMI. 
BABWAASH. 	A disreputable person, a ruffian, a man hired to 
beat others. 
BANYA. 	A Hindu trader, shopkeeper or moneychanger. 
BARBAI. 	Carpenter. (Caste name). 
BARI. Torch-makers and bearers. (Caste name). 
BAZAR. 	A daily market; a market place. 
BAZZAZ. 	Cloth merchant, draper. (Caste name). 
BEGAR. Forced, unpaid labour. 
BHAIYACHARA. 	Term applied to a village held by a group of 
zamindars,q.v., whose shares were determined by 
some customary division of the lands other than 
ancestral shares. CF. PATTIDARI. 
BHANGI. 	Sweeper, cleaner, menial. (Harijan,q.v.,caste name). 
BHARBHIYA. 	Grain-parcher. (Caste name). 
BRAT. 	Minstrel, genealogist. (Caste name). 
BHUMIDHAR. 	"Land holder". Tenure holder under I of 1951 with 
most complete proprietary rights in revised tenure 
system. 
BHUMIHAR BRAHMAN. Hindus of eastern Uttar Pradesh, particularly the 
districts of Gorakhpur, Azamgarh and ganaras, who 
claim to have originally been Brahmans,q.v.,who 
were degraded because they became cultivators. 
(Caste name). 
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BHURJEE 	Grain parcher. (Caste name). 
BIGHA. 	A variable land measure. A standard bigha, as used 
in British revenue surveys, equalled of an acre. 
A kacca,q.v.,bigha equalled about i of an acre. 
BISWA. 
	
	A measure of land equal to one-twentieth part of 
a bigha,q.v.. 
BISWADAR. 	The holder of a share in the lands of a village 
where these are expressed as fractions of a bigha, 
q.v., ie. as twentieths or biswas, q.v.. 
BRAHMAN. 	The first Hindu caste, traditionally priests. 
CACHA. 	See KACCA. 
CHAKBANDI. 	The consolidation of holdings (chaks) in a village. 
CHANAR. 	Leather-worker: tanner, shoemaker. (Harijan caste). 
CHAUFAL. 	A roam in which men conduct business; a raised 
platform near a house for a similar purpose. 
CRORE. 	Properly, kror. Ten million utits: 1,00,00;000. 
DACOTT. 	An armed robber or bandit. 
DAL. 	 Phareolus aureus, a legume used to make a pease 
soup important in the Indian diet. 
DARBAR. 	A court, audience or levee. 
DARZI. 	Tailor. (Muslim "caste"name). 
DASAHRA. 	Ten (das) day festival in November, celebrating 
the events recorded in the Ramayana,q.v. 
DHANUK. 	Cane-worker. (Caste name). 
DHARAMSALA. 	A house of charity: a rest-house for travellers 
or pilgrims or a hospital for the poor. 
DBINAVAR. 	Hindu water carrier. (Caste name). 
DEOBI. 	Washerman. (Caste name). 
DHOTI. 	Loin cloth worn by Hindu men. 
DHUNIA. 	Cotton carder and comber. (Caste name). 
DIWAN. 	The chief, and usually the finance, minister. 
MANI. 	The office of the diwan f q.v. Henze, the civil 
administration and particularly, - in later Miighal 
times, the revenue and finance administration. 
DIWANI ADALAT. Civil court. 
DOAB. 	Lit. "two waters" and hence the tongue of land 
between two confluent rivers; used especially of 
the tract between the Ganges and Jumna. 
DURBAR. 	See DARBAR. 
FAKIR. 	Mohammedan religious mendicant. ("Caste" name). 
FASLI. 	Agricultural year; 1 October - 30 September. 
GAON. Village. 
GAON FANCHAYAT. Executive committee of the Gaon Sabha,q.v. 
GAON SABHA. 	Corporate association of all adult members of a 
village; established by Act I of 1951. 
GARERIYA. 	See GARHARIYA. 
CHAIR. 	Lit. "Different, other". A building outside the 
abadi,q.v.,used by the men of the household, especially 
during the cultivating season,and as a store for 
seeds, implements and cattle. 
GHEE. 	Clarified butter which remains send-liquid and is 




GRAM. Village; also the name of a type of legume. 
GUJAR 	Agriculturist. (Caste name). 
CUR. Melasses, treacle; the product of the first 
inspissation of the juice of the sugar cane. 
GUSANEE. 	Hindu preacher, religious man. (Caste name). 
GUZEREDAR. 	Holder of land in lieu of maintenance allowance. 
HARI. 	A form of forced labour in which the tenant had 
to devote at least one day in the season to 
ploughing the fields of the landlord. 
HARIJAN. 	Lit. "God's people". Gandhiji i s term for the 
outcaste Hindus, the "untouchables" or "Scheduled 
Castes': ie those castes outside the four great 
caste divisions - Brahman, Itthatiya, Vaisya 
and Sudra,q.v. - whose occupations made them 
"unclean" and who could, therefore, render 
another Hindu ceremonially unclean by contact 
by touching his person, food, water or belongings. 
Eg. Chamar41 Bhangi, Pasi. 
HAT. 	A market or fair held only on certain days in 
each week. 
ISAEE. 	Christian. (Caste name). 
JAGIR. TE36fure common under the Mughals by whimh the 
revenues of a specified tract of land were made 
over to a servant of the State together with the 
powers necessary to collect and administer. Jagirs 
were either conditional, ie for the maintenance of 
515. 
troops, or unconditional; ie as a reward etc.. 
They were sometimes hereditary. Jagir is used 
in this sense in speaking of Hyderabad but in 
village Kin, district Sultanpur r it was used 
in its literal sense of "grant" orildependency" 
to denote a holding granted under the jajmani 
system,q.v.. 
JAGIRDAR. 	The holder of a jagir, q.v., in the Mughal sense. 
JAJMAN. 	The client or employer in the jajmani system,q.v. 
JAJNANI SYSTEM. Originally a system of employing Brahmans; q.v., 
for religious services but extended to a general 
exchange of services within the village without 
cash payments. 
JAMA. 	The declared amount of land revenue payable on 
a village or any component unit of it. 
JAMABANDI. 	The roll showing both revenue and rent dues in a 
village. 
JAN. 	People. 
JAT. Agriculturist. (Caste name). 
-JI. 	A mark of respect attached to names,eg. Gandhiji. 
JOG-I. Lit. one who practises yoga (the yog or jog). Hence, 
a religious mendicant, ascetic and musician noted for 
this. (Caste name). 
JOLAHA. 	See JULAHA. 
JOSH'. Astrologer, fortune-teller; sometimes an inferior 
order of Brahmans,q.v.,doing these things. (Caste 
name). 
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JOWAR-BAJRA. 	Two species of millet; AndropoRon sorRhum and 
Panicum spicatum. 
JULAHA. 	Weaver; usually Muslim. (Caste name). 
KACCA. In a general sense denotes something unfinished 
or incomplete. Hence it may mean raw, unripe, 
immature or crude depending upon the context. 
So, eg, a k. house is one made of mud or unbaked 
brick, a k. road is an unsealed road. A k. 
settlement is one made directly with the raiyats 
q.v., without the interposition of the landlords. 
KACHHI. 	Cultivator and gardener. (Caste name). 
KAHAR. Agriculturist and labourer. (Caste name). 
KAMAN. 	The worker or employee in the jajmani system,q.v., 
See KAM KARNEWALA. 
KAM KARNEWALA. 	Lit. "a man who does work (6wm)1 the full form 
of kaman,q.v. 
KANUNGO. 	The accountant of a pargana,q.v.. 
KARINDA. 	A zamindar's agent in a village. 
KAYASTHA. 	Clerk, accountant. (Caste name). 
KEWAT. Agriculturist of Eastern U.P. Cf. KURMI. (Caste name). 
KHADI. 	Hand-spun, hand-woven cloth. 
KHADI BHANDAR. 	A store selling khadi,q.v., and village handicrafts 
generally. 
KHARAJ. 	A tribute imposed by Islamic law an non-Muslims 
allowed to retain land which had. been conquered. 
In Mnghal India this became the term for the land 
revenue. 
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KHARIF. 	The autumnal harvest. The crops sown in April- 
KHASRA. 	The register of the fields of the village and, 
thus, an index to the field map. 
KHATA. 	A. block of land; a holding in a co-sharing village. 
KHATAUNI. 	The register of all persons cultivating or 
occupying (ie, holding) land in a village; that 
is, it is a register of khatas,q.v.. All fields 
are listed, under the proprieto5and the name of the 
cultivator the number of the field, the extent of 
the field, the rate of assessment, the rent and 
its manner of payment, and any allowable deductions 
are recorded. 
KHATIK. 	Agriculturist. (Caste name). 
KHATTAI. 	Agriculturist. (Caste name). 
KBATTRI. 	Silk weaver. (Caste name). 
KBEWAT. 	A list of co-sharers and proprietors in the village 
with their interests and the shares of revenue 
payable by them. 
KHUDKASHT. 	Lit. "sowing or cultivating one's own ground". 
Landlord's k. was land which he cultivated for 
himself with hired labour or his own servants or 
personally. A k. tenant was one who cultivated 
land in his own village ie. the village in which 
he resided. 
KISAN. 	Peasant; cultivator. 
KORI. 	Cultivator, gardener. (Caste name). 
KSHATRIYA. 	The second Hindu caste; traditionally warriors and 
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rulers. Thakurs and Rajputs were Kshatriyas. 
MAHAR. 	 Potter. (Caste name). 
KURMI. Agriculturist. (Caste name). 
KURTA. 	A loose-fitting shirt worn outside trousers. 
KUTCHERY. 	Office. 
LAKH. One hundred thousand units: 1,00,000. 
LAUBARDAR. 	The term was originally "Numberdar7 derived from 
the fact that the holder was identified by a 
number in the settlement records. 	The holder 
was the cultivator who represented the village 
community in revenue matters. 
LATHI. 	A staff or club. 
LEKHPAL. 	The village registrar and accountant appointed. 
and paid by the State government. The lekhpals 
replaced the patwaris after zamindari abolition. 
See also PATWARI. 
LODI. 	 Agriculturist. (Caste name). 
-LOG. Corruption of Sanskrit "loka", people. 
LOHAR. 	 Blacksmith. (Caste name). 
MAHAJAN. 	 Merchant, banker; money-changer and money-lender. 
MAHAL. 	 A group of lands regarded as one unit for the 
assessment of land revenue. The mahal was 
sometimes, but not always, the village. 
MAHALWARI. 	A land revenue settlement proceeding by mahals,q.y., 
rather than individual holdings or villages. 
MAHARAJA. 	 A supreme or sovereign prince or king. Applied 
in courtesy to any raja,q.v. 
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MALI. 	Gardener. (Caste name). 
MALIK. An owner, master or proprietor. Applied to any 
member of the zamindari community or to any 
cultivator possessing an hereditary title in 
his land. 
MALLAH. 	A sailor, boatman, fisherman. (Caste name). 
MARATHA. 	A man from Maharashtra, west-central India. 
MARWARI. 	A man from Melva, a state in the Rabutana Agency. 
These persons often settled in other parts of 
India and acted as moneylenddrs; bankers and 
merchants. 
MASJID. 	"A place where the head may be laid down in 
prostration for pprayer;" Wilson,p.527. An 
Islamic building for prayer, anglicised as "mosque". 
MAZDUR. 	Labourer. 
MELA. A fair or market held on particular occasions, 
usually at religious festivals. 
MOFUSSIL. 	Correstly; MUFASSAL. A district and particularly 
the district outside the capital or administrative 
headquarters. 




NAI. 	Barber. (Caste name). 
NAWAB. The deputy or local Governor of one of the great 
provinces of the Mughal Empire; eg. Avadh, Bengal, 
Hyderabad. The title became honorary. 
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NAZRANA. 	Lit. a present, an offering from an inferior 
to a superior. It came to mean especially an 
exaction in excess of the rent, particularly whma 
paid to the landlord as a premium for admission 
to a holding. 
NYAYA FANCHAYAT. A panchayat,q.v.; to administer justice, ie. a 
village court. Under Act I of 1951 the Nyaya 
Panchayat served a group of; usually, 5-10 
villages. Cf. ADAIATI FANCHAYAT. 
FAIKASHT. 	 A non-resident cultivator; one who resides nemr 
to, but not in, the village in which he cultivates 
land. The antithesis of khudkasht,q.v. 
PAKKA. 	See PUKKA. 
A member of the nyaya panchayat l q.v.,under I of 1951. 
FANCHAYAT. 
	
	A village assembly, traditionally of five members 
(panch = five). Under Act XXVI of 1947 and Act 
I of 1951 the gaon panchayat,q.v., is the executive 
committee of the village (see GAON SABHA), and. 
the nyaya panchayat,q.v., is the village court. 
PARGANA. 	A group of villages; a tract of country containing 
a number of villages. 
FARISHAD. 	 Senate. 
FASI. 	 Pig-keeper. (Caste name). 
PATHAN. 	 An Afghan; particularly those who settled in. 
Rohilkhand. 
FATTA. 	 A deed specifying the conditions on which land is 
held including; most importantly, the rent. 
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FATTIDAR. 	A holder ad a patti, that is) a share in a 
co-sharing village. 
FATTIDARI. 	Term applied to a village held. by a group of 
zamindars,q.v.iWhere the lands are divided on 
ancestral shares. 
FATWARI. 	Village registrar and accountant before zamindari 
abolition. After the enactment of I of 1951 they 
were termed lekhpals,q.v.,although the older titles 
persists in the villages. 
PERGUNNAH. 	Corrupt form of pargana,q.v.. 
PEON. 	Orderly or messenger. 
PlE. Copper coin, one-twelfth of an anna,q.v.. 
PRADESH. 	State. 
PRADHAN. 	Village headman; chairman of gaaa panchayat,q.v.. 
PRAJA. Subject, dependant, people. In the villages often 
denoted a tenant from first two meanings. In 
Praja Socialist Party (EP) denotes "people". 
PUKKA. 
	
	Implies something completed or correct: ripe 
fruit, sealed roads, brick houses, a legally 
binding agreement. The antithesis in every way of 
kacce4q.v. 
PURDAH. 	Lit, a curtain. The practice of keeping women 
veiled or in a private section of the house so 
that they will not be seen by men from outside 
the family which is common amongst Muslims and 
also some high-caste Hindus. 
RABI. 	The spring harvest. The crops are sown in about 
3 20. 
November and are gathered in the first three 
or four months of the ensuing year. 
RAIYAT. 	Lit. "those who have to be protected; the herd". 
Hence applied to tenants and came to mean a 
cultivator or a peasant. 
RAIYATWARI. 	A land revenue settlement made directly with the 
raiyats;q.v.; so that there are no landlords and 
the cultivators are severally but not jointly 
responsible for the payment of the revenue. 
RAJA. 
	
	A king or prince. Sometimes assumed. by zeminaArs 
as a title. 
RAJPUT. 	Lit. "son of a king (raja)". Name of races in 
northern and western India who claim descent from 
the Sun Kings. 
RAMAYANA. 	An epic poem telling of the fortunes of the god 
Rama and his consort Sita. 
RANGREZ. 	Dyer. (Caste name). 
ROTI. The flat wheat cakes eaten as bread in India. 
RUPEE. 	 More correctly RUPIYA.: Silver coin. In 1958 
c• Rs•lO =.CAl• 
RYCT. 	 Corrupt form of raiyat,q.v.. 
RYONARI. 	See RAIYATWARI. 
SABHA. An assembly or organisation. 
SADR. 	Chief, supreme. 
SAHAYAK SARPANCH. The deputy of the sarpanch,q.v.. 
SAHIB. 	 Form of address: "master", "lord". 
SAKKA. 	 Muslim water carrier. ("Caste" name). 
SANAD. 	 A document conveying a grant of the revenue rights 
in a specified area to a person. 
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SANAYASI. 	Religious ascetic, mendicant. (Caste name). 
SANGH. 	Society, party. Eg. Jan Sangh, lit. "People's 
Party", a Hindu communal political party. 
SARYANCH. 	President of the nyaya panchayat, q.v.. 
SAYAR. 	Landlord's income from sources other than rent, 
eg. fisheries, tolls, timber. "Feudal dues". 
SEER. 	Measure of weight; about 2 lbs. 
SEPOY. 	Soldier. 
SERI. Jagirdar's,q.v. own lands in Hyderabad. Cf. SIR. 
SHAJRA. 	Detailed field map of village. 
SH1KMI. 	Sub-tenant. 
SRI. Honorific title. Implies fortune, wealth. 
SINGHARA. 	Water chestnuts. 
SIR. 	The personal farm of a landlord, cultivated by 
• 	 hired labour, or by tenants at will. No tenant 
rights accrued in sir and the lands were assessed 
at a privileged rate. 
SIRDAR. 	Tenure-holder with limited proprietary rights under 
Act I of 1951. 
SITARAMA 	A form of address made by joining the names of 
Sita and Rama; see RAMAYANA. High-caste villagers 
also address each other with "RamRam". 
SONI. 	See SUNAR. 
SUBA. A province of the Mughel empire; eg. Avadh, Bengal. 
SUDRA. 	More correctly CUDRA. The fourth great Hindu caste 
traditionally labourers and artisans. 
SUNAR. 	Goldsmith. (Caste name). 
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SWARAJ. 	Lit. "self rule". The name given to the goal of 
national independence by the Indian National 
Congress. 
TAOCAVI. 	Advances of money from the government to the 
cultivators for agricultural purposes. 
TABSIL. 	Revenue subdivision of a district; several' 
parganas, 
TAHSILDAR. 	Officer in charge of a tahsil,q.v. 
TALUQA. 	Lit. "dependency". An area of land held. by the 
immediate holder in subordination to a puperior 
title, eg. the State or a landlord. In nmmy 
ways comparable to a jagir,q.v.. 
TALUQDAR. 	Holder of a taluqa,q.v.. The term had. varying 
implications during the British period depmaing 
on the superior right. Thus in Bengal and some 
parts of the Agra Province the term denoted an 
inferior landlord; ie. one holding from another 
landlord or zamindar,q.v.. In Avadh, however, 
the taluqdar held from the State and constituted 
the strongest tenure grade. 
TALUKDAR. 	See TALUQDAR. 
TELL Oil presser. (Caste name). 
THAKUR. 	A Rajput s q.v. Used as a title for one in 
authority and deserving respect. 
THANA. 	Police station. 
THERA. A lease of the revenue of an estate; ie. a 
contract by which a person engages to my afaxed 
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amount of revenue on being allowed to collect 
the revenue payable to the proprietor. 
THEKADAR. 	The holder of a theka,q.v.. Hence, a lessee of 
revenue. 
TOMBALL. 	A Mainpuri tobacco dealer. (Caste name). 
UTTAR. Northern. 
VAISH. 	More correctly VAISYA. The third Hindu caste, 
traditionally concerned with agriculture, trade 
and cattle but now chiefly traders kind businessmen. 
VAKIL. 	Attorney. 
VIDHAN. Governing, ordering. Hence, the legislatures 
are V. Sabha and V. Parishad. See SAHHCPARISHAD. 
ZAMINDAR. 	Lit. "land holder". efore the British period 
denoted a landholder with a title antecedent to 
the MUghal rule. The British interpreted the 
term as landlord. 
ZAMINDARI. 	Pertaining to zamindars,q.v.. Bence a zamindari 
was the estate of a zamindar and. a zamindari 
settlement was a settlement of the land. revenue 
made with the zamindars as the settlement-holders, 
ie. those liable for the land revenue. 
ZILLADAR. 	A district-level revenue officer, although the 
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The entries in the bibliography are arranged alphabetically 
by the name of the author or, if the author is unknown, by the 
title or, in the case of official documents, by the name of the 
area to which they refer; in the following sections: 
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5. Miscellaneous Official Reports. 
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7. Published Documents and Collections of Documents. 
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A. PRIMARY SOURCES. 
1. ACTS AND COMMENTARIES ON ACTS. 
Agarwala;B.P. and. V.D. (ed.) The United Provinces Local Acts with 
Bengal Regulations and important rules and annotations. 2 vols. 
3rd. Allahabad, Ram Narain La]., 1941. 
Agarwala, M.L. A commentary an the Agra Tenancy Act (III of 1926). 
13th. Allahabad, Ram Narain La]., 1935. 
Agarwala, M.L. A commentary on the Oudh Rent Act (CLII of 1886). 
2nd. Allahabad, Ram Narain La/, 1927. 
Bilgrami, A.A. An analytical and exhaustive commentary on the U.P. 
Tenancy Act (XVII of 1939). 
3rd. Allahabad, Ram Narain La]., 1950. 
Husain, S.M. Commentaries on the U.P. Zamindari Abolition and Land 
Reforms Act; 1950. 
Lucknow, Eastern Book Co., 1955. 
Outline of the changes introduced by the Agra Tenancy Act,III of 1926. 
Allahabad, Superintendent, Government Press, U.P., 1926. 
Radha Charan (ed), U. P. Revenue Companion. 
Allahabad, Ram Narain La]., 1922. 
Singh, G.D. An analytical study of the U.P. Zamindari Abolition 
and Land Reforms Act, 1950. 
2nd. Lucknow, Eastern Book Co., 1955. 
United Provinces. Tenancy Act, 1959 (XVII of 1959) with amending 
Acts: V of 1943; III of 1946; X of 1947; XLI of 1948. 
Allahabad, Superintendent, Printing and Stationery„U.P.,(1948). 
Uttar Pradesh. Zamindari Abolition and Land. Reforms Act, 1950 
(I of 1951) as amended by XVI of 1955; XX of 19544 VII of 1955; 
XVIII of 1956; V of 1957 and Ordinance II of 1957. 
Lucknow, Superintendent of Printing and Stationery,U.P.,July 1957. 
2. ADMINISTRATIVE REPORTS. 
United Provinces of Agra and Oudh. Report by the Board of Revenue 
on the revenue administration for the year ending 30 September 1920, 
1921, 1922. 
Allahabad, Syperintendent, Government Press, U.P. 
United Provinces of Agra and Oudh. Government resolution on the 
revenue administration for the year ending 30 September 1923, 1924, 
1925, 1926, 1927, 1928, 1929, 1930, 1951, 1932, 1933, 1934. 
Allahabad, Superintendent, Government Press, U.P.. 
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United Provinces of Agra and Oudh. Rpport on the revenue 
administration for the revenue year ending 30 September 1955, 1956, 
1957, 1958, 1959, 1940. 
Allahabad, Superintendent Government Press, U.P. 
United Provinces. Report on the revenue administration for the 
year ended 50 September 1941, 1942, 1945, 1944, 1945, 1946, 1947. 
Allahabad, Superintendent, Printing and Stationery, U.P. 
United Provinces. Report on the general administration,1949. 
Lucknow, Superintendent, Printing and-Stationery, U.P.; 1951. 
Uttar Pradesh. Report on the revenue administration for the year 
ending 50 September 1948, 1949, 1950, 1952, 1955. 
Allahabad, Superintendent, Printing and Stationery, U.P. 
Uttar Pradesh. Report on the general administration, 1951. 
Lucknow, Superintendent; Printing and Stationery, U.P., 1952. 
5. PROCEEDINGS. 
North-Western Provinces. Proceedings of the Sadr Board of 
mss. Allahabad, Government Central Records Office, U.P. 
United Provinces. Proceedings of the Legislative Council. 
report. vol. III: 25 July 1921 to 9 August 1921. 
Allahabad; Superintendent, Government Press, U.P., 1922. 
United Provinces. Proceedings of the Legislative Council. 
report. vol. IV: 24 October 1921 to 17 November 1921. 
Allahabad, Superintendent, Government Press, U.P., 1922. 
United Provinces. Proceedings of the Legislative Council. 
report. vol. XXIX: 24 March 1926 to 8 April 1926. 
Allahabad, Superintendent, Government Press, U.P., 1926. 
United Provinces. Proceedings of the Legislative Council. 
report. vol. XXX: 25 June 1926 to 31 July 1926. 






4. SETTLEMENT REPORTS. 
Ahmad Ali, S. Final settlement report of Aligarh District. 
Allahabad, Superintendent, Government Press, M.P., 1942. 
Browne, W.F.G. Final settlement report of the Bijnor District. 
Allahabad, Superintendent, Printing and Stationery, 1939. 
Cooke, C.H. Final settlement report of the Meerut Districj;. 
Allahabad, Superintendent, Printing and Stationery, U.P., 1940. 
Fordham, J.A. Final settlement report of the District Sultanpur. 
Allahabad, Superintendent, Printing and Stationery, U.P.41940. 
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Haig, C.A. Final settlement report of the Shahjahanpur District. 
Allahabad, Superintendent, Printing and Stationery, U.P., 1943. 
Hasan, S.A. Final report of the settlement and record operations 
in District Sitapur. 
AllahabdC"Superintendent, Printing and Stationery, 1959, 
Hasan, Z. Final settlement report of District Maimpuri. 
Allahabad, Superintendent, Printing and Stationery,U.P., 1944. 
Lane, H.T. Final settlement report of Jhansi District. 
Allahabad, Superintendent, Printing and Stationery, U.P., 1947. 
Lewys -Lloyd, I.W. Final settlement report on District Bareilly. 
Allahabad, Superintendent, Printing and Stationery, U.P., 1942. 
Maheshwari, H.S.K. Final settlement report of the Unao District, 
United Provinces, 1926-1929. 
Allaha.bad, Superintendent, Government Press, U.P.,1931. 
Mudie, R.F. Final report on the settlement and record operations. 
in District Agra. 
Allahabad, Superintendent, Government Press, U.P., 1930. 
Owen. L. Final settlement report of the Bare Banki District (Oudh) 
1930. 
Allahabad, Superintendent, Government Press, U.P., 1931. 
Prasad, B. Final report of the settlement operations in the 
tahraich District. 
Allahabad, Superintendent, Printing and Stationery, U.P., 1959. 
Sharma, B. Final report on the settlement of land revenue in the 
District Hardoi (Oudh). 
Allahabad, Superintendent, Government Press, U.P.,1932. 
Sharma, B. Final report on the settlement of land revenue in the 
Lucknow district, Oudh, 1926--28. 
Allahabad, Superintendent, Government Press, U.P.,1950. 
Siddiqui, M.M. Final settlement report of Etah District. 
Allahabad, Superintendent; Printing and Stationery, U.P.,1944. 
Singh, B.B. Final settlement report of the Partabgarh District, 
U.P., 1930. 
Allahabad, Superintendent, Government Press, U.P., 1930. 
Singh, J.K. Final settlement report of Gonda District. 
Allahabad, Superintendent, Printing and Stationery,U.P.,1944. 
Turner, A.C. Final report on the third regular settlement of the 
Rae Bareli District, Oudh'; 1929. 
Allahabad, Superintendent, Government Press, U.P.,1929. 
328. 
Waugh, A.A. Final settlement report of the Budatui District, 
U.P., 1929. 
Allahabad, Superintendent, Government Press, U.P., 1930. 
5. MISCELLANEOUS OFFICIAL REPORTS. 
Census of India,. 	Vol. II, Uttar Pradesh, Part I-A, Report, 
by Rajeshwari 14-asad. 
Allahabad, Superintendent, Tinting  and Stationery, 1955. 
India Office. Statement exhibiting the moral and material progress 
and condition of India during the year 1924-5, prepared by L.F. 
Rusbbrook Williams. 
London, H.M.S.O., 1925. 
India Office. Statement exhibiting the moral and material progress 
and condition of India during the year 1929-50. 
London, H.M.S.O., 1931. 
The United Provinces Government at work. July 1957-January 1958. 
(Allahabad), Department of Public Information, U.P.,(1958). 
United Provinces. Legislative Council. Report of the Select 
Committee on the Agra Tenancy Bill. 
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